

ZURAB ZHVANIA
THE PRIVILEGE OF OUR GENERATION

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Preface to English Edition

Zurab Zhvania's book "The Privilege of Our Generation" was first published in Georgian in December 2005; later it went through two Georgian editions. You are currently presented with the English language translation of the original Georgian version with minor editorial amendments. Based on the educational purpose of this publication (the book has been extensively used as a training material for students of Zurab Zhvania Georgian Institute of Public Affairs and other institutions), the Georgian edition contained several additional annexes – biographical information of the persons referred to during the lectures and historical documents well known to English reader, like "Magna Carta" or "Bill of Rights" – that have been removed from the English edition.

We believe that the present publication will be of special interest for scholars, politicians and students interested in the newest history of Georgia and transitional societies, in general, as well as for those readers who want to learn about Zurab Zhvania as a politician and thinker.

We would like to express our sincere gratitude and appreciation to the Green Party in the European Parliament and, specifically, to European Parliament members Mrs. Marie Anne Isler Béguin (Greens, France), Chairwoman of the European Parliament Delegation to EU-Armenia, EU-Azerbaijan and EU-Georgian Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, Mr. Joost Lagendijk (Greens, Netherlands), Chairman of the Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, Mr. Paolo Bergamaschi, Political Advisor on Foreign Affairs to the Greens/EFA and Ms. Tamar Gugulashvili for supporting the idea of this publication and granting their most valuable assistance to the release of the present book.

Editorial group of the English edition

Nino Zhvania

Giorgi Margvelashvili

Preface to English Edition

This book is a course of lectures delivered by Zurab Zhvania in 2002-2003 to master program students of the schools of Public Administration and Journalism at the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs.

It must be noted at the outset that the author's intention was to create a work that would consolidate his political experience and general, theoretical approaches to democracy and politics, as well as the analysis of problems facing contemporary Georgia. Zurab Zhvania had planned to do this in the 1990s. The first chapter of this book, the Preamble, is Zurab Zhvania's first attempt at this kind of text; something he has started to work on with his friends at the end of the nineties.

Later, in 2002-2003, he analyzed the transcripts of the delivered lectures for the same purpose. However, due to the author's untimely death, the book he had intended to write is imperfect and incomplete in many respects. We are actually publishing the raw material Zurab Zhvania was going to revise later. It is therefore important to explain in the introductory section several points that will facilitate the comprehension of the given text.

Firstly, we have preserved the style of the decoded transcript as much as possible. This reflects the learning process in class and presents Zurab Zhvania in the less familiar role of lecturer. Consequently, we have preserved the format of the lectures – students' questions and Zurab Zhvania's answers. Student's questions are presented in the bold type.

Secondly, we have organized the material and filled in the gaps from notes students had made during the two year courses.

Thirdly, several very important speeches made by Zurab Zhvania have been annexed to the book. We hope that they will complete the unfinished work to a certain extent. Along with these speeches, the annexes also contain historical documents which expand the context of the lectures and enable the interested reader to study in the issue on a deeper level. The annexes also include biographical information on the persons referred to during the lectures. This information has been provided by Mr. Jumber Titmeria.

Fourthly, comments provide the reader with additional information on the context of lectures and the referred material.

Finally, titles have been given to the lectures by the editor and are of an arbitrary character.

The material used in this book comprises audio records, notes made by students and the shorthand notes of Zurab Zhvania's speeches given in the annex. It was impossible to obtain and restore completed material in several cases.

Furthermore, we would like to thank the Urban Institute for supporting the project and the 2002 and 2003 graduates of the School of Public Administration of the Georgian Institute of Public affairs for decoding the audio records. We would also like to thank Shukia Apridonidze, Eka Badridze, Irakli Chkonia, Giorgi Giorganashvili, Khatuna Gogorishvili, Elene Gotsadze, Merab Gotsiridze, Mamuka Didmanidze, Nino Ebralidze, Maka Ioseliani, Lika Kakabadze, Dato Kakulia, Nino Kaldani, Daniel Kunin, Eter Maisashvili, Gia Makharashvili, Irakli Melkadze, Lizi Sopromadze, Eter Svianadze, Kakha Skhulukhia, Gigi Umekashvili, and Nana Shengelia for their contribution to this publication.

Giorgi Margvelashvili

Ilia Magalashvili

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*Preamble*¹

THE PRIVILEGE OF OUR GENERATION

Nobody anywhere can stand beyond one's own history, and this is especially true for Georgians. By history, we first of all mean the entire system of values and traditions that originate from historical events that have taken place in a society, rather than the historical events themselves.

Why did many generations of our predecessors fight for independence, the preservation of individuality and the right to determine one's future? Because the history of Georgia, its state tradition and unique culture are an important, indispensable part of every Georgian's *self*. It is inconceivable for a Georgian person to live a real life beyond all this. Consequently, a Georgian can experience a feeling of dignity only in one's own state, where they are able to determine its arrangement, elect a government and be responsible for the state's future.

Georgians defended this right beginning with the Roman Empire and ending with the Soviet Empire. The names of thousands of heroes and martyrs relate to a struggle that lasted twenty five centuries. It was mainly their deliberate choice, a choice made in favor of an independent Georgia. Surprisingly, the course was not pursued by individuals but by the entire nation. Our generation is standing just at the end of this path. We have stepped over the threshold to where a new epoch begins.

Each generation must bear its burden. It must at the very least manage to pass on to the next generation something crucially valuable, just as its predecessors had. Our generation has a very difficult, but at the same time, jubilant mission. It has to accomplish the aims which previous generations suffered, fought, created and prayed for. Our historical privilege is to establish a viable, strong, Georgian democracy to restore the Georgian state. We should remember that it is not our achievement. It is the fulfillment of those who were before us and we should strongly acknowledge the responsibility that we affirm in relation to them. We should also remember that we are accountable to future generations, since we have to explain how we have used this historic chance.

¹ "Preamble" (1997) is a chapter from the book Zurab Zhvania intended to write.

Today we are all absorbed by everyday problems and passions. Many of our citizens face the problem of physical survival. Nostalgia for the false wellbeing of the past which was given to all of us in a limited way by a hand that was not very generous, is still alive. The temptation to reduce the present pain and turn back is still strong. In a couple of years, though, no one will remember this pain. Our memory and history will have only one point to evaluate – the decision that we took today and the loyalty to that decision.

For just this reason we are saying once again: There is no higher value for our generation than the independent Georgian state. This is our chance to build a society based on the ideas of freedom and dignity.

Lecture I

INTRODUCTION

How are you doing today?

Giving lectures is a totally new experience for me. To be more precise, I've given lectures many times at different universities², but when Giorgi proposed to deliver this kind of discourse, the idea attracted me very much, because it was the first time in the last ten years of my political activity that I've had the opportunity to summarize ideas that had been forming between my friends and I for a long time; within the circle that is called the Georgian political class.

So I want to suggest from the very beginning that you also take part in the formulation of what will finally develop into a course of lectures, the purpose of which is to describe and record those objectives, those problems, those challenges that are facing contemporary Georgian politics.

What do you think, in general, is the main task of modern Georgian politics today? Apart from being an endless struggle of individual politicians, leaders and groups for posts, influence and so on, if we look beyond that, the main uniting task is to create a successful state. I think that for you, for students of these two courses³, who are going to continue their activity in posts of the civil service, and like professional journalists, are expected to provide society with your interpretation and your ideas, it is especially important to consider all those difficulties, the entire package of problems that are facing today's Georgian politics. You all probably remember the Soviet period. I think, here we have the students of that generation.

- **(A comment from the audience in Russian, which cannot be heard clearly)**

² Zurab Zhvania, as a politician, gave lectures at Columbia University, Georgetown University, John Hopkins University, Stanford University, МГИМО, as well as at the universities in Germany, Ukraine, UK and Israel.

³ Master program students of the schools of Public Administration and Journalism that are attending Zhvania's lectures.

- Shall I continue in Russian? Я жалею, что у нас сейчас такая политика...What shall we do? Is it better to do it in Georgian? ... Я продолжу по грузински, а потом⁴...

I want to get back to this topic. If you remember, in the Soviet period – I do not mean the year eighty-nine, rather, I mean the year eighty-two or eighty-five, when it was very difficult to imagine that Georgia would someday become an independent country; you might have likely thought, “What will happen if we get rid of this communist constraint and have the opportunity to create our own state?” I remember very well that I felt at that time. Whenever I talked with my friends, we always deeply believed that as soon as communism ends, as soon as we are separated from Moscow, Georgia will automatically become a country like Switzerland or Belgium.

It was an illusion of my generation and of many people in your generation as well ... an illusion that cost us a lot. So, the purpose of my lectures and our conversations is to imagine, in concrete terms, how complex the system called the state is; that the state is not just putting up your national flag on the top of your main buildings, for example; nor is it the membership of different international organizations. The state is the most complex system which was created to ensure the performance of a number of functions, and it is successful only in the cases when it ensures this; if it ensures the security of a citizen or a group of citizens so that they feel they are safe and protected; if it ensures that each individual sees the possibility of realizing one’s own potential. This extremely complex system of state ensures their well-being, ensures economic success and ensures that this happens on the condition of competition with other states and nations. It ensures the establishment of oneself, and stemming from this, of its citizens in the context of international relations within the most complex developments that take place on this planet. I think we will try, together with you, to analyze what those very bad and fatal mistakes Georgian politicians made ten or twelve years ago were, and those that we often make today. This is to understand how high the price of such illusions were...we oversimplified too much and under-considered the

⁴ The question seems to come from Azeri and Armenian students attending Zhvania’s lectures.

objectives that were facing us when we had that chance to build an independent state.

One thing is that it is the privilege, objective and burden of our generation to build an independent state. Another thing is that this state – there is probably a consensus regarding this, at least no one questions it publicly – has to be a successful democracy. I don't know whether you have ever thought about what the essence of democracy is. Is it democracy when you can release as many newspapers as possible, without state's intervention in its creation or functioning, or when people can organize meetings and actions without restrictions, etc? Is this enough for democracy?

In post-Soviet society – not only in Georgia – a very simplistic approach to democracy nominates, as if democracy were only individual groups', people's and individual's right to say and do whatever they want.

- **It's crazy ...**

Anyway ... In reality, democracy is the most complex system of very strictly formulated principles, mechanisms and institutions, without which, without the functioning and existence of which, talking about democracy would just be profanation. What are these principles? We will talk about them in detail during our future conversations, but I want to suggest that you seriously think about some of them right now.

One of the main factors, which laid the foundation for democratic tradition on this planet, is the idea of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism does not mean writing a constitution and then implementing it. It is a principle which originated from somewhere in the sixteenth, seventeenth centuries in Europe and implies that the law stands above any men, even when this man is a monarch with unlimited power. From the point of England, even before the Cromwell revolution, when they agreed on the existence of articulated, written and agreed rules in society, which even the king had no right to violate, constitutionalism materialized not as an idea, but as a practice. Since then it has been developing all the time and today it is formulated as a concept I am sure all of you have heard about. It is called the American principle with the slogan

Rule of Law and not of Men. It has become a more complex concept today and means much more than just supremacy of the law. Rules that penetrate all spheres indicate who can move up to which point, who has what rights, who does not have what rights, and so on.

The second very important principle of any democracy is the participation of people in the creation of representative institutions. There was direct democracy in the ancient Greece and Roman poleis, when all the citizens who had the right to be decision makers gathered and made the most critical decisions. The principle of representativeness was clearly established when larger republics started to form again on the continents of America and Europe – we are speaking of the United States, first of all. Since it is impossible for all the people to gather to make a decision, I have to at least be represented there, at least my interests and my opinions have to be taken into consideration. And the institution of representativeness was created for this purpose. The most refined form of representativeness, so to say, the crown of this system is parliamentarism. Parliamentarism is not only the parliament. It is an enormous tradition, rule or custom which exists in any traditional parliamentary country, and we will talk about the parliamentary system separately.

Equally important is the third principle, which I am sure all of you have heard about... it is called the separation of functions. The author of the concept of the separation of functions was Montesquieu. Among modern political thinkers he most clearly articulated the statement that executive, legislative and judicial power have to exist separately so that power is not concentrated in the hands of one organization, one person or one group; so that everyone controls each other on a permanent basis and power is not usurped. It is a society arranged in such a way that there is no one, single person on whom it depends on whether the country will be successful or not, or whether the president will turn out to be good or bad. A system is viable only if it contains a guarantee that no one will be able to usurp power by any means. The conception of the separation of functions was based on just this idea. Secondly, for all the state mechanisms to operate successfully, they must all balance each other; each of them has to check and relate to each other in such a way that they help each other work better. This is what the separation of functions is for. The concept of the separation of functions first appeared in European

political philosophy somewhere in the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth century, Montesquieu formulated it in a way which corresponds to our present understanding. But the modern understanding of the separation of functions is much more complex than just a simple separation of the network of legislative, executive and judicial power. Today, this system is called *check and balance* in English, the system of balance. I have always found it difficult to translate it into Georgian.

If we talk about Georgian constitutional system today, we will find that there are actually more branches of power than these three. For example, the Chamber of Control is a separate branch of power which is related to both legislative and executive power in a special way. Let us take election administrations as an example. Normally, it has to be a separate branch of power, secured from everyone, the only mission of which is to ensure free, independent elections... Today, the mechanisms of how to check the defense and law enforcement agencies so that no one ever has a desire or ambition to use tanks and planes at their disposal and so that no one steps over the line set by constitution, are very well defined. In our environment, the modern system of division and separation of power is much more complex and refined, has many more levels than that simple and truly genial system which was created by Montesquieu in those times. Montesquieu was the basis of this, but it is much more complex today. This is another very important principle without which democracy would not exist.

When we think about democracy and want to imagine the modern concept of democracy, we are bound to realize that the topic of national minorities has a very special place because in the end, democracy is a means which ensures that society makes decisions by the majority vote. But to protect this majority from any possible instability – chaos – so that it is not beset by groups of a dissatisfied population, special mechanisms have been formed, mainly in the last two centuries, that ensure that the minority is never oppressed by the majority. This theme becomes especially delicate when we talk about ethnic minority, because the topic of ethnicity has always been very painful, delicate and sensitive. It touches chords that are the most sensitive and important to every man's heart. This is one of the most critical topics, especially for such a country like Georgia. The topic is not merely related to democracy of

society, despite being one of its most significant indicators. It is also related to the security of society, its stability, so that no bombs within society will drop and explode any moment. You have to understand that if among about thirty people you have three people who are always dissatisfied with something, or strongly experience discomfort and feel insulted for some reason, those three people will continually wait for the moment when either you fall asleep or are busy with something else, to take revenge and restore their dignity. This is what the ethnic minority issue is. If you want to live in a secure and stable society that does not contain a permanent threat of destabilization, you should accordingly make religious and ethnic minorities feel that their interests, dignity and rights are adequately respected and you should accordingly try to make them feel comfortable in a society where a majority different than them lives.

It is impossible to imagine a modern democracy without mentioning the very special role of civic institutions and first of all, the role that mass media plays. This is because we are talking about checks and balances, when we are talking about the prevention of the usurpation of power, so that no one manages to do so, and that people should rule themselves – this crucial role is played not only by separated and somewhat competing government institutions, but also by citizens who are organized in the form called “civil society.”

When talking to you now, I would like to discuss the two most fascinating and important components of civil society. One of them is the mass media. The word *Mass Media*, implies mediation between society and decision makers; or these are the people who are independent from me, as a politician, and from their own perspective and then present them to the public. This is Mass Media’s most important function.

The third pillar of the civic sector or the third sector, as they often call it, is non-governmental organizations. Non-governmental organizations are a specific form of uniting citizens’ interests with their efforts. For example, when people say that they want to solve their neighborhood problems themselves, engineers, doctors, teachers and others who live there say they will give a certain amount of time to the improvement of their environment and

conditions and organize themselves. The non-governmental sector plays a huge role in all democratic systems, in both the European and American ones. In the last years they started to talk about procurement⁵. This term is used in America and Europe. This is when state functions that had only been previously carried out by bureaucracy are delegated to non-government organizations. Such organizations become implementers of state orders and this is also an important component without which, it is difficult to imagine modern democracy. Another important aspect of the interrelationship between civil society and state authorities is civic control over defense and law enforcement agencies – departments where physical force already exists. Every democracy is successful when the component of force, which every state needs, be it police, army or special services, is restricted by the mechanisms of civil control. This means that if some general wakes up in the morning and for some reason goes out of his mind, he will not be able to abuse his power even though hundreds or thousands of people fully obey him.

After talking so much about democracy we might mention this last topic in our list. It is one of the first topics in its importance. This is the free market economy – the economic foundations of democracy. We will never learn anything about democracy unless we realize from the very beginning that it is all based on very specific rules of economic life and foremost is the primary principle, called “free market relations.” If the economy is not free, if one of the most fundamental rights – the right to property – is not ensured for each person and citizen, then democracy simply cannot establish itself, because it is the keystone of it. So when we think about the tasks facing our society and our country, we have to put special emphasis on this.

Democracy, of rule of the people, exists only where people – every individual – is guaranteed something most important... that they can be an owner, achieve economic success under the conditions of competition, and enhance one’s wealth. This is one of Smith’s most genial formulas, which he introduced in the eighteenth century, and it will always be the determining concept for everyone. The state becomes stronger when people care for their well-being. You should not try to form a human being into something that totally contradicts human instincts, which is what the communists were trying

⁵ The appropriate word in the recorded text might be *outstanding* instead of *procurement*

to do. On the contrary; you should try to develop those human instincts that are inherent in everyone, so that the individual achieves personal success. But this has to be channeled in a way that serves social wellbeing, so that each of you endeavors to become strong, successful, rich and benefit not only your individual selves but also the social wholeness which you represent. This is what the modern market economy is based on and without it the existence of democracy would be totally rejected; without it every democracy would be a profanation, since democracy is an accord of free people. The freedom of carrying out entrepreneurial activity and most importantly, being a proprietor, is one of the determinants of freedom of the individual and society. Free market relations also imply that free competition has to be ensured in every sphere of economic activity. In different states at different times, depending on whether leftist ideas or monetary and liberal economic ideas were more influential, the state intervened in the economic process to a varying extent. Taxes can be high or low. There exists, for example, the Swedish model, American model, German model, and so forth. This does not matter. Anyway, whatever the taxation system, pensions system or insurance system is, the main, general principle is that the existence of conditions for free competition and definite rules, are the same for everyone.

I want you to realize that when we are talking about the formation of the state, when we are talking about the development of a fully-functioning and effective democracy in Georgia, we are not talking about slogans, but about very complex mechanisms. Without putting them into motion, they will merely be words that will never achieve any results for our citizens.

We have been through a ten or twelve year period of Georgia's independence, the so-called transformation period. Unlike many other people, we can determine based on our own experience what it means to leave a totalitarian society and develop into a state which has not been formed yet; although imperfect is still a democratic society.

Compared to any democracy, the totalitarian state is arranged in an absolutely reversed way. Why in a reversed way? Because the main thing here is the supreme, messianic idea, like the idea "Let us establish Communism around the whole world", or "Let us do so that the Aryan race rules all the

other races”, or ... I don't know ... any idea like this. But in such a case a citizen is regarded as a servant of that super idea whose interests, whose life, whose property are nothing compared to it. In a totalitarian society, and I want you to realize and feel it very deeply, an individual and a citizen are totally insignificant, have no value, whereas democracy is an arrangement; it is a way of arranging society where everything is geared to an individual citizen. The citizen pays taxes and that is why we have the popular term – tax payer. And what does tax payer mean? It means that I, as an ordinary citizen, send some part gained from my work to the treasury, and by doing so I hire those people who compose my government. So they are hired by me, they are my representatives. On the other hand, each citizen is a constituent, and they elect and send their representative to any entity, be it the Local Council or the Supreme Court, or any other elected body, so their representative defends their interests there. So the relationship between the citizen and the government is exactly the opposite to what he have in a totalitarian system. Any government is hired by me and is therefore my elected representative.

This is the foundation on which enormous differences are based between the psychology of people and societies living in a democracy and the psychology of people and societies living in the totalitarian regime. When talking about our problems, I want to discuss them separately. We are facing many problems only because changing this kind of psychology takes much more effort than we actually invest.

What I am relating to you is a short list of those main principles that democracy cannot exist without ... Under the universal principles of democracy, we can pool all we have talked about and many other things under a common concept; for example, the existence of self-governance, and in many cases the existence of federalism, also the mechanisms and institutions of civic control that are necessary for any democracy wherever it is, whether in Japan or Ireland. But, I also want you to realize from the very beginning that every democracy is totally unique. These universal principles have no value if they are not placed in a concrete national context and not only fit, but are also

- **adjusted**

... adjusted to it. It must actually grow out of those traditions, that heritage, which are created in the course of the entire history of every nation, of every people.

For this reason, during our conversations, I want to talk, separately, about my understanding of the basis of Georgian political tradition. What is it, something peculiar that's necessary for Georgian society? Democracy, which is often misunderstood by our society, is not just a commodity; for example, chewing gum imported from somewhere that you put on the table and it serves its function. It has to be necessarily national or be based on national traditions and organically fit into this context of the national political tradition. Let us take Great Britain as an example, where the monarch opens parliamentary sessions every year, where they do not even have a written constitution and where we have one of the first and oldest democracies on earth. Once while in London, I told my friend, the chairman of a committee in the English Parliament, "If you look as an outsider, superficially, at the English system, and judge it by what is written on paper, you'll think that there's not even a separation of functions." This is because the Supreme Court or the House of Lord is subordinated to the Queen and the House of Lords is like a court and is also the legislative power. The Queen, at the same time, is a monarch, is the Commander in Chief, and so and so on ... You might think that it is an awfully despotic country. All this is preserved there; the remains of an old tradition when the English Parliament was gradually depriving its monarch of all the functions. Some symbols still remain, but they do not function, actually, because it has never caused any threat. It is different in France, where the President of France has no right to step over the entrance threshold to Parliament. The President of the French State would always show me, with pride, that the President can walk up to the end of the staircase, but he is not allowed to make a single step beyond that. This is the peculiarity that originates from the historical experience of France, when Napoleon, in whose hands the executive and military power was concentrated, proclaimed himself an absolute monarch and he did it with the agreement of the Convent, the representative body, which acted under his pressure. And this little attribute still exists in France. I'm telling you this to show how surprisingly multifaceted democracy can be and how different its faces are.

But at the same time, there are common, necessary, universal principles which I was talking with you about some time ago.

By the way, I want to tell you this too ... and we'll probably be talking about this: I am sure that Georgian experience, the Georgian political experience, determines the fact that this society, Georgian society, can be successful only as a democracy. This stems from individualism, which is one of the foundations of Georgian mentality. This stems from the experience that when Georgia had the opportunity to self-actualize and rule oneself, and release itself from external pressure, it always made decisions that were European by nature and created a system that was European by orientation. And as in the case of the first republic, it was much more progressive experience than in most states of that period.

- **(Comment from the audience ... Cannot be heard)⁶**

You see ... I am very glad that I have so many like-minded people here. By the way, when I said "I am Georgian and therefore I am European"⁷, this reflected my belief that this formula best demonstrated our entire political experience.

I am telling you this because there are states with totally different social cultures, totally different historical experiences. Many western analysts sometimes do not understand this. I don't want to name them now, because I am an acting politician and have to be more delicate sometimes. I hope, you'll forgive me this. There are societies where the accomplishment of these democratic principles will always be related to some imported good, imported from the outside, rather than internal traditions. But Georgian society will never be stable, will never be settled and Georgians will never see themselves self-actualized and happy unless they live in an independent state that builds democracy.

When talking about these themes I'll try to familiarize you with my understanding of some of the main ideas, main concepts that determined the formation of the modern international system, modern experience. Another very

⁶ The content should refer to the declaration made by Zhvania in 1999 at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe "I am Georgian and therefore I am European".

⁷ Zhvania's speech made on January 27, 1999 at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. See Annex 1.

important point all of you have to understand is: The relationships that we currently have in the U.S. or Belgium or any other successful democracy, any country with a successful democratic experience, were not formed because a philanthropist, a kind man, who, while at the top of the hierarchy of power, introduced some customs and rules into social and state relations. All that was an achievement, an achievement made by societies through the most difficult struggle. All this constitutionalism, separation of functions, representativeness and different forms of self-governance was the result of a permanent social struggle which had an evolutionary development. What we'll be talking about at our lectures was given to us by the best thinkers, the best representatives of mankind, something that societies have finally managed to accomplish. Therefore, it is not my purpose to provide you with a complete picture, a system of what the history of political philosophy is. We will discuss instead the ideas of several of the most important figures that changed relationships in a principled way and as a result, changed the world. At the same time, I don't want our conversation to be only past oriented. I want to devote time to those challenges that every modern society, every country faces today. I'm determined to draw your attention to the fact that the modern world differs significantly from what it was before. Those international relations that occurred after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and after the completion of the cold war, for example, those relations that are now called globalization, have put every society, every nation into an absolutely new position, different from what it had ever been, throughout the entire history of mankind. You might be surprised, but in this respect there were more similarities between the nations of Tutankhamun and Brezhnev than between the modern world and the world we lived in only twenty years ago. Without understanding and realizing this, without being aware of the fact that you are bound to be involved in a totally new rhythm of global developments – and you have no possibility to isolate yourself from them, since isolation means total underdevelopment and failure, you will have no idea in what kind of world and environment you will have to live even here, in Tbilisi.

Therefore, one of the topics of our conversations will be globalization.

The purpose of this introductory lecture was to just give you the range of topics for our future discussions, but the main topics we'll be talking about are arbitrarily broken down into three parts.

The first part will be devoted to the formation and development of the concept of modern states and will cover issues like: what the nation state is, how interstate relationships develop in the modern world, what principle was established after Cardinal Richelieu, the principle that is called the principle of the national interest or *Raison D'état*, how these relationships changed after Woodrow Wilson offered the world totally new principles for international relations, the principles based on American idealism. On the other hand, we will discuss the evolution of those democratic ideas and conceptions that led us to the modern understanding of democracy. This will be one part of our course.

Part two is dedicated to the analysis of the Georgian political heritage, its nature. I want to look at it again, together with you, to see what our country is, the country we have to take care of, the country we live in; what Georgia is and if we know our homeland well enough, if we know our country in terms of its historical experience and the incredible diversity that we have today. We will specially emphasize the last decade of the Georgian political development, which you will all agree, was the most dramatic and stormy.

The third part will be dedicated to globalization, to our state's and our country's chances, problems and opportunities in the globalization process, in a totally new world.

These are the topics we will go through together. I want to warn you from the very beginning that it is not my purpose to give you systematic knowledge. So, you will not be able to say that "You know, Zhvania came, talked to us and now we know what John Locke's philosophy is." This will not happen. I will be talking, of course, about specific experience and ideas, but it is not my purpose to make you feel what the modern Georgian state and democracy are, the democracy that has to be established in our country; to make you feel the main principles without which nothing will work and nothing can be accomplished. I really like Kennedy's words, who said: "Democracy is never a final achievement. It is a call to untiring effort." You cannot say, "I have achieved democracy and now I can have a rest and relax." Democracy is a continual effort and as soon as society stops making such an effort,

this system collapses. It is based on the daily participation of every citizen, and my aim is that future government members and civil servants, future successful well-known journalists feel just this; and of course, my Azeri friend too. We, by the way, have to decide what to do later, so that this girl understands what we are talking about⁸.

This is what I wanted to tell you as an introduction. What name shall we give it?

(A comment from the audience. Cannot be heard).

- Modern Georgian politics. This will be the name of the entire course⁹.

When asking questions, take into consideration that I am trying to distance myself from current political events. My evaluations will naturally be biased. So, do not ask me whether the budget has been approved or not, who said what about whom and so on.

I am talking to you not as a politician but as a person who makes suggestions and challenges you. I am emphasizing again that we have to think about these issues together. Your questions, your ideas and your vision will be very important to me, so that we are able to refine everything we're talking about.

I want us to get to know each other. To know you better, I would like to ask you to write short essays twice, so that I know what your vision of this or that problem is. I want to ask you to decide today about the first essays, before we continue this course. I want to ask you before our next meeting, during the next three or four days ... I don't know who they should be handed in to ... to write such a two page essay – *Contemporary Georgia, the Weaknesses and Success of the Modern Georgian State*, if you think they exist. When writing the essay, I want to especially ask you to pay attention to this aspect – the Georgian state, its problems, successes and weaknesses and Georgian democracy. I am really very interested in what each of you thinks regarding this before we continue our lectures. And then, our later discussions at the, so to speak, closing stage, will be also very interesting

⁸ Reference is made to the Azeri student of the School of Journalism who attended Zhvania's lectures and used translation.

⁹ Next year Zhvania renamed the course into "Theory and Practice of Democratic Politics."

for me. If you have any questions, I'm ready to answer them with pleasure. But imagine...

- **I am very interested in (is not heard clearly). I think that you and Mister Mikhail Saakashvili have a very similar position and the same vision. Why aren't you together? (Noise in the classroom).**
- To demonstrate that we are together I can even bring Misha here. I will show you – You see, he and I are together. No, we are really together now, even though there are many issues, tactical issues, which I don't agree with him on. In general, I am very cautious about the possibility of a revolutionary development of the situation, because I deeply believe that any revolution in the end yields bad results. What you have on the bottom always comes to the surface; the destruction of everything that you have today, etc. I don't want to say that Misha is a revolutionary, although he often has such impulses. But he and I have a totally identical vision of the future of Georgia, and the rumors about the competition between us, etc., are groundless. And I want to tell you that we still have a wonderful relationship ... we trust each other ... and I think that, on the whole, it is important to have the influence which I represent and it is also necessary to have a different influence, which is represented by Misha Saakashvili. So, in the end, we will be together, of course.
- **Then how do you think this idea should have been presented to the public? Now I understand what you are talking about ... democracy, etc. But how, at that time, could it have been clear to the public what democracy is? The process was such that we wanted to destroy something and become like Switzerland ... And it was something natural, or ...**

I am not saying that we shouldn't have destroyed that something. I will devote one lecture to the analysis of this very interesting issue. Please recall the national movement. I was part of it and if I say something critical about this movement it will apply also to me just like to other bigger leaders of that time. We did not talk about economic sovereignty then or about how an independent state's economy should function. And such a neglect of economic problems drew us into total absurdity, when our first independent government and its Prime

Minister announced that if Russia did not meet certain requirements they would place an embargo on some products and would not send mineral water and tangerines to Russia. This is how we saw our economic problems and what economic problems really mean, we all already understand quite well.

- **Was that PR?**

- No it was not PR. It was total ignorance rather than a lack of experience. The Baltics were not very experienced either, but I happened to visit Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia several times and that time when they had People's Fronts the main issue was the elaboration of the conception of sovereignty. This was taboo with us. I will never forget a meeting at the Rustaveli Society when Roman Gotsiridze said, "Let us develop a concept of the economic sovereignty of Georgia" and was severely attacked for that. He was told that it would be a betrayal, a deal with the Kremlin, that the most important thing at the moment was political independence and so forth. The separation and even confrontation of political independence and Georgia's economic independence cost us a lot.

Another very dangerous illusion was that playing with the national theme. You remember Russians' propaganda, Moscow's propaganda in the first years, during Zviad's period. They said that Georgians put forward a slogan <<Грузия без грузин>>, but these were actually the words of a hopeless idiot which were not appropriately condemned. On the contrary. Some found them very pleasing. This was a flaw in our position which was artificially augmented all the time and the leaders of those days didn't understand at all what the relationship with minorities had to be.

- **Was it a fascist approach?**

- It was not a fascist approach. It was an idiotic approach. The fascist approach is much more consistent. What was going on here in this respect was totally inconsistent, impulsive idioticism.

- **Was it deliberately or not?**

- It doesn't matter today whether it was deliberate or not, but our ten year experience provides you with wonderful material to see what our society's strong and weak points are. I emphasize minorities because when talking about today's Georgia – Georgians of the modern Georgian political era, the Azeri from Marneuli, the Armenians from Akhalkalaki, and the Greeks from Tsalka – should be necessarily taken into consideration as part of this nations, just like Gurians from Lanchkhuti, Tushetiands from Omalo, Ajarians from Khulo, etc.

- Who are politically Georgian.

- Yes, who are politically Georgian. And if some of them don't feel themselves politically Georgian, to the same extent as a person born and brought up in a Tbilisi traditional Georgian family would do, they will start looking for chances outside and will permanently create a threat of instability. For this reason, involvement of minorities in the political events currently taking place in Georgia is not done for minorities. There can't be philanthropy and charity in politics. This is done for the majority, so that there are no delayed action bombs, shells that will explode sooner or later. This happens when a group of people constantly feels itself discriminated, not presented and believes it has no chance to actualize itself. Now, don't make me fit everything into one lecture ...

- (A question. Cannot be heard clearly.)

- So, when I am saying that I will devote a substantial part of this course to the politics of Georgia in the last decade I plan to do the following; First how Zviad came – I'll talk about Ziad's period and the Military Council up to the year ninety-five. Then I want to dedicate one lecture to the Constitution of ninety-five and to how this Constitution was accomplished and fulfilled after ninety-five years.

- I wanted to ask such a question: You mentioned different revolutions – in England, France, etc. All of them were led by big men. But our situation developed in such a way that after overthrowing Zviad, Kitovani, Jaba and Sigua became our leaders. They were talking about democracy, and by the way, were supported by many people – politicians, public figures. What phenomenon was that? Jaba, Sigua and others talking about democracy?

- There is rhetoric and an actual effort, what the English call *commitment*.. that you really want to do something. That time it was popular rhetoric, just as today popular rhetoric is to keep saying how bad corruption is and the more corrupt you are the louder you say this. Just like this the necessary rhetoric was – democracy, democracy ... And this was said by people who represented the totally opposite extreme.

- **What phenomenon caused their popularity?**

- Kitovani's phenomenon at that time was based only on the fact that he had an armed group, and a large part of society felt insecure. And given the clashes we had, Kitovani was perceived as someone who counterbalanced this, was a balancing power of what happened on September 2 so that it did not happen again. I don't think that anyone considered him the father of Georgian democracy.

Lecture II

THE HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY

Hello. How are you doing? Did you think about democracy?

Thank you. By the way, here are some of your essays. I didn't have time to read all of them. What I read was very interesting. They are very sincere. Thank you for that. They are very interesting and important for me, too. This will enable me to imagine the issues you are concerned with and select the topics for our discussions.

Now, at our first, let's say introductory lecture, when I tried to give you a general picture of what we would be talking about during our meetings, one of the main things I drew your attention was that we have to understand: Democracy is not an abstract concept. It is a very specific conception, the functioning and origin of which is based on several very specific mechanisms and principles. The existence of democracy implies the existence of several very specific institutions and certain types of agencies and institutions. This is what's called the universal principles of democracy. I emphasize the universal principles because during our future meetings we will also talk, as I've already told you, about the national

context of democracy, about the fact that for democracy to be successful, it has to emerge from and be based on each nation's specific traditions, customs and historical experience.

But today I want you to imagine, just somehow feel the flavor of history, realize that all those principles that are today recognized as the universal principles of democracy have not come from heaven. These are the results of achievements where in a normal democratic state and society a person is much more protected from the government, can much better realize oneself and exploit one's own opportunities; can demand from an authority that it cares for him and can struggle for one's own interests. All this was a result of very dynamic, often very ruthless and bloody historic developments. This is the heritage that you have received from truly the best children of mankind. And in order to fathom the problems facing today's Georgia, I want to review the main points that have brought us to the contemporary understanding of democracy through these dynamics, historical dynamic.

When we talk about the history of democracy we have to understand that we basically stem from history of the European peoples, starting from the eighteenth century and also from the history of North America, which later became the history of the United States when the United States were formed. This does not mean that other peoples did not contribute to the development of world civilization. Definitely not. But Europe has its special place because initially, democracy was a totally European product, which was based on the experience created by the peoples of Europe. All of you have probably heard about Greek democratic **poleis**. The state of Athens is still the object of admiration for many people who think about the theory of democracy. By the way, together with the Roman Republic, it was an example, a real model for the Founding Fathers of America to follow. The leaders of the French Revolution and others often referred to its peculiarities and uniqueness. For this reason, the experience created in Athens and later transferred to the Republic of Rome is still very relevant today. It remains the source of a sort of inspiration because mankind, already 2500 years ago, managed to create such a system, such state relations, when society created a government whose aim was to protect the interests of the entire commune, rather than achieve well-being for oneself – government members, and protect its own interests.

If you read ... and by the way, I strongly recommend that if you have time to at least look through Aristotle's *Politics*, you will be amazed at how modern sounding his ideas are about very many problems. For example, some time ago I very carefully read his ideas corruption, because this problem was also a problem for Athenian democracy and Aristotle evaluates corruption in approximately the same way as our most enthusiastic fighters against corruption do.

Plato's Republic is still a system of ideas about how the state has to be arranged. So you can take a lot from it, use it as a model suitable for today. By the way, unlike other civilizations of those times, like the Persian civilization and others, Greeks had an understanding that man is a social being, that each citizen has to be driven, in the first place, by social interests and interests in social life. They called such people, those who live with social interests πολίτης A "Polite" is a person who lives not for his own interests, his own personal well-being, but is a person who understands that the fulfillment of his interests depends on the common success of this society, this commune, this town or this or that settlement in which he exists. Do you know what they called the people without social interests – the opposite of polites? ιδιώτης. Polites versus idiots. This is the distinction the Greeks made between the two main types of people in relation to the state and society. And it is very interesting, indeed. Let us presume that the Empire of Cyrus, or the Persian civilization of that period, in general, created huge armies, the court was very rich, they spent a lot of money on the military and so on, but society was of secondary importance there. The essence of Greek democracy is that it was a form of governance, where the state and the authorities there cared for each person's well-being, interests and success. Later, this experience was much more deepened and extended by the Roman Republic.

The Roman Republic created several totally unprecedented developments, valuable till this day. A significant contribution to the development of the modern state and democracy is that together with the creation of republican governance and the poleis type governance, it formed a regular army, which was a totally new phenomenon. In this case, you had a regular army and didn't have to gather volunteers all the time. You paid them salary and therefore ensured that at least, they were not marauders on your country's territory. Conquering was a different case. Rome created phenomena like bureaucracy, administration and a hierarchical administration system. Incidentally, in the Roman Empire the governance system

was extremely refined, created with geometric precision. No previous civilization had such a precise, refined system.

Romans created a phenomenon which from that period, for already twenty-two or twenty-three centuries, has been the main basis for the existence of any stable, solid state. Instead of tollage, Romans introduced permanent taxes. And by the way, it was the representative body – the Senate of the Roman people – who introduced them. And after that, every Roman person knew he had to give away a part of his private property, part of his private income, to ensure the success of his Republic. And another amazing thing is the present that Romans made for you and all mankind is a codified legislation. And even today, many of you have probably heard that this or that code is based on the Roman traditions. And the Roman codification system still works. Codification means bringing laws together to form a single system. This is the experience which was created by Romans and which is still purposeful and significant.

In short, by the time Christianity started to establish itself and a new era had begun, a certain type of state – you have the example of Rome here – had actually been formed. In it public interests were recognized first of all, contrary to the interests of the ruler, tyrant or despot. This was a priority, where the most important state institutions existed; like the army, taxes, administration, written law and systematized legislation. And at that moment the idea that totally changed everything that had existed before entered, so to speak, the life of mankind and especially the life of Europe. That was the concept of Christianity. At this point I want to say, “today’s democracy is an experience based on Greek, Roman and Judaic-Christian traditions”.

You have to understand that what I told you before does not apply to everyone. Aristotle, the great Aristotle, among other things, was an apologist of slavery and believed that the existence of slavery was necessary. There were forty thousand citizens in the Athens poleis and about four thousand other residents, who actually had no rights. Some of them were slaves, others just foreigners. The same with the Roman Empire, where people were divided into Romans and Latins, who were closer to Romans. There were foreigners too, but they did not actually have any rights like those Roman citizens enjoyed. And there were slaves, who you have seen a lot of films about. Even before the advent of Christ, Judaism had

created ethics different from those of the Greeks and Romans (we are now talking about this channel of the development of mankind) because instead of the gods from the Greek and Roman pantheons, who were very much like people, a totally new concept of a single God had been introduced; a totally different vision of God who is very different from man and whose service of those ideas and values, became a determinant, let's say, a vector, for any person who believes in this one God.

You might be surprised and ask why I shifted to this religious theme, but the thing is that at this point, together with monotheism, a totally new ethics emerged, a totally new mentality, and without realizing it, you will never understand anything about modern democracy. You will never understand how big the difference is between the most ideal and beautiful Greek poleis and modern democracy. The idea of Christianity is a deepened and absolute idea of good, forgiveness and equality. The idea of equality – this is what I want to emphasize. You might laugh but even the topic of Christian sexual ethics did not even have a remote analogy in the cultures inhabited by ancient gods; it becomes one of the basis for changes in fields like economic relations and economic developments. Therefore, the third very important component out of which modern democracy was evolving for many, many centuries, is Judaist – Christian, or after the first centuries, Christian ethics and the ideals of Christian equality. This is the recognition of the existence of supreme values, which a human being must serve.

Now I want to tell you that this idea, the Christian idea, turned out to be so strong that for many, many centuries, it totally conquered people's minds. And all this happened, you remember, in the first century when after Christ was crucified, His disciples went to different countries, found the first churches and so forth. In parallel, this is followed by great cataclysms throughout Europe. The Roman Empire first split into the Eastern and Western Empires, and an amazing migration of peoples began. You all probably remember from your history courses what a big mess there was there. I'm emphasizing this to make you understand why there was a break in the tradition created in the ancient period. Those great cataclysms that began in the first century caused a break in the experience and traditions of the ancient democracies and ancient republics.

So, the early Middle Ages began. In the Middle Ages, Europe was populated with different tribes and actually, none of them had a state as we understand it today. Clerical power – religious power possessed disproportionately – was big power, huge power. In the first fifteen centuries, the history of Europe is largely composed of the experience of a struggle with the Pope, as the English and German call it – “Papism.” And, by the way, this struggle between the clerical and secular powers actually continued up to sixteenth century and eventually ended with the great reformation of the Church by Martin Luther. And this was also a very important moment, which I want you to remember well: Luther introduced the revolution by, so to speak, rejecting the canonic tradition that had been formed for fifteen centuries within the Catholic Church. Luther was a very interesting and surprisingly religious person. He arrived in Rome from his small town in Germany and went to the main citadel of Christianity and sanctity. And what did he see when he got there? At that time the Pope was Alexander II, Alexander Borgia¹⁰, known for his debauchery ... He protested against all this. Back in Germany he said that all those icons and everything was fake and that it was the right of every man and every believer to read the Bible freely. And the basis of Luther’s revolution was that he translated the Bible into German and said: Each of you can read and understand it in your own way. Today, many historians, philosophers and scholars believe that this time became the basis of the major liberal revolutions in Europe, revolutions in thinking. This happened when people allowed themselves to freely interpret the Bible or the Word of God. After that they developed a totally different understanding of the freedom trade, freedom of commerce, etc. But let us go back to our historical developments.

During that period there was a lot of struggling for the redistribution of power between, I am saying it again, the clerical and secular authorities. If we look from today’s perspective at the history of France, Spain and Britain in the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a reformer – a person who is a reformer by spirit – would probably support those who struggled for the secular authorities having more power in, for example, their native England, their native Germany or native Sweden, so that they were not fully dependent on the pope and his power.

¹⁰ Luther arrived in Rome in about 1510-1511. At that time the Pope was Julius II. Luther was shocked by the practice introduced by the predecessor of Julius II, Pope Alexander Borgia, who started selling indulgence from 1500. Martin Luther was later opposed to Pope Leo X, who sent Luther the papal bull to show that he risked excommunication unless he recanted 41 sentences drawn from his writings. Luther set fire to the bull.

At that time, secular (monarch) and clerical (Papism) power periodically opposed each other. Sometimes a strong feudal would win, other times the Pope. When the Pope weakened, the monarch said that power was divine by nature – in the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries emerged the concept and theory of the divine nature of power, which means that I, the king, have the right to be the master of my subordinates, collect tollage and take what I want because this right has been given to me by God. This is the theory of the divine origin of power. It is very important that you think about it, because after this we will get to the theories which rejected this belief of the divine origin of power and actually became the immediate basis for the modern theory of democracy.

- **Sorry, but aren't there some people who still believe in the divine origin of power? (Noise in the classroom).**

- No. By the way, I'm not talking about the anachronisms that sometimes, unfortunately, still occur, even today. The theory of the divine origin of power was a whole concept. In those times people thought, "I am a peasant, I have no land and I work on the land that belongs to some feudal (lord). There is the king who is actually equal to God. He can do whatever he wants with my life, my property and my wellbeing." I, as a representative of ordinary people, Common Class¹¹, as the English would say, have no rights that would be protected from this monarch having divine power. And the explanation, the answer that time was such that of course you don't have this right, because this monarch of yours, your lord, be it a king, a prince or whoever, is your leader, your master by God's decision and this is what the answer is.

I don't want you to think that in the European consciousness of that period no important changes took place; changes that would eventually be important for the formation of the modern democratic system. During those wars, during those stormy relationships between different countries, states and peoples, at certain points it became necessary for kings to ally, for example, with local communes against barons. This is what happened in France when king Phillip IV tried to overcome the opposition with the small feudal and reinforce his monarchy. To do so he allied with local self-governance. In those times they were not called local self-governance, of course. The monarch made deals with the assemblies of towns

¹¹ Common People or Working Class

and villages to have them finally support him and set up so-called states general, which were one of the representative bodies and together they made decisions regarding taxes and achieved significant success.

History was a bit different in England. In approximately the same epoch, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, King John tried to suppress the feudal, but he failed and the feudal made him sign the most unique and greatest historical document, called the Great Charter of Freedoms or *Magna Carta*. This is the first document in Europe, in the Europe of the post-ancient period, that created the basis for constitutionalism. Actually, the history of written constitutionalism started in Europe after the signature of *Magna Carta* in 1215. This is the first precedent where a document was created which stated there are issues, in relation to which some rules have supremacy over the monarch's decision; for example, when land is passed on, through heritage, to the elder child. Before that it was like this: Let's assume that a landowner died and if the king wanted to, he took possession of his land. He legalized property and ownership rights – the right to heritage.

In just forty years after the creation of *Magna Carta*, during the rule of Henry II, parliament was finally formed, because the English, the English nobility clearly saw that the singular existence of a document is not enough and that it is necessary to create such an institution. If I am not mistaken, in 1258, an English parliament was formed¹², that became the guarantor of the protection of the freedoms declared in this *Magna Carta*.

I want you to imagine for a moment that you are the English living at the beginning of the thirteenth century and to experience how revolutionary that change was. If we assume that you are a land owner, you receive a guaranteed right that the property you buy in the course of your life, would be inviolable. Moreover, together

¹² This section refers to the institution that was not called *parliament*, yet. It was a council that can be considered a parliament. Such a council was first set up in 1258. The Council was composed of 12 members and was based on the *Provisions of Oxford* adopted in the same year. It was a plan of reform accepted by Henry III in return for the promise of financial aid from his barons led by Simon de Montfort. It was planned to form a 15 person council that would supervise the appointment of ministers, local governance and prisons. In 1259 *Provisions of Oxford* were replaced with *Provisions of Westminster*. Later King Henry repudiated *Provisions of Westminster* that entailed the Second Baron's War. After the civil war, during the imprisonment of King Henry, Simon de Montfort managed to elect a council of nine people in 1264 and rule the country. The same year he invented the nobility, the clergy and knights to join the Council. In 1265 city representatives joined the council which was already functioning as a parliament.

with the formation of the parliament, one of the rights approved by the parliament was the establishment of taxes. We will go back to the history of parliamentarism also in the future. An interesting thing is that parliaments, or representative bodies, from the moment of their formation were the bodies whose primary and major function were, so to speak, the guidance of the executive power. It is a very sensitive issue, the issue of taxes, because it implies that I, a citizen, will be forced to permanently pay some amount to the authorities to support themselves.

Therefore, England created the experience which is called constitutionalism, and constitutionalism, as I told you at the first meeting, does not mean writing a constitution. There are many countries today that have constitutions, and by the way, we lived in such a country for seventy years. The Soviet Constitution was the best constitution in the world. But the existence of the constitution in the Soviet Union was not a precondition for the existence of constitutionalism.

Constitutionalism is a condition of society when there are recognized rules, recognized principles, the respect of which becomes mandatory for absolutely everyone, and no one, no one, neither the monarch nor the sovereign, can change them, unless they go through all the relevant procedures. So, at the beginning of the thirteenth century it was most perfectly formed in England, although correspondingly, it was formed in the Scandinavian countries in the form of the so-called “tings”. The present Danish parliament is called Folketinget, and Althingi in Iceland, if I’m not mistaken, etc. By the way, representative bodies are quite powerful too, like States General in France, but in England they are formed in the most perfect way.

Is it interesting to have such a historical discourse or do you feel very distanced from the present Georgian reality?

- We are gradually getting closer to it. We’ll have the opportunity to compare.

Since you are people interested in politics, I’d like to say a couple of words about how the modern understanding of politics was formed. And this also happened somewhere in the fifteenth – sixteenth centuries, in conjunction with the formation of the first national states in Europe. Where do you think the first states in Europe appeared, of the type that can be compared to our modern states?

These are Italian republics, the Republics of Venice, Florence, Bologna and other republics. And this is very interesting because it's the place in Europe where they were most quick to understand what commerce was, where the non-despotic forms of governance were developed and types of republics emerged. And the strongest among them was the Republic of Venice. It is not surprising that a totally new concept of politics, of what a ruler or a politician must serve, emerged in those Italian republic in the fifteenth, sixteenth centuries. And this was described in the work which is called *Il Principe* and which was written by Niccolò Machiavelli. They often think, and you shouldn't think like this, that Machiavelli was an apologist of cunning policy. In reality, Machiavelli was the first one to say that wars between countries shouldn't happen because someone wants to marry someone's cousin and isn't allowed to do so, or someone wants to invade some place, plunder and then leave it, etc. Machiavelli was the first one to formulate that politics have to serve the achievement of pragmatic – realistic objectives. Machiavelli was the first one or a first one who formulated the concept of national interest, which later undergoes development. We'll get back to the concept of national interest later, but today ... at our next meeting ... and it is the core idea for the understanding of what the state means. Machiavelli was the first one to touch upon this idea. He talks very beautifully indeed, in his work *Il Principe*, which he wrote to his prince. By the way, Machiavelli, as a politician, was treated quite badly by him. Machiavelli himself was from the middle class and was not very successful.

One of the basis' of Machiavelli's concept is that the politician should be evaluated by his results rather than his desires; not by his sentiments, but by the results he achieves. You know, by saying this he somehow opposes the tradition of clerical thinking, which was implemented by the Catholic Church and religious authorities in general. It said the politician's aim was to go and conquer land, then come back, etc., and that the main thing is that the politician must endeavor all the time to remain within the framework created by mother church. Machiavelli said, "No, it is not the politician's mission. He's mission is to achieve results with the instruments he has at his disposal, the results against which he will be evaluated." So, I ask you to take into consideration that the modern understanding of politics, refined many times later – and we'll necessarily go back to this refinement and its changes – originated from Machiavelli's *Il Principe*.

Now I want to go back to England, to the discussion that was going on in correlation to the denial of the idea of the divine nature of power. All great ideas are established in a specific historical context. It never happens that a prophet appears, starts preaching something, and society accepts it when what he said is not topical to it.

Let us go back to England, where, for many decades those ideas that inspired the French enlighteners and the American Founding Fathers were maturing. The seventeenth century was very stormy in England: sometimes the kings tried to deprive Parliament of power, other times it was the people who tried to deprive the king of his rights to support Parliament. The formation of Parliament in 1258, did not at all mean that after that, like today, parliament assembled on a regular basis. There were periods, when for many years Parliament had no opportunity to work; parliament members were arrested, irrespective of whether they belonged to the House of Commons or the House of Lords. Parliament was dissolved and so on. Somewhere at the beginning of the twenties of the seventeenth century, Charles I dissolved Parliament and caused a lot of excitement. After lots of effort, a new Parliament was assembled. It adopted a document called the *Petition of Right*¹³. It reinforced the principles stated in *Magna Carta*. It was the first time when the statement about the supremacy of the law over the law market and over the king appeared. The law can be good or bad, but it has supremacy over any law market. This is the nature of constitutionalism. Rule of law and not of men. Opposition between the king and Parliament lasted for about forty or fifty years. The Parliament became so strong in the forties of the seventeenth century that poor Charles I was finally beheaded. And this, of course, is related to the protection of the interests of the strengthened middle class in England. This was followed by Cromwell's revolution, when General Cromwell fully abolished the monarchy. After that Cromwell was overthrown. Then appears James II, who tried to restore the balance in favor of the monarchy, which ended with the arrival of William III, Prince of Orange, and the constitutional monarchy, in its present form, was finally established in England. This period was characterized by endless wars, oppositions, total chaos and lawlessness. There was no system the stability of society could rely on. There was no prevailing idea. This was a period of kaleidoscopic changes. At that point, there

¹³ In 1628, the English Parliament passed the Petition of Right. It addressed Charles I regarding different issues, like forced loans, arbitrary arrests, neglect of Magna Carta's principles, arbitrary interference with property rights, etc.

started, so to say, anarchy. It was quite appalling, by the way. Just like in any society, the society there also split into royalists and supporters of the Parliament. And one of the Royalists was Hobbes, who created one of the best known works in the history of modern political theory, which is called *Leviathan*, and in which he formulated, with amazing precision, the theory of what the phenomenon of sovereign, the phenomenon of authority and ruler is.

Hobbes was a supporter of the Royalists. He accompanied James II when he emigrated to France and stayed there for ten years. Hobbes was an unlucky man, because his ideal - monarchy - was ruined before his eyes. He believed that he experienced all the calamities. In that period, there were many philosophers and thinkers in Europe; like Spinoza, for example. In this environment Hobbes thought up the theory of the rights of nature and formed a consistent system, which I am going to tell you in brief:

Hobbes' work *Leviathan* is thought to be one of the examples of not just English thinking but also western European thinking. It is a surprisingly consistent, clearly formulated union about the theory of the rights of nature. What is the theory of the rights of nature? The basis of this theory is that all people are born with equal rights that are given to them from birth - the rights to life, health, property and freedom. From its very birth, a human being has these rights and that is why they are called rights of nature. It doesn't matter where you were born, what title you have. By the way, these are the rights that are called fundamental human rights today. For the first time, it was recorded that no man, no monarch has the right to restrict you from what has been given to you by God, when he blew the soul into you and created you as a human being. I am telling you a very straightforward and very simplified version of these ideas.

- Aren't you tired? Are you? Just stand it for a little while.

But now imagine that there is a society, where all the people enjoy the rights of nature, the so-called state of nature. What is the state of nature? It is the state where you have no authorities and where all the people enjoy these rights to property, freedom and other rights. But also imagine what is going on in this state. What happens there is that at a certain point your and my rights to property clash with each other, and there has to be someone who will say what is just, and will resolve these endless conflicts, and will protect you from anarchy. I have said this to

show you what environment Hobbes lived in and what his environment was like. He was a man shocked by anarchy, blood, misfortune and the civil war in England. It was his response to anarchy. And at that moment, Hobbes said what the sovereign was for. The sovereign to whom we pass our rights of nature and who has the right to make decisions. I give away part of my freedom to be protected, a part of freedom in exchange for security and protection. According to Hobbes, as a result of such a social contract – this is Hobbes' term, and it's also used by Spinoza, Locke, Rousseau – we create the sovereign, the ruler. By this theory Hobbes contradicts the theory of divine nature and finally proves that power is not of divine nature; it is of human nature. People create this power themselves, but Hobbes thinks that the sovereign has to actually be unrestricted. He should not be restricted by frameworks or limitations. He should only be guided by ethical considerations. He should be naturally interested in the happiness of his subordinates. Hobbes said that we have our responsibilities in relation to the sovereign, the responsibilities that stem from our principles. Therefore, the sovereign is a ruler created by men for a certain purpose: He has to ensure that each man's rights are protected, and at the same time, that their protection does not violate other people's rights. For this purpose, he enjoys unlimited power. The sovereign is restricted by moral principles rather than written ones. Hobbes is an apologist for a strong monarchy that has a single limitation: It shall not violate the rights of nature of any man. And there, by the way, we encounter the ideas that were formulated in the past in the *Magna Carta* and that originated in the thirteenth century from Thomas Aquinas, who was the first one to mention these rights.

Are you able to stand another fifteen minutes? We are approaching a very interesting point. We are approaching the point where Locke's opponent appears, sorry, Hobbes' opponent, in only ten year's time.

Another very big public figure, Locke, was a representative of the camp opposite to Hobbes'. He was on the Liberals' side. By the way, he took part in the so-called Glorious Revolution, which took place at the end of 1688, and ended up with William's (Prince of Orange), who later ruled England under the name of William III, arrival from the Netherlands to England and the final establishment of the constitutional monarchy. This happened during the period of William III, Prince of Orange. He came back and his activity ended up with the signature of a document in England in 1689, which is most notable. This document became the true guide for Americans when they were writing the Constitution, and had a big impact on the

initiations of the Great French Revolution, etc. This was the *Bill of Rights*, according to which the king no longer has the right to dissolve Parliament without Parliament's agreement, has no right to introduce a tax for even one year, without Parliament's agreement, cannot solve many, many issues without Parliament. For example, when Parliament takes a decision on the issue of royal heritage, etc.

Parliamentarism and constitutionalism were finally established in England and after that, some kings really tried to change this, but never with success because the *Bill of Rights* finally fully established the constitutional monarchy in England.

John Locke was on the side of William, Prince of Orange. He also was an emigrant. During the chaos, in the years of monarchist's revenge, he went to Holland and met William there. He didn't have a close relationship with him. He wasn't successful politician either. By the way, he was a physician by initial education ... He returned to England together with William and created his own theory – the philosophy of the rights of nature, the beginning of which sounds approximately the same as Hobbes' ideas. Let's talk about this and we will actually finish our day's lecture.

Now imagine that here is this classroom there is some state which is bigger and that we are all there. Each of us has the right of nature and we have no government, no government. We all live, all of us want, so to say, some property, some well-being, some success. There are naturally some differences between people. Someone is weak, the strong tries to oppress the weak. Then this happens. The weak see that ... "This one oppresses us. Let's unite and not let him oppress us." Permanent conflicts emerge – isn't it like this? – in this state of nature it becomes necessary to create a government...

A laugh in the classroom

And when a necessity to create government emerges, what will the government be like that you plan to create with these rights of nature? By the way, in his Declaration of Independence, Jefferson called these rights of nature, the rights given by God and nature that no one can infringe upon. So, what kind of values will be created by the state of nature? What should they be like?

- Representative

- Should they be or not? What should be the interest of this government be directed at? At building dachas and villas on Sairme hill? At reinforcing its own, this government's, so to say, wellbeing and interests? It should be a government that cares for our interests, the interests of the members, participants of this state of nature.

A very important point that Locke introduced in the course of creation of government is the point of agreement. Government is created by agreement. Not by force, by arms, by conquests or heritage – someone's grandmother or grandfather was the ruler here, etc.

- **Through forgery?**

- Not through forgery, sir, but by AGREEMENT. This was the main point that Locke recorded in the genesis of government. In response to the question "how can we avoid conflict?" Locke gave an answer different than Hobbes'. He believed that what was needed was a government created as a result of public agreement, rather than the sovereign. Public agreement creates government to accomplish specific tasks. The government sets concrete objectives. It has to ensure the public good. Here we have the very important term from the Greek polis. The government's main objective is just this. This means that I give part of my sovereignty – part of the right of nature to the government created by this agreement, only on the condition that it ensures the control of public well-being. Moreover, Locke said that if the government departs from those objectives, those aims – because it was created by the public of nature and state of nature – people have the right to overthrow it through rebellion. He justifies uprising, revolution, makes them legitimate. However, he wrote that he wasn't talking about temporary mismanagement, some problems. If the government constantly violates the rights of nature, then people have the right to rebel and overthrow it. Strictly limited government – this is the main idea of the modern understanding of democracy. Stemming from this, John Locke is considered to be the main ideologist who actually formulated an extremely principled statement, much more principled than any other thinker did. Hobbes believed that any kind of a most ruthless, unjust government is better than the state of nature, where there is no governance. Locke believed that the state of nature is much better than a bad government. It gives priority to the rights of nature. This echoes ideas that are called Christian morale. It took seventeen centuries to produce such a refined formulation of

the Christian doctrine; the Christian world outlook through the language of political theory.

It was Locke's philosophy and vision that formed the ground for the foundation of United States of America. The Founding Fathers of America used it as a truly guiding document, and if you read it ... today, I want to ask you to do this ... the Declaration of Independence of the United States of 1776, and the Preamble to the Constitution of America¹⁴, which was adopted in 1787, you will see that all of these ideas were taken directly from John Locke's ideas and are based on them.

I want you to imagine that in reality ... actually ... partially, except for the United States, there was no society or state created in this way – People came, sat down together and said, “We need a government,” and elected that government, etc. Any nation, any people, any democracy has its history of development. I asked you to think of this model, play with it in your mind so that you can picture yourself the creation of government, its functions, its tasks and its nature in the context of modern democracy. That is why I asked you to picture this model to yourself, the model I talked to you about; Locke's state of nature and from this, think of a model for the creation of government, a free government.

So, this idea was imported to the United States. But at the moment of the foundation of the United States, it was also accompanied by several very important things. By the way, I want to tell you that when Jefferson, Madison and the other Founding Fathers, George Mason and others were writing, talking and thinking about the creation of their new country, they always had the Roman Republic in front of their eyes, and they loved to compare themselves with the Romans, with the ancient Romans. It's funny, but those of you who have been to Washington – this also shows the architecture – must have noticed the Americans love Roman – Greek pompousness ... And you know why? Because, they say, that the strength of the Romans was that their society was based on civic dignity. Each citizen has this sense of dignity; they were ready to give something away for their society and social well-being. They understood that there can be no well-being for each member of society without the well-being of society. And for just this reason, civic dignity was the

¹⁴ Preamble to the United States Constitution: “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution of the United States of America.”

concept they originated from, when they were founding their country and their democracy. They said, “The government we are creating fully in agreement with Locke’s theory, must be created with our agreement.” Madison, by the way, had a very interesting philosophy. He said that the ancient Greek democracies were democracies where all the people gathered on the square, would sit there and make decisions. By the way, Montesquieu and many other philosophers of that time also said that democracy only could exist in a very small state because, how could all the people take part in decision making in a big state? And Madison created the term “republic”, which is a big democracy and where – since it is impossible to gather all the people – the representative system is formed. And he called America a representative republic. They were all wonderful Republicans. Madison said that representatives are elected by the largest part of public rather than by some groups of people and these representatives rule and make decisions on behalf of the people.

I am thinking now whether they will be able to digest Montesquieu ...

- **Don’t worry about that.**

We said that a government which is formed in a society equipped with the rights of nature, should be such that it does not take into its hands power that violates and restricts these rights of nature.

How can such a government be formed? By the way, Abraham Lincoln had a theory that every ruler always tries to gain as much power as possible. It is inherent in human nature. And precisely to avoid this, to make sure that an authority or a group of authorities do not possess too much power, the theory of separation of power was developed. It’s believed today that the most accurate, the most refined theory of separation of power was articulated by Montesquieu in his work *The Spirit of the Laws*. Montesquieu said: “It is not important how the law is written. What is important is the spirit of the law.” This, by the way, is valid up to now.

We can’t hear ...

- Maybe. Thanks.

Montesquieu is an enthusiastic admirer of the English system. By the way, he believed that the system in the England of that period was most perfect and was the closest to his beliefs. By the way, Locke also talked about the separation of power and

he separated power in the following way: There is the executive power, which makes current decisions, there is the federal power, which makes decisions about peace and war. He distinguishes it as the second type of power. And there is also the legislative power which adopts laws and should check how these laws are implemented. I am telling you this because you have to understand that the division into judicial, sorry, legislative, executive and judicial power, in the given sequence, did not happen by itself – it happened when people were thinking about the essence of power when it was divided into clerical and secular power. Locke, that amazing thinker and the true father of the modern democracy, actually singled out local, central and legislative power. And Montesquieu formulated this concept, this triad in the most precise way. And it was directly taken as a guide by Americans, so to say, by the Founding Fathers of America when they designed their government and they stated directly that they were doing it for protection, in case a government member or some branch empowers more than acceptable for the common interest, or common well-being, so that it does not usurp the rest of the society.

During our next conversation we will see how this system has been amazingly refined up to now. And the entire present approach to government is that you ensure the efficiency of the government on the one hand and on the other hand, the existence of lots of balancing mechanisms and agencies, which doesn't allow the president to become an usurper and introduce a despotic regime, that doesn't allow parliament to enjoy excessive rights. By the way, in the eighteenth century America, it was very important that the court wouldn't abuse its power, wouldn't, so to speak, abuse the public, etc. Finally, by the second half of the twentieth century a modern check and balance system was created, abundant with different mechanisms, and we'll discuss all this when we talk about modern government.

This is the path the modern world followed up to the creation of modern democracy. I wanted to walk this way together with you – a way that has taken about two thousand years, twenty-one or twenty-two centuries, starting with ancient Greece up to creation of the American democracy – so that you could imagine the evolution of human thinking before it created the form of governance which is, and this is unquestionable today, the most successful form – democratic governance.

I have been talking to you for such a long time to make you clearly realize there was the Greek-Roman experience and Greek-Roman models, but they were deprived

of the ethics created by the Judaism-Christian tradition and created by the Christian morale. How was absolute government gradually deprived of power in those Middle Ages and how was constitutionalism developed, starting from *Magna Carta* period? How did the parliament, as an institution, develop into the protector, the guard of this constitutionalism, so that what has been written is not left on paper, only? How did people finally arrive at the conclusion that the government was not appointed by God to rule – that it was created to protect their interests? Remember, we said at the previous meeting that the primary goal of the government was to serve people and this is the most important experience in the mentality of totalitarian, despotic and democratic societies. Finally, ideas triumphed that had been digested for quite a long time among different peoples – the French, the English, Greeks and Romans – and at a specific historical moment, in a concrete historical situation the first democracy – American democracy – was established, which became an immediate pattern, a model, which is still working today. The whole world is still looking at it today as at the model of democracy that is functioning up to now and which all of us, want to imitate, in many respects.

What I finally want to tell you today is that when the Constitution of the United States was adopted in 1787 and the Declaration of Independence was issued in 1776, the storming of the Bastille occurred in 1789, and the Great French Revolution, which finally destroyed the system developed in the Middle Ages in continental Europe; it was the moment that, so to say, put an end to the era of absolute monarchies in continental Europe and introduced amazing changes on the agenda. The Middle Ages actually ended in Europe with all this and then begins the nineteenth century, with its creation of liberal ideology – which we will discuss by all means, at our next meeting – with its totally new type of international relations, brings us straight to the world that exists today. And in that destroyed, boiling Europe there was by the way, a wonderful French philosopher – Alexis de Tocqueville, who wrote the book *Democracy in America*. This happened in about 1830. He brought this exact vision, a description of American democracy to Europe. And he evokes admiration, feeds people's ideas who think, for instance, in Poland, how to arrange the Polish Republic, or how to arrange the Batavian Republic, which thanks to the French, existed on the modern territory of the Netherlands, and so on, and so on. Garibaldi's followers in Italy were excited by his ideas, and by the way, so were Georgian public figures, first of all, Ilia Chavchavadze.

In short, the import of American ideas into Europe became possible after the storming of the Bastille and after Louis XVI and his family were beheaded, because the Europe that was developing, developing gradually during the entire post-Christian, sorry, Christian epochs, during the entire Middle Ages, was destroyed and the space for new ideas was opened. Those ideas, which together with the ideas discussed by us today, finally determined the formation of modern democracy and the modern state. This is what I wanted to tell you today. Now I am listening to your questions.

- **May I ask a question?**

- Yes. How much time have we got? It will be good if we fit it into ten minutes. I want to know whether my lecture was too long.

- **No.**

- **You are a biologist. Have you received any education in this field?**

- No, I am not a biologist, only. Whatever I do, I do it perfectly. Frankly speaking, it is really impossible to think about what we should have in Georgia, not only just without reading this but without experiencing all this, yes, without experiencing all we have talked about. I will repeat what I told you at our first meeting: I cannot teach you the history of political philosophy, the history of political theory ... This is not my purpose. My purpose is to make you experience, feel what democracy is, how this phenomenon developed and how diverse and complex it is even today. This is what my purpose is. Otherwise, I'm sure that we have people here who know these theories, maybe, much better than I do ... some of them or all of them. But I'm sure, that you have to see for yourself, as a whole, these dynamics to understand what problems Georgia is facing today.

- **May I ...**

- Locke was a physician, by the way, and he was a private doctor for one of the Earls. Then he was arrested. By the way, Locke escaped. Then it was just like it is now.

Lecture III

LIBERALISM, SOCIALISM AND NATIONALISM

At our previous meetings we went through about two-thousand-two-hundred years, from the fifth century B.C., to the point the United States was formed, which was and still is the greatest actualization of the ideas of Locke and his predecessors. Additionally, it should be noted that Montesquieu and his conception of the separation of the executive, legislative and judicial power, had a significant impact on the Founding Fathers of America. Locke himself distinguished federal and executive power, and by executive power he meant local or regional power and did not single out the legislative – judicial power. That is why it was Montesquieu who very accurately formulated what the Founding Fathers of America had accomplished. He established the idea that it isn't necessary for democracy to be implemented through the direct participation of people and introduced the concept of representation. Rousseau had already believed that democracies could only exist in small communes and that people should have the opportunity to directly participate in every act of decision making. So, with the formation of the United States of America as a big republic, the institution of representation began to develop in the bowels of democracy. And representation is based on the equal right of all citizens to elect their representative. It is a new understanding of representation, different from feudal understanding when casts or groups elected their representatives. So we have reached the point called the concept of democracy, which still exists in its unchanged form.

Today, I'd like to talk to you about another three important concepts; about ideas that had a great impact on the development of modern thinking. By not knowing these, it would be very difficult to understand the processes that are, for example, occurring right in front of us in Georgia; and by not knowing it would be difficult to imagine the problems Georgia faces today. These are the three main ideas that dominated thinking and had a great impact on people throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They still sound very exciting. These are the concepts of liberalism, socialism and nationalism.

First, I will speak about liberalism. When we are talking about modern democracy – representation, parliamentarism, constitutionalism – we are talking about a definite construction, an architecture. But what is the content of this construction? What direction is it moving in? What drives it and what is the main thing that puts this construction into motion and directs it for the purpose of the well-being of society, of each member, to satisfy their interests? It is actually based on the progressive ideas we talked about at our previous meetings. When we talk about today's democracy, it actually means that we're talking about liberal democracy, especially after the Soviet Union, when the opponent of these ideas collapsed and the concepts of liberalism and democracy became identical to each other.

What's the essence of liberalism? This is the philosophy and concept of the freedom of the individual and society, which is based on the belief that any person has absolute freedom to express what they think. It's based on the understanding that society and the state created by society exists, first of all, for the protection of the individual's rights, to ensure these rights. It's based on the belief that society should ensure political and religious freedom, existence of a free opposition to the government and so on.

Liberalism already had many predecessors in the Middle Ages. But the real revolution in human thinking, in the perception of the world, was caused by Adam Smith. A totally new and extremely important component appeared in the theory and concept of liberalism, which did not exist in the previous concepts and approaches. This is the economic component introduced by Adam Smith.

Adam Smith was a peaceful professor. He was not involved in political battles. He worked at Glasgow University in Scotland and happened to live in England during the period we call the "industrial revolution" was just starting. This was the second half of the eighteenth century, a period of important technological achievements, especially in Europe and particularly in England: the steam engine, railway, intensive manufacturing and all those inventions ... Society began to industrialize. There was a shift from slow production to faster production. This needed technical innovations. Such inventions were very important for development of mankind and the new achievements of the last centuries drove society into a totally new condition, both politically and socially. Globalization is also a result of technical achievements.

Adam Smith lived in the epoch of the first industrial revolution. If you look at the books of his contemporaries, you'll see that there was no darker country than the England of that period: needy people, miners, coal mining ... Life expectancy was forty years. People in towns lived in extreme hardship. It was the period when the old England had collapsed and the new England had not yet formed.

If you look at the England of those times you'll see terrible chaos and precisely in that chaos Adam Smith saw a wonderful order, which is called market order, market relations. This is what makes him absolutely genial. He introduced a revolution in human thinking. In 1776, Adam Smith published an invaluable work, *The Wealth of Nations*, where he wrote what a market is and what market relations are, how the market regulates itself to ensure social well-being. Smith saw all this not in today's New York or London; he saw this during a period when the market economy was just starting to develop. This work is still important today. Adam Smith actually developed the basis for modern economic science. He presented an economic interpretation to history and historical development; he defined what capital was.

What's the main principle Adam Smith was talking about? The main principle was that each person should endeavor for one's own well-being and while struggling for one's own well-being they also create social well-being. This was the answer to an old question mankind had been concerned about. Liberalism was the answer which clearly solved this dilemma in favor of the individual. Liberalism is a world outlook, a philosophy that places each individual, each person in the center of this order. And the basis of this is the formula created by Adam Smith: The endeavor for personal well-being ensures social well-being.

How does this happen? When you go to a butcher, baker or salesman, you don't talk to him about lofty matters, you don't try to touch the chords of humanity in his soul. You talk to him about what you will spend money on, or rather, about what you need. You talk to him about his profit, his income. You appeal to his instinct rather than his spirituality. It is this little picture that shows how the system was seen and described by Adam Smith. He believed that the main regulator of the transformation of personal efforts into social well-being was competition, and competition was one of the most basic principles – the law of how the market functions.

Why competition and what does competition do? Let's, for example, think of pencils and the people who produce these pencils. In the case of competition, each of

you tries to receive income by selling as many pencils as possible. What does this do? First of all, the quantity is regulated or this competition is a regulatory mechanism, so that you produce the amount the customer, the market needs.

The second point competition regulates is price. Imagine that you set a much higher price for your pencils than it cost you to produce them. And this price is higher than the price set by others. In such a case, you will sell fewer pencils than others and you will lose. For just this reason, competition regulates the component as important as price is.

The third very important point that determines the triad on which market economy rests, is income. Price of course, implies quality; a certain price for a certain quality of products.

Let us imagine that there are only three people who produce pencils, but this is not enough because the demand is high, and since you are the only person who produces pencils, you can charge 10 lari per pencil although the cost is only 1 lari. So, you profit 9 lari per each lari spent. Meanwhile, others are busy with the production of gloves and profit 50 tetri per lari. They look at the pencil business and shift to it. But in case, as all of you taken together produce more pencils, the demand declines, and consequently the income naturally becomes regulated and goes down to a level which corresponds to the average income level in actually all economic sectors. This model was created by a man, who in terms of the philosophy of economics – later called political economy after Adam Smith – had no predecessor. That is why Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* was a real revolution in human thinking. So far, no invention, including nuclear bomb, has had such a huge effect on all mankind as Adam Smith's system.

Adam Smith called this system the *System of Perfect Liberty* – the system of perfect freedom, when the market is left alone. He used the expression *Let it be alone* ... leave this market alone. The market regulates itself on its own, it regulates how much has to be produced and what the prices need to be, so that the producers involved in this process receive more or less equal income and so on.

In France, Adam Smith met Quesnay, who was one of the thinkers at the court of Louis XIV and had ideas similar to his. He called the principle that provides for the

state's non-intervention into economic processes *laissez faire*. This term is used up till now and means total non-intervention in economic life or market functioning.

Adam Smith proposed a very interesting formulation of what the function of the government – of the authorities – should be in conditions where the market itself regulates everything. The function of the government is:

Firstly, protection from violence, wars; so that no one attacks us, no one takes what we have created away from us.

Secondly, the court must ensure fair, accurate and appropriate execution of what is called the law, so that the law works and the government is responsible for this.

Thirdly, a very interesting function ... Smith believed that the government should do the work that isn't profitable and can't be regulated by market relations at the level of individuals, businessmen or entrepreneurs. For example, he talked about the buildings of roads, or about what was called social work. The same with education: The state should spend accumulated amounts for specific purposes.

Smith actually formulated today's economics or political economy. He defined what capital was. He divided the entire material value of all that we create in two parts: What you need for your own consumption, and the rest. And he called the "rest" – something that has to be used for development and reproduction – capital. Actually he defined capital and its accumulation rules. There are two laws like this given in *The Wealth of Nations*. One is the *accumulation law* and the other is the *population law*, which was later developed by Malthus and had quite bad followers in Nazi Germany.

Adam Smith created this philosophy in a very justified, sophisticated way and convinced everyone that personal freedom, personal initiative, struggle for personal well-being is the basis for common success. Naturally, Smith isn't able to witness the difficult times that now accompany the market, like competition, for example. If we look at what is going on in today's Georgia, we are very far from the economy described by Smith.

I want you to understand literally, word for word, all I'm telling you, because all this has a direct implication on today's Georgia. A little departure ... When we talk about corruption ... It's not corruption when the chief of police builds a house on the

Sairme hill. Corruption is first of all, that we don't actually have free competition. If there's no competition, then there is no free market, no market economy. What we have is not subject to any law. Society has its laws that are necessary for its functioning. Society will never develop if it does not respect these laws. And I want you to look at Georgia's problems from this perspective. Our problem is what we politicians, authorities, don't respect even the elementary principles; without this society will never achieve success.

Adam Smith's theory was the main, consistent economic foundation for the intense development of liberalism in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Smith's theory is still one of the guides for those economists who are formulating economic theories today. For example, Milton Friedman's ideas are totally based on Adam Smith's ideas. However, there are representatives of the liberal school influenced by the ideas of social equality, equal distribution of wealth. Like-minded thinkers believe that the state should intervene in the creation of social wealth to a certain, strictly determined extent. Anyway, it was Adam Smith's ideas and his works that created the concept of modern economic liberalism, which is the basis of the entire system of the capitalist approach throughout the world.

Later, the theory of liberalism became very complex. In this context I have to mention the great thinker of the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill, who wrote in 1859 a very interesting book called *On Liberty*. Mill presents a comprehensive formulation of the modern theory of liberalism. He says that social progress and development need freedom of thought. According to Mill, freedom of thought is composed of two things: First – freedom of thought from government and authorities; Second – freedom of thought from habits and customs. To move forward, thought has to be as free from the government as from stereotypes rooted in society.

Mill stated how important it was to tolerate different opinion and that you have to adjust to the existence of opinions different than yours. Out of ten ideas, nine might be stupid, but the one you share might ensure tomorrow's success, social progress.

Mill talked in a sophisticated way about the necessity of the constitutional restriction of power in favor of human freedom. Locke said that power had to be limited, at a minimum, to not search a person without having any grounds for that. This idea sounds better elaborated here and covers the whole scope of human

freedom, including free choice of faith, freedom of speech, freedom of media ... In his book Mill actually formulated the entire system of contemporary liberalism.

One of the most interesting and attractive points about Mill's conception, which is still an inviolable principle for any liberal democracy, is the topic of minorities. Mill said that despotism can be exercised by not only individual despots but by the majority too. Mill said that society is successful and protected in cases the majority makes its decisions, but only when minorities' rights are protected. Minorities' ideas, religious beliefs and so on, have their place in society, within its integrated system. This is a very interesting insight and it becomes the determining principle that penetrates any understanding of democracy.

Alexis de Tocqueville also contributed a lot to the development of the liberal approach. In the twenties of the nineteenth century he traveled to the United States of America and wrote about his impressions in the book *Democracy in America*. This book about the U.S. is still considered to be the most accurate description of democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville was John Stuart Mill's friend. He was an anglophile, like Montesquieu, Rousseau, and many other French philosophers. He discovered a totally new perspective to develop Mill's ideas. De Tocqueville established several specific principles: Distribution of central power, which is not just the formation of the three branches, but a further distribution of power among different central agencies as well as decentralization. Proceeding from this, he spoke about the very special importance of self-governance. Mill also touched upon this theme but de Tocqueville elaborated more on the necessity of self-governance. Government should be decentralized in any direction. It should be decentralized at the central level; at the level of different agencies, which will balance each other; decentralized between central and local governments, as well as different groups of society, so that the minorities have some leverage in order to protect themselves. These have to be well developed agencies and institutions that should ensure the respect of minorities' rights. It is one of the main themes in the theory of liberalism.

Thus, in the first half of the nineteenth century a strong belief was formed, that a society can be successful and just, only if it is oriented towards individual freedom. The state shouldn't restrict an individual's activity. It is very important to protect the interests of minorities and individuals. It is necessary to have self-governance and free

opposition. From this, liberal concepts supplemented and refined the concepts that preceded the formation of democratic construction.

Imagine the mechanism described by Locke. When based on a free agreement, people from a government, form a representative government where only the representatives of the majority are elected. We could imagine any kind of majority, for example racial majority. Let's assume that in a country live 80% Caucasian people and 20% Mongolian. If the interests of this 20% are not met, they will feel discomfort all the time, and at a certain point will try to defend their rights. We will often go back to this topic, because it is the gist of democratic thinking and consciousness.

Now I want to touch upon another concept that I personally respect little of, but has had a huge impact on the development of mankind. This is the concept of socialism. If you take any successful country, you'll see that there is a balance – which can take different forms – between concepts that have been opposing each other for a long time. I mean liberalism and socialism.

In the nineteenth century, not everyone was happy about the fact mankind had entered the capitalist stage of development and not everyone approved of the accumulation of enormous wealth and resources in the hands of separate groups and people. In the nineteenth century working class movements began to gain power. This first happened in Britain, where industry had been developed much better than in Continental European countries. Just like in the Middle Ages, new concepts are born as consequences of some confrontations and struggles between people. When feudal land owners fought with the king, the *Magna Carta* was created. Now workers were looking at those fat capitalists and demanding higher wages and less work. For this purpose they organized themselves and that gradually led us to the trade union movement. By the way, those movements had a different histories in different countries. In some centuries they developed without any problems, in other centuries they were accompanied by bloodshed and repressions. Finally, by the eighteen-fifties to eighteen-sixties, workers' or trade union movements had been formed everywhere where intense development had taken place. This trade union movement was a movement of individual groups, of workers in individual enterprises who wanted to have more rights, mercantile, but vitally important rights. It went on like this until these movements became linked to a political concept, which overwhelmed mankind

and played a decisive role in its development throughout the twentieth century. This was the political concept of socialism.

The concept of socialism has a long story. You've all heard about the utopists of the Medieval centuries. Socialist utopists appeared at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century. One of them was Robert Owen, who was a rich capitalist and had a successful business somewhere in Scotland. Owen believed that the system he lived in was unjust, that the relationships in that system were unjust. So he set up a colony, as we were taught at that time, a commune, based on this approximate principle: Each person has to do some work to meet the interests of the whole commune, rather than his own interests. Please recall what I told you about Adam Smith. Smith had said when a person tries to satisfy one's own interests, by doing so he meets the interests of all mankind. Here Owen says that's not true, that we should work for the well-being of our commune rather than our own well-being. This is one of the most dangerous illusions mankind has ever had and for which it's paid a very high price. Many millions of people and many countries became victims of this illusion, including our own country. Because of this our country regressed very badly and slowed down its development for many years. However, the idea itself was so attractive that it spread very fast, first in Great Britain and then in France, where we had French utopists Saint Simon and Fourier. By the way, none of them used the term *socialism*. By the 1850s, about twenty or forty colonies had been founded in the United States. They liked the state of Indiana very much and also experimented in Texas. Fourier believed that the foundation of the first colonies was a sufficient enough example to transform all mankind to this kind of relationship, including Tibet mountains, in three or four years. You know this didn't happen.

These utopian ideas gradually evolved and gained an economic basis.

French socialist-utopists were followed by Proudhon, who was much more realistic compared to his predecessors. He viewed industrialization from the agrarian perspective, just like one of the leaders of the anti-globalism movement who makes cheese in one of the villages in France. He was pretty much, wealthy Proudhon, the immediate predecessor of Karl Marx. Marx and Engels introduced a crucial change in the formulation of socialist theory. Following Marx, this theory is called scientific socialism because Marx noted a really interesting explanation – though unacceptable for me – as to why mankind's movement in the direction of communism has no

alternative. This idea was first formulated in a document called the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. One of the most important things Marx introduced was that historical development was interpreted as a class struggle. And who wins in this class struggle?

- **The Proletariat.**

- Yes, the proletariat wins, because “it has nothing to lose but its chains”. Marx says in his *Manifesto of the Communist Party* and *Capital* that capitalism has created its own grave digger – the market – and capitalism will inevitably collapse and the proletariat will win and become the ruler. By the way, Lenin logically developed this theory and directly spoke about the necessity of a dictatorship of the proletariat. It was not Lenin’s invention, though. During the Great French Revolution, Saint-Just mentioned the dictatorship of freedom when talking about Jacobinism. For this reason republicanism as such, can never mean democracy, or moreover, liberal democracy, if republicanism is accompanied by ideologies that justify violence. Lenin repeated Saint-Just’s words – “Death to the enemies of freedom.” What an incredible combination! Despotism of freedom ... This is how Lenin spoke about the dictatorship and despotism of the proletariat. The idea of socialism, the idea of equality was formulated in the well known Marxist slogan: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his need.” It was the drug a large part of mankind lived under the influence of for one-hundred or one-hundred and fifty years ago. I recently read a very interesting statement made by an American scholar who works in the philosophy of politics. He says that the twentieth century was the period of opposition between Lenin’s and Wilson’s political ideas. It is very interesting, indeed, to look at the twentieth century from this perspective, because Lenin believed that the dominance of Marxist ideas, rather than the ideas of democratic socialism, should be ensured through forcible methods, whereas Wilson was the first one to put an end to traditional American isolationism. We will often go back to Wilson later. He said that America didn’t have a national interest, as this term was understood in the nineteenth century, at least by European states; that the only interest of America was to support freedom, liberal democracy and the self-determination of people in the whole world. Now imagine clearly these two fundamental ideas which were later institutionalized as two systems, the systems concentrated around Moscow and the western world (I don’t want to mention Washington, only). It was a bloody opposition and struggle, and you know how it ended up.

At the same time, civilized and democratized socialism started to play an extremely important role from the beginning of the twentieth century to regulate market relations for the establishment of additional social welfare mechanisms. Roughly speaking, all the economic systems that exist today represent a balance between purely liberal approaches and the approaches oriented to social problems. This does not include leftist ideologists. For example, Ludwig Erhardt, the author of German economic miracle, was a rightist even though he created the German economy, one of the most successful economies of the world, oriented to the social well-being; the first economy to create welfare state.

And here is the final concept we are going to discuss today, the one you really have to take into consideration when thinking about today's Georgia and those problems facing Georgia today. This is the concept of nationalism and the idea of nationalism. Just like the two other concepts, nationalism played an extremely important role in determining the development of mankind, especially from the thirties and forties of the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century. And very often, the twentieth century, to which we actually still belong, is called the century of nationalist movements, the century of the development of nationalism. When do you think nationalist thinking and experience was born, in general?

Now, think of one of the most dreadful episodes in the history of Georgia when Jalal Uddin invaded Tbilisi and one hundred-thousand people were beheaded on the Metekhi bridge because of their love for motherland. Were those people nationalists? Were they driven by a nationalist spirit? Or David the Builder, who created an amazingly refined system of Georgian statehood and who is still considered to be the most successful Georgian ruler, and who most successfully achieved the Georgian national interest ... Was he a nationalist?

- **He was kind of a cosmopolite, but still gave preference to what was his own.**

- That's interesting. You're introducing a pair of opposites: Cosmopolitanism versus Nationalism. By the way, nationalism was partially developed conversely to cosmopolitanism. But I don't think David the Builder was a nationalist ... He couldn't be a nationalist, because nationalism as a system of values developed only at the end of the eighteenth century. It started to develop with the French Enlighteners.

Before we get to a nationalism, which was formed counter to cosmopolitanism, I want you to understand the difference between nationalism and patriotism. Patriotism is such an old and archaic phenomenon with such a long history ... as long as ... I don't know ... probably, the Mtkvari river. Patriotism and patriots have existed since the emergence of human society. In a certain respect it is an emotion related to your home, the environment where you grew up, to your village or your neighborhood in a town, or the region, or the country you grew up in and is close to your heart. The sounds of its music are sweet to your ear ... Patriotism is an emotion, an emotional attitude to your homeland – patria. Those 100, 000 Georgian martyrs were driven by patriotism and the firmness of their faith, like every dignified person throughout history. I urge you very strongly to pay attention to this because again, when we try to analyze the course that has brought us to the present time, it will be a very important point to take into consideration.

- **Can I ask a question? Is the slogan “Fatherland, Language, Faith nationalistic of patriotic?**

- That's a good question. “Fatherland, Language, Faith” is the formula for Georgian nationalism. It's an amazing thing ...

The difference between nationalism and patriotism is that nationalism is not an emotion. It's an intellectual concept, a very clearly formed system of beliefs, and I'll say it again, it's not an emotion. It's a pragmatic opinion about how your nation should achieve success! In political thinking the development of nationalism is, of course, related to the development of the concept of *nation*. The term *nation* appeared quite late in the political thinking, somewhere at the end of the eighteenth century. At least, it acquired the present meaning in that period.

In Europe, Mazzini is considered to be one of the fathers of nationalism – its symbol. Mazzini was one of the leaders of the Italian liberation movement. By the way, he was probably the first one to create a consistent system of beliefs about modern European nationalism. He had a very interesting definition: What's a country in a nationalist's opinion? It's not a territory. Territory is only a basis of what this country is. It's an idea that emerges from this basis, on the basis of this territory; but in addition to the territory, it's a feeling of love, the experience of love that unites all the children of this territory through the emotion of brotherhood ... Such a poetic description emphasizes the fact that concept of nation or state consists of several

components: The existence of a common territory, a common cultural heritage, linguistic unity or the existence of a common language, certain customs – and from this, a common world outlook. I am saying it again that in this respect, the concept of nation, and consequently of nationalism appeared at the end of the eighteenth century and underwent intensive development in the nineteenth century.

They distinguish two main traditions with nationalism. Arbitrarily, these are the English-French tradition, called classical nationalism, and German tradition which is called romantic nationalism. Classical nationalism or liberal nationalism originates from the works of Diderot and Rousseau. Rousseau formulated the idea of national sovereignty, and based on this, along with the development of liberal ideas, formed the idea – it formed especially fast in France in the period of Great Revolution – that all nations are as equal as all humans. All nations have the right to self-determination and the right to rule themselves instead of being ruled by foreigners, and this governance has to be democratic. This is one of the main principles of liberal nationalism. By the way, the fathers of liberal thinking, of liberal concepts, contributed a lot to the development of nationalism. In his book *Considerations on Representative Government*, John Stuart Mill clearly formulated the principle called modern liberal nationalism. In this work he reiterates that all nations are equal and that each nation has the right to self-determination and this right to determine oneself can be enjoyed in cases of democratic governance, when the nation governs itself.

We'll be talking separately about the international situation in the relevant epoch, but Mazzini became the first ideologist of a united Italy. He endeavored to unite all the states of the country, pool efforts, liberate the country from the rule of the Austrian Empire and create an independent state. By the way, the rest of Europe viewed the nationalist movement in Italy very positively. Yet, as often is the case, Mazzini was a very tragic figure. He created young Italy's national movement. It was the first accomplishment of something that is still going on in today's world – in China, Turkey or Japan. It was Mazzini who formed the first nationalist organization of this type, and when Italy was liberated, Mazzini was declared a traitor to national ideas by Garibaldi and Baron Tavor. After that, Mazzini had to live in Italy under a false name. He died an outcast in the liberated Italy of his dreams. So remember that history is full of the paradoxes like this. I also want to draw your attention to another thing: When it was thought that only large nations had the right to self-determination,

conversely from small states and nations, even the fathers of liberal nationalism like Mill and Mazzini considered Iceland a country, which was then too small to enjoy the right to self-determination.

Classical, liberal nationalism played a crucial role in the development of twentieth century nationalism, but the latter was not perfected until Woodrow Wilson created a major revolution in international relations after 1914, World War I. Before that, the *Threshold Principle* was inviolable. Wilson rejected this principle and by creating the first international organization – the League of Nations – After World War I, many more nations had the chance to determine themselves. Before Wilson, only twelve ... fifteen states existed in Europe. After Wilson there were twenty-five nation states in Europe. Since the threshold principle was no longer applicable, at the beginning of the twentieth century nationalist and self-determination movements spread not only to Eastern Europe, but also to the Arabic world, India, Indochina, and Asia. From the fifties of the twentieth century these tendencies expanded to Africa, and much earlier to South America and actually became the guiding principle for the self-determination of nation.

One of the first founders of romantic nationalism was a very interesting German philosopher, a philosopher of history – Herder, who, at the end of the eighteenth century, gave his own interpretation of the essence of nation. He used the term *Volk*, that can be translated as people, nation. *Volk* is an entity a person belongs to, not because of his free choice, but from his very birth. Depending on what your native language is, the place where you were born, in which environment, and what your heritage is – you belong to this or that *Volk*. Herder himself had lots of respect for every nation, but unlike those who followed the tradition of liberal nationalism which said that all nations were equal, Herder declared that all nations were different; that every nation had its own spirit. Yes, every nation is different, every nation is individual and unique. You see, the idea itself is very beautiful and doesn't contain any threat. On the contrary. While it was an apology for the uniqueness of each nation, it became dangerous when this idea about the national spirit started to develop into a political theory. By the way, Herder was Immanuel Kant's student and was one of the best representatives of Germany in that period. There were a lot of small states in Germany at that time. The German idea, as such, was not at all important to Herder. In general, he didn't fight for the unification of small German states and kingdoms. He didn't put political unification on the agenda. Some

movements in this direction were observed then, but they didn't appeal to Herder very much.

One of Herder's students was another well known German philosopher, Fichte, who further elaborated on the idea of romantic nationalism. Fichte believed the history of mankind was the history of the development of national spirits. What the world would be at any single moment depended on the interrelationship of these national spirits. No matter how strange it might sound, because of these truly unique and lofty ideas, the Nazi ideology developed right from the German nationalist tradition. See how dangerous it can be to bring terms that seem to be beautiful and totally innocent into political thinking. One-hundred and fifty years passed from Herder's period to Hitler's. For Herder, national individuality, national uniqueness didn't imply the discrimination of other nations. Herder believed Germans had made the greatest contribution to European civilization but he didn't think, for example, that the French and the English had fewer rights than Germans. The philosopher Chamberlain was Hitler's predecessor. He created racist and to a large extent, nationalist ideology. In this case, nationalism implied that "my nation stands above all the other nations". So, Herder's romantic nationalistic idea and the idea of nationalistic exclusiveness developed into the Nazi idea.

I find it extremely important that you realize what can be caused by, so to speak, political concepts that aren't based on pragmatic, natural or healthy theories but on theories that require a sort of artificial approach to human nature.

Why did racism emerge? A more horrible idea has never appeared than the idea of Nazism, which justifies the killing of millions of people, for example, in gas chambers, only because they are Jews. How did it happen that such a monstrous philosophy emerged in a Germany that gave mankind so many wonderful things in art, philosophy, music and literature? The thing is, when the ideas of romantic idealism, which sounded so fascinating in the poetry of Heine, became the guiding principle for politicians, they gradually modified into something monstrous like Nazism. The romanticism that's Beethoven's music is truly a great accomplishment for world culture, but when you use irrational terms to explain the development of your state, your nation, and make predictions, this becomes very dangerous, indeed. I'm a strong supporter of liberalism and might be biased to some extent, but I believe that any idea

that isn't based on a healthy and natural understanding of the human being or society, is bound to cause very many problems.

As for the development of nationalism ... At the beginning of the nineteenth century classical nationalism spread throughout Europe, after Napoleon's wars, when Napoleon exported the ideas of the French Revolution into Europe and created legal systems; not only did he conquer the German states, Italy, and so on, but he also started to spread *bacillus*, as Metternich said. Along with Napoleon's wars, the ideas of French cosmopolitanism spread, which actually were Franco-centric cosmopolitanism. Beyond the ideas of European unity, brotherhood, unity and love, stood an intense Franco-centric policy which expressed the dominance of the French language, French ideas, French style of dressing, French architecture and so on. As a reaction to French cosmopolitanism, national ideas and national movements began to develop intensely in all of present-day Europe - Spain, Holland, Greece and other countries.

A correct understanding of nationalism is extremely important for us contemporary Georgians. I was talking to you about the classical liberal traditions and romantic nationalism. Which category do you think Georgia fits, in terms of its recent developments? Which nationalism do you belong to? One of the main problems is that we don't have a pragmatic understanding of our national interest. Let us take Abkhazian issues, for example. How does the Georgian public react to these problems? There are very few political groups - for example, Zurab Chavchavadze, an apologist of Georgia-Abkhazia unity - who say everywhere, and also in Sukhumi, that we are one, indivisible, historical, ethnic and political unit. The other biggest part of the political sector, including the people who are very much respected today, have developed a totally different ideology. They say that the Abkhaz are Apsua, that they came from somewhere and had never lived here before ... this gap has widened. This is the romantic nationalism type of reaction to this concrete case, the reaction of this nation, of this public to the Abkhazian issue. One way is to be pragmatic and try to fill the gap and unite the nation and the other way is to finally split the Georgians and the Abkhaz, talk constantly about your exclusiveness, your exclusive rights in relation to this territory and try to solve the problem by force.

Another thing we Georgians like to do very much is invent external enemies, enemies that establish bad ideas with us and bring any kind of misfortune - in

general. There was a need for patriotism, modern patriotism, but this kind of nationalism, the nationalism that developed along with us was brought by a bad man. At that time, it was just a manifestation of our spiritual culture and our laziness. I'm not talking about the things that only happened fifty years ago, by the way. A very important topic in today's Georgia is whether a person's nationality should be entered into the passport. From the perspective of classical nationalism, the issue is as clear as two times two is four. Look at what we're talking about. Imagine Georgia, where 30% of the total population is composed of ethnically non-Georgians. What should be the objective of the Georgian state in relation to these people? One way is to make them think they're different and tell them that you are different and are related to the Georgian state in a different way than I – as a Georgian – am. The other way is to gradually integrate them. I don't want to use the word *assimilation*, although this means their assimilation; to involve them in a common national process.

Which way is beneficial for the Georgian state? Before Georgia, many states existed as independent states and their experience is successful in this respect. Among such states are our neighbor countries. For example, one of the most dynamically developing countries, not only in our region, but also in the world, is the Republic of Turkey. There the share of ethnically Seljuk Turks constitutes the minority of the total population. Some scientists think they compose 50%, others say that it is 45%. The rest of the population is composed of Kurds, Laz, Greeks and Armenians and other ethnic groups. What kind of policy did Turkey choose? Now imagine what would have happened if they had issued a decree in 1918 or 1920 saying that the Turkish passport of every Laz shall say – *Laz, a citizen of Turkey*, or *Georgian, a citizen of Turkey*, in the case of Georgians, or *Kurd, a citizen of Turkey*, in the case of Kurds. What would today's Turkey be like after all this? Many of you have probably been to Turkey. In the Georgian speaking provinces I've met Turks of Georgian origin, speaking very good Georgian. They even said in a private conversation "Of course, I'm a Turk." This shows that they consider themselves the citizens of the state they live in.

It's not confidential, so I can tell you about the debates between Shevardnadze and I regarding the issue I was just talking about. It was an expanded meeting of the Security Council attended by lots of people. Suddenly Shevardnadze told me. "You're wrong, Zurab. We have to do it like this. During the Soviet period we fought for this all the time, for having the word *Georgian* in our passport."

I said, “But the thing is, what we as Georgians wanted from the Soviet Union is the same as what the Azeri and Armenians want from Georgia. Of course, the minorities are interested in acquiring special status by this account because your constitution recognizes all its citizen’s rights, but when you write there, in the passport, that this person is a citizen of Georgia, plus Azeri – by doing so – you undertake additional responsibility, a very specific responsibility that you’ll take care of his language, his culture, uniqueness, a uniqueness that is different from that of Georgian...”

You can’t have the idea of separatism in Ajara, the idea of separation from Georgians. There’s a political problem there, there’s a problem with a concrete political leader and his attitude to other political leaders. Wasn’t this theme artificially introduced and presented with so many other problems?

This discussion of nation building and the most important issues pertinent to it cannot be postponed. It is very important that we learn to understand we are children of our independent country. There are two approaches to it. One is that any group of people, in this case our people, our nation, has concrete problems you can’t find an effective explanation for. So you start inventing absurd, conspiratorial theories and say you can’t eradicate corruption, not because you don’t know how, but because of some conspiracy against your country; for instance, because Masons and Zionists are intervening, and so on and so on. In reality, the key to the problem is there on the surface. You just have to see it and evaluate. The same applies to any other issue that is related to the success of our nation and future well-being. We have to learn to be pragmatic. We have to learn to see what our national interests are.

Georgia has this kind of experience. We’ll talk about the wonderful experience Georgian politicians have created. Let’s think of David the Builder. We think he was a guy who swished his sword left to right ... In reality, he was a person, who four hundred years before Richelieu, created the concept of the so-called national interest. David the Builder didn’t go to the mosque because he was sentimental ... He definitely wasn’t and could pledge thousands of people without any problem whenever the state needed this. He went to the mosque to send a “message” to all the Muslim subordinates, to all Judaist subordinates, Armenians and others, to tell them that they were as dear to him as the people of Georgian origin, that they were full

citizens of Georgia just like Georgians by their origin. So we've had such a precedent in Georgia.

Unfortunately, we've never declared our responsibility to think in terms of the interests of the integrated state of Georgia and look for those ways, take those decisions, that bring us more success.

We reject the solution of concrete problems because we operate on some irrational and absurd concepts. Instead of solving our concrete problems, we invent some world where some flying dragons live that have to be fought off with swords. And we do this instead of tangibly building our state and solving concrete problems.

I wanted to familiarize you with those three concepts, even in general terms, as we have today. I'm talking about the concepts of liberalism, socialism and nationalism. These three factors were the driving force that largely determined the history of mankind during the last two hundred years and all three ideas are still topical for our country. Any questions?

- You said that we Georgians lack national self-awareness. It's true. Why is that? What's the reason?

- It's deeper than the socialist slogan.

- When we were brought up, they cultivated national awareness in us, but still ...

I think this question is about what are the main problems of Georgian nationalism, of the Georgian state – I mean this when using the word nationalism. I want us to think about them together during these two months. I want to know what you think about this issue. It's clear that Georgian national self-awareness isn't as strong as that of other nations. There's a lot of blah-blah-blah in our case, which is a shame, but we have to admit that regional self-identification is also very strong in us. And there are regions where regional self-identification is much more important than national self-identification. This does not mean, that these people deny they're Georgian. But they are, first of all, if we look at this seriously. One of the main things is that very many nations weren't an entity formed from the very beginning, and you have to understand this. Many nations and most nationalities are an artificial concept. Let's think of Germany, for example. Germany was established within its present borders only after Bismarck. I ask you, why isn't Austria a part of Germany and why

is Austrian self-awareness different from German? These are clearly two different nations, different national unities. This is an artificial concept. The same is true for Italy. Italy was divided – before Mazzini and Garibaldi – into small states and territories, formed as a union only in the second half of the nineteenth century. I personally think that Georgia is also an artificial concept. There was a fantastic moment in Georgian historiography when Parnavaz became the sovereign of an integrated Georgia. At a certain point he was approached by the king of Kolchhis, Kuji, who told him that he wanted Parnavaz to be above them all, to become their master. So Kuji agreed to become a feudal leader in a centralized administrative system. I don't know whether this is a legend or a historical fact, but even if it is a legend, it is very important for me – as an acting politician. Kuji could have approached someone non-Georgian instead of Parnavaz to form a separate state there. This is why it is very important that you, the people, who will contribute to the formation of state and undertake your share of responsibility, understand that this process is still going on. Maybe Britain was formed as the present national union because it was surrounded by the ocean and sea, but in Continental Europe national unions were basically formed like this. This process is still going on. And do you know why it's important to understand this? Because an Armenian from Javakheti and an Azeri from Marneuli should naturally become part of this unity. Along with the love for this country and loyalty, they should be related to it through the experience of unity, just like the residents of Kakheti, Guria or Samegrelo. We are now forming modern Georgian nationalism and we have to understand this. Otherwise, this will be a very weak point for our country, our homeland.

- Does it mean that an Azeri in Georgia is Georgian?

- Of course, in political terms he is Georgian. He might speak Azeri, but he is Georgian by his subordination, by his citizenship. I'm sure if we had Mr. Guram Sharadze here, he'd feel very disappointed.

- You talked about classical nationalism, romantic nationalism, but as I know there is also a more widespread aspect which is called ethno-nationalism, which is quite topical issue today, at least in Georgia. And often, when you were talking about nationalism and giving explanations, I had an impression that you were talking about ethno-nationalism.

- Yes, it was like this when I was talking about romantic nationalism. Of course, I talked about this today. Tomorrow I'll be talking about the history of the formation of nation states, and it'll probably be the end of this introductory part. I'll talk about how nation states were formed, how differently they approached international relations at different stages and how we've arrived at the type of international relations we presently have and proceeding from this, from what perspective Georgia can view this whole system of international relations. And at this point we'll get back very substantially to the idea of nationalism. But you have to understand that I only spoke about two traditions, even though there are many more forms of nationalism. Let's take Zionism as an example, that was created in the second half of the nineteenth century by Theodor Herzl. This is a very different and interesting type of nationalism. Although it was created for one nation, the Jewish nation, it had a surprisingly large impact on the formation of nationalist feelings and beliefs among other peoples. So, we'll get back to these issues at our future meetings.

- Is democracy a system which enables us to go through this process in the most optimal way?

- Yes, of course.

- I want to know how you justify this. And the other issue is related to the national idea. When we reached independence, we knew that we wanted independence, but we didn't know what we wanted it for, what we were doing this for ... Difficult to explain. We have to clarify our motivation in relation to independence and to realize how this process should develop. How will today's system and the way we are following today, facilitate this process in the future?

- I'm sure that strong, integrate Georgian self-awareness can be formed only when Georgians pursue democracy. I'm sure that the entire tradition of our development, the tradition of Georgian development, ensures that it's inevitable that Georgia can become stable only in the event of democracy. By the way, when our group was in America not long ago, one of the messages we tried to transmit, and we managed to do it very successfully, was that Georgia is very different from the other countries in the region because we can be stable only if we have democracy. This doesn't apply to people of every culture. There are many nations around us, who can live in a very different way, in a different system, and this won't make them organize protest marches in the streets and cause destabilization. Of course, stability is a

necessary precondition for the development of economy. In the end, the formation of an integrated economic system, as well as common institutions, plays a huge role in the formation of common self-awareness. By the way, different countries have a different vision of this. An Italian delegate, Mazzini's contemporary, said at a first session of the Italian Parliament: "We have created Italy. Now, the only thing we have left to do is to create Italians." Even Pilsudski, a well known hero, fighter for Poland's liberation said: "It's not the nation that forms the state it is rather the state that forms nation." Thus, a stable state forms and unifies nation. This needs some historical experience of successful common existence. This is what I think.

- However, we won't be able to establish forms of governance without cultural unity.

- Of course. It sounds a bit imperative when he says that the state, in the first place ... the words of delegate, "that we have to create Italy now" ... Maybe, first, some ideological basis ...

- Of course it was an exaggeration, because if not for some unity in Italy, Italy wouldn't have been shaped into its present form. Thank God, Georgians have a firm basis for feeling strongly towards national unity, because we really have an historical experience we can be proud of. We are also united by many common sentiments. Each of you and your friends from, for example Telavi or Zugdidi, get excited from the same episodes of our history, by the same facts and so on. So, there are many factors that could unify our nation and this is the basis all of you have to work on.

- Is it only about the territory in case of Abkhazia, or there is something else?

- A very good question. I am not a professional historian, but as far as I know, the history of Georgia and the history of Abkhazia, despite the fact that the Abkhaz language is much more different from Georgian than Svanetian, this never prevented the Abkhaz from experiencing themselves a part of Georgian unity. This unity split and as a result, the Abkhaz formed a separate national awareness. They started to separate themselves from this common Georgian context and by doing so tried to separate themselves from the rest of Georgia. But let's not talk about the topics waiting ahead for us. I want us to follow the order I'm suggesting, because I want to repeat once again that ...

- **What do you think about Samtskhe-Javakheti? Should we give them autonomy?**

- Samtskhe-Javakheti is a different story. Of course, you can't give it any autonomy and in general, you shouldn't give anyone anything, because the main law is that once you allow someone something – I don't only mean territories populated by ethnic minorities – you'll never get it back and it can only be taken back through bloody clashes.

(A question that cannot be heard)

- I think we'll discuss this separately at our future meetings. But I have a feeling that in Caucasian relations, in relations that have developed between Caucasian peoples in the last fifteen centuries, for example, the religious factor was a dominant, determining factor. I've traveled in the North Caucasus a lot, together with Naira Gelashvili. We had a movement called "The Caucasus – Our Common House." And I remember quite well that even the most rigid Chechen leaders would always remember with pride that before the sixteenth century, the Chechen, Vainakhs and Ingush were Christians and even today there is a wonderful Christian cathedral there. They had Christianity oriented towards the Georgian Church, but unfortunately, the Georgian church was also very weak that time. The counterargument to the statement that the religious factor was crucial in Abkhazia, is Ajara. Ilia's trip to Ajara was a fantastic phenomenon. Ilia was the first who reinforced among Georgians the idea that a Georgian is Georgian, irrespective of whether he is a Muslim or Christian. Before that, Georgian identity implied Christian identity, and moreover, Orthodox identity. Ilia denied that, despite being a very religious person and said it's possible to have Georgian identity even when your religious identity is Muslim. By doing so, he placed Georgian identity above that. And this idea had a very big impact on Ajara and the rest of Georgia. My dear friends! I ask you not to shift to modern Georgian problems, because if you don't deeply realize what I've been talking about, you'll always find yourself at a dead end when trying to solve Georgian problems. And also, if you misbehave, at the next lecture your assignment will be to read *Capital*.

Lecture IV

THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The historical overview presented to you during the previous lectures won't be complete until we look at how the world has taken its present shape; the international system Georgia exists in nowadays is guided by the international relations which have determined the nature of the present world. We might believe that the kings, leaders and political figures of the seventh or twelfth century Georgia applied the same terminology to describe the processes around them as we do, or even if the wording was different, that they assessed the events like we do today. I hope you've noted several specific examples of how differently we define the notion of democracy in comparison to the average Athenian citizen. In the same way, our modern understanding of what the relations between various nations were and how the world was constructed, differs considerably from the opinions on the same issues made around four or five-hundred years ago.

Today we are going to look at those interesting, intriguing events that took place in Europe in the last three to four-hundred years, and in North America too; as they have determined the nature of today's international relations, the system in which the modern world exists. I'd like to stress that the history of modern international relations coincides with the history of establishing nation states. Essentially, it's the history of how successful countries with rich natural resources forced other nations to follow their rules of the game, known as international relations. It has happened, as if symbolically, that every century had its own dominant nation which dictated these rules to Europe and later to the entire world, shaping and re-shaping it at their will. The seventeenth century Europe was radically altered by Cardinal Richelieu. As a result, France – up till then a marginal, relatively insignificant country – became

powerful and clearly dominant in Europe. It was Richelieu who introduced the notion of *Raison d'état*, or the concept of national interest as a guiding principle. In the eighteenth century, England successfully counterbalanced France's domineering position and introduced the system called *balance of power*, which acted as a counterweight for the singular and advanced role of France in Europe. In the nineteenth century, the Austrian Empire played an influential role. It had been referred to as the Holy Roman Empire until the turn of the nineteenth century and although it was rather weak and shaky in later times, its success was determined by the lucky fact that Clemens von Metternich was the Chancellor; a man of exquisite intelligence and unlimited opportunities. Thanks to the system he created, weak Austria found itself in the center of European political events. This serves as an example of how an extremely able and intelligent figure can slow down, even practically reverse the wheel of history. The Austrian Empire became dominant in the nineteenth century and later passed its exclusive position to Germany, which had risen from the nations of the Prussian Empire. We're also going to discuss how Otto von Bismarck managed to strip old Austria of its past glory, unite the formerly disjointed German lands and establish the most powerful nation in Europe. In the twentieth century, more precisely, from 1919 onwards, an entirely new political player emerged in the world – the United States. The twentieth century is definitely dominated by the US, as it managed to slowly, gradually force old Europe to accept the system of its values and to follow its rules of game.

The evolution, which began in the sixteenth century, is based on the opposition of several concepts. When we discussed Medieval Europe, I told you that the world and its nations were organized along the idea of universality. In essence, it meant that human societies had to be mirror reflections of the heavenly world. Since there is one God, one ruler so to speak, there had to be one universal church common to everyone. In the western world, the Catholic Church had assumed this universality, with the Pope as its leader. Likewise, the secular world had to be organized along the same guidelines, where an empire was the ideal with the emperor at its head; suchlike was the Holy Roman Empire. Opposed to this tradition of universality, or more precisely, opposed to the institution of the Pope, Reformation emerged on the German territories. Eventually, an entirely new system was created on the British Isles, where the Anglican Church with the monarch as its head, became independent from the Roman Catholic Church. Interestingly, the principle of universality was never fully realized in the Holy Roman Empire, throughout its long history. It

officially ceased to exist in 1804, during the Napoleonic Wars, when Napoleon conquered Vienna. The Holy Empire had existed since the third, fourth centuries, so it actually enjoyed a long history. At various stages of power, the Empire ruled over or included vast territories, such as the Pyrenees – today’s Spain and Portugal. In the north, it included modern Holland and Belgium, called the Austrian Netherlands until the nineteenth century. It exercised its influence in over three-hundred German counties and kingdoms, but it was Bismarck who succeeded in unifying them into a country. The Empire comprised of Italy and the lands eastward, up to the Russian borders, and southward, to the borders of Turkey, the former Ottoman Empire. Despite its vastness, the Empire failed to spread the principle of universality across Europe and failed to apply it to controlling the continent. The kings of France were weaker than those of Vienna, the kings of Spain were also weak, when the Hapsburg dynasty ruled for a long time. Generally speaking, the Hapsburg dynasty is the longest-ruling monarchy line of the Holy Roman Empire. Although the Hapsburgs reigned there too, Spain managed to occasionally escape the Austrian Empire’s sphere of influence. The principle determined their politics, but it didn’t in the least bit mean that the principle was ever fully and completely applied. And indeed, there was no moment in history when all west European nations came under the universality principle as one, when they could be considered to have submitted to one single scheme. No one questioned the demand of various peoples, nations, societies to accept the system as infallible. In this respect, we need to bear in mind two significant elements: the first – the subjects of the Roman Catholic Church, and the second – the subjects of the Emperor’s throne, or that of the Holy Roman Emperor.

Such was the widespread and unquestionable concept, philosophy or viewpoint of those times. And it was at this moment in history when a genius appeared on the political stage, a person of such astuteness, it can hardly be matched. I don’t know many world figures whose biographies are so paradoxical. I’m talking about the head of the government of Louis XIII – Cardinal Richelieu. As his title suggests, he was a high-ranking cleric of the Roman Catholic Church, who began his career as a priest. You might have seen many films in which Richelieu is depicted as a vicious and dumb character. Incidentally, it’s because of Dumas and the enormous popularity of his novels that Richelieu is seen as a ridiculous figure by the general public. In reality, he was the man who brought two-hundred or two-hundred-fifty years of guaranteed hegemony of France on a platter. He turned France into what we call a super-state

today – the country of incontestable dominance in Europe. How did it happen? Let's look at the history.

At the times of Richelieu, Ferdinand II ascended the throne of the Roman Empire, by which I mean the Austrian Empire with Vienna as its center. He was a typical Hapsburg, described by his contemporaries as a man of high moral standards. In general, Hapsburgs were all stern followers of their principles and never wavered from their viewpoints on the world structure. And the principle of the universal system laid at the heart of their beliefs.

What happened during the times of Ferdinand II?

Well before his accession, when he was the Archduke and heir to the throne, he had to face the issue of the growing popularity of Reformation on the German territories. You'll remember that Martin Luther's reforms began in the middle of the sixteenth century. Luther's ideology had a much stronger impact, at least on Europeans, than the theory of Communism did on mankind. The idea that common people were able to read the bible in their own language, that they could communicate with God without the clergy and get the divine message directly, was indeed a revolutionary step, as people gained unrestricted freedom to reach the supreme meaning – God. It meant society became much freer, which explains the popularity of Luther's reforms. Simultaneously, Reformation of the kind began to spread to Italy and Switzerland – like Calvinism. At approximately this time, Henry VIII established the Church of England to practice Anglicanism. Not surprisingly, Reformation acquired huge popularity across many German lands, especially when German prince himself left the Catholic Church and converted to Protestantism. Naturally, this entailed logical developments. For instance, when you've converted to Protestantism, but the Catholic Church, archbishops and monasteries own enormous property in your country. Why should the Catholic Church possess so much land, so many villages? So lands and property were appropriated. As I mentioned, the Hapsburgs were stubborn in their adherence to principles, failing to keep up with the times, actually becoming "hostages of their own fossilized principles." As Ferdinand II ascended the throne of the Holy Roman Empire, he faced the following situation: Right in the heart of his Empire, close to Vienna in neighboring Germany, an unimaginable rift had appeared, threatening the very foundation of his world, of

everything he believed in. And he began a relentless struggle to combat his Protestant threat.

Now we can look at what Cardinal Richelieu, the head of French Catholicism, was doing in Paris. He was a deeply religious man, not cynical at all. For him, eternal life – life after death – and similar beliefs were truly significant, as opposed to an atheist. What should Richelieu do in face of the century-old tradition of the universalism principle? Naturally, he should show solidarity with his fellow-Catholic Ferdinand II, in what appeared to be holy war against Protestantism. It would be natural because he had to confront dangerous heresy in order for the Catholic Church, rather than the state, to triumph. But believe it or not, Richelieu acted in a contradictory way. He claimed that as long as Vienna, the heart of the Holy Roman Empire, exists and remains powerful, there was no hope for France. Imagine France surrounded by the Austrian Netherlands, today's Belgium, from the north, the German territories from the east, Italian counties and Spain from the south, all parts of the Holy Roman Empire with the Hapsburgs ruling in each of them. What were the chances for France, virtually surrounded from every side?

Richelieu justifiably introduced the notion which has since become a determining factor for every self-respecting country in establishing its national policy. It's the notion of *Raison d'état*, which can be translated as the state or national interest. What's its essence? Richelieu, and the French governmental structures under his guidance, ceased to follow the principle of universality. Instead, they chose to follow the purely national interest of France. What was the national French interest at that time? It was to weaken the Holy Roman Empire. What did Cardinal Richelieu, one of the primary hierarchs of the Roman Catholic Church do to achieve this aim? He conspired with the Protestants, financed the king of Sweden and several German princes. Moreover, he concurred with the Ottoman rulers, deftly instigating them to create problems for Vienna from the south-east. He openly announced his aim to ignite in the heart of the Empire – in present-day Germany – a fire of such enormity that it would prevent Vienna from looking towards its western province, France, for many years to come. His effective scheming and plotting resulted in one of the bloodiest wars ever in the heart of Europe – the so-called Thirty Year War, which began in 1618 and ended in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia. Pretty much until the Napoleonic Wars, the system adopted by the Treaty of Westphalia shaped Europe and gave rise to national states and establishment of the principle called the balance

of power. It's really amazing that during the War, rebellious German princes suggested ending the war to Ferdinand II. The population of Germany decreased by 60%; six men to every ten perished. It was by far, the most destructive war. It affected not only Protestant, but Catholic territories as well. Unprecedented bloodshed swept across the Austrian Empire in those thirty years. The German princes implored Ferdinand II: "Let us stop the bloodshed. We are prepared to remain the subjects of the Empire, admit your supremacy. In return, you should allow us to exercise our right to follow the Protestant faith, don't dispossess us of the lands taken from the Catholic Church and monasteries, let them be controlled by their present owners." As I said before, Ferdinand, exhausted as he was, remained a man of rigid principles. It would've been logical even for him to agree to the suggestion. What could have been more natural than to grant the right to exercise religious choice to a group of people who wished to remain his subjects? But he refused. This is the major difference between Richelieu and his contemporary political figures; between Richelieu and Ferdinand II, whose lives were in radical opposition to each other. And Richelieu was the winner in this confrontation; consequently, it was the country whose policy he directed – France.

So it happened that Richelieu introduced the principle of *Raison d'état*, however, the other principle, that of universalism, was still quite dominant. When Louis XIV, the Sun King, came to power, he faced an altered reality: a weakened Austria, disjointed countries, impoverished lands, enormous human loss, ruined economics and devastated resources. Nothing could prevent France from becoming the dominating power in Europe. In one way or another, many European countries found themselves involved in the Thirty Year War, but Richelieu was its true conductor. He was the first to discover that no matter what alliances lie on the surface, the main guiding principle should be the national interest of your own country. If it is within your interest to weaken your fellow-Catholic Austria, you should ally with its enemies. I've mentioned earlier that Niccolo Machiavelli preceded Richelieu with a similar principle. His book *The Prince* was comprised of advice to his sovereign, Lorenzo Medici. Machiavelli himself wasn't an active political figure, though he had tried to pursue a political career, he wasn't successful. He remains important for modern political theory, thanks to his principle: "Politics should be valued not for the aspirations and ambitions of the politicians, but should be assessed by the results achieved." In other words, if you are a ruler, a politician, it doesn't matter what ambitions and dreams you harbor, the most important thing is to achieve your goals,

and then the aim justifies the means, and, eventually, you are judged in terms of how successful you were and what means you adopted in order to reach your goal.

I'd like to remind you that Cromwell's revolution took place at that time too; Charles I was beheaded and so on. Eventually, it all ended with what is referred to as the Glorious Revolution when William of Orange ascended the English throne in 1688 as the first constitutional monarch.

Now try to imagine what William of Orange could see on the Continent from across the English Channel. He clearly saw France powerfully rising amid the shambles of the war's aftermath. What reaction could the British monarch have had, being Dutch by origin? Belgium and Holland were under control of various powers during various periods. He saw that Louis XIV was all set to seize Belgium, with its numerous forts, castles and ports which provided easy access to the English coast. Needless to say, William of Orange wasn't at all thrilled to see Louis XIV supporting the arts and building Versailles and so on. He must have been extremely uneasy at the thought that the French would reach his island, and that the unquestionable French dominance in Europe would put serious limitations to the potential of his monarchy.

The principle of *Raison d'état* as a political tool didn't remain long in the French monopoly. Many other nations adopted it at times when, as a consequence of William of Orange's fears and worries, England began to form numerous alliances, and rather successfully at that. It was William of Orange who managed to establish the so-called Grand Alliance, which included Spain, the Netherlands, Austria and various German lands, with the aim of outweighing France. This is the previously mentioned balance of power which, though greatly modified, still exists and plays a significant part in the modern world. Nothing like it was imagined before the described historical events.

In its essence, the balance of power principle means there are no more or less permanent alliances between nations; therefore we can't say that in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries some countries were allies for several decades, for example, Russia and Germany, Russia and Austria, Russia and France, or any others. Countries always tried to choose partners by carefully considering the balance, cautious not to violate the rules set by powerful European players. Here again it's interesting to look at the rationale behind the principle. The idea that the strength of each country is balanced by its cooperation with other countries, is then projected onto the larger

entity – like the world – is the principle that provides for the welfare of mankind, to the extent that the balance of power is preserved at all levels and on all scales.

It was at that period that an English political priority emerged, demonstrating an interesting approach to continental politics. It existed throughout Churchill's terms until the end of World War II and was later adopted by the U. S. What's the nature of this principle? The British decided they had no interests on the continent, or rather, no territorial interest in Europe. Instead, it transferred all its efforts to secure its position on the seas, as its fleet remained undefeated through the centuries until 1945, when the U.S. emerged as a huge marine power. No other nation had ever defeated the British at sea, which is why it's often referred to as the Queen of the Ocean; an epithet the British take particular pride in. Thanks to its fleet, Britain managed to colonize so many nations overseas.

Their reasoning was: "Why should we fight the Germans, French or Italians when we can move into Africa?" That's how the British conquered India, this extremely rich subcontinent, with only a couple of battalions. Thus, the British were guided by the principle of not having any territorial interests in Europe; their only vital interest was to not let any European nation get powerful enough to create a realistic threat to Britain itself. Being separated from the Continent, Britain felt safe. Considering the possibilities of the time, in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, the English Channel was a serious obstacle for reaching the British coast. Britain decided it would interfere with European issues only when some nation had the audacity to cross the Channel. From that time onwards, Britain took on a special function in European politics: It has always been on the side of a country fighting against the emerging power of any nation at any historical moment.

Incidentally, there were two alternative approaches in early Britain: The Whigs, supporting the idea of isolation, maintained there was no need to react or send a military contingent to Europe unless there was a direct threat, while the Tories believed in taking preventive measures well before such a treat became realistic. This presents an extremely interesting seventeenth century dilemma, when the insular character of the British Isles, or the idea of isolation was quite strong. In a sense, the idea was a forerunner of U.S. isolation, when the approach was copied at the end of the nineteenth century. More specifically, there were debates as to whether the U.S. should intervene with the establishment of the new world order. As for Britain, its

economic and industrial development became a decisive factor, consequently, the U.S. was obliged to not only think about its safety, but to seriously participate in European events in order to secure its long-term economic interests. This policy became conclusive for the U.S. at the turn of the twentieth century.

During the Napoleonic Wars, when events fluctuated kaleidoscopically, Britain often changed its allies. At one point it allied with Prussia, then opposed it; first it supported Austria, then turned against it and so on. I give you these examples so that you will clearly see how important the British guiding principle of the balance of power was at the time when France emerged as a powerful state and Britain was obliged to introduce a principle to balance its domineering position.

However, the idea of balance doesn't always work ideally and flawlessly, for which the Napoleonic Wars can be an illustration. After the French Revolution, Napoleon Bonaparte succeeded in directing enormous energy freed by the nation. And like a tidal wave destroys a small dam, he toppled the European system of balance and, though for a relatively short period, managed to hold the hegemonic position.

From the Napoleonic Wars onwards, Russia began to play a significant role in the European balance of power. In fact, Russia saved Europe and the world twice from totalitarian hegemony – during the times of Napoleon and Hitler. For centuries, Russia was seen as a savage monster, and it still remains so. Even today, Russia is regarded as totally alien and wild by Europe, but its role in organizing its own sphere of influence was certainly highly appreciated. The fact that formerly invincible Napoleon was defeated in Russia at the time of Alexander I, caused his downfall. And it was from that moment in history that Russia began to play an important part; and is still regarded as a permanent partner in the European system of balance of power.

After the defeat of Napoleon, the balance of power system was immediately restored. The main party responsible for this restoration was a very, very important figure, an amazingly talented person – Clemens von Metternich. Metternich, who was from an Austrian family, is considered to be one of the main proponents of Conservatism, one of the main vanguards of conservative ideas in nineteenth century Europe.

Metternich hated the new ideas spreading throughout Europe at that time. He couldn't stand liberalism and was awfully scared of it. He couldn't stand nationalism, because he believed it was shattering the foundations of the world existing then. The main principle in Metternich's conservatism was legitimism, understood as loyalty and the preservation of monarchist traditions. Metternich, who was at the Hapsburgs' court, became Chancellor of the Austrian Empire at a very young age. For fifty years he played the most important role in Europe and for fifty years all Europe danced to his tune. He was a man confident about his power and intellect.

He believed he was more powerful and more intellectual than anyone else and managed – with very scarce resources present in the Austria in that period – to bring the entire post-Napoleon Europe back to the Austrian orbit. The well-known Vienna Congress commenced in 1814 and continued in 1815. At that time Napoleon was on Elba Isle. He escaped when the Congress opened to create a map of post-Napoleon Europe. The Vienna Congress, which actually represented an attempt to create a league of nations, was the predecessor of the latter not only because the heads of state gathered for the first time to think and debate about how to remake the map of Europe according to the new reality and their interest; not because of the similarity between the Congress and the League of Nations or the UN, but because Metternich managed to convince his partners, and especially Alexander I and the King of Prussia that foreign policy should be based on the internal arrangement of the country. A new idea of universalism was born. It stated: The nature of interstate relationships should be based on the nature of the country's domestic arrangements. About seventy or eighty years later, this became the main determining principle in the revolution Wilson brought about in external relations. But Wilson was an absolute ideological antipode of Metternich. For Metternich, the principle of universality was identical to the principle of legitimism.

Metternich suggested this principle to Friedrich Wilhelm III, King of Prussia, Alexander I and the Emperor of Austria, Franz. "The most important thing," he said "is that three of us are legitimate monarchies. The main thing is that we'll help each other during this stormy period, when thousands of idiots like Mazzini are telling Italians to leave the Austrian Empire and create their own national state; when some people organize strikes in France and speak about workers' rights; when liberalism is starting to establish itself. What's most important in this difficult time, is that we defend each other's legitimism." And this became the basis for the union, for a

particular balance of power, that was first formed at the Vienna Congress. This was when the *Holly Alliance* was created to include three royal courts of Eastern Europe: Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna.

Now look what happened there: The alliance, built upon monarchic unity, created an obstacle for the developments which were then taking place on German territories. Germany, divided into three-hundred units, had always wanted to unite. There were people speaking the same language – people with a similar perception of national identity. At that time, the dominating Austrian Empire was quite shattered. On the other hand, Prussia's aspirations were increasing after Friedrich the Great. It particularly aspired to consolidate the German states. At the same time, it seemed as if war was going to break out between Austria and Prussia. The Holy Alliance set up by Metternich wasn't based solely on *Raison d'état*. It also convinced the partner that the most important thing was to not allow liberalist and nationalist tendencies to develop on their territories and all of Europe and not to fight for the redistribution of influence over them. The main thing was to maintain a Europe founded on their collaboration, because they were legitimate monarchs.

And stemming from this, Metternich believed that any democracy, any nationalist movements, any liberal movements, all threatened stability and that the legitimate monarchies would always find a common language. Leibniz, who you know was one of the greatest philosophers, said that it was better to live under the worst ruler than in the best democracy. This is how they perceived life, the experience created by the French Revolution. At that time democracy, freedom and liberalism were linked to events related to the French Revolution.

Metternich's decline started in the 1860s as a result of the Greek uprising and their victory.

Poor Greeks, whose culture was the foundation for all Europe! Nevertheless, when the Greeks started to fight under the national flag to separate and become independent from Turkey, and the Turks reacted with the destruction of Orthodox cathedrals, annihilation, and inhumane ruthlessness, not only did Russia refuse to help the Greeks, but it didn't even show solidarity. And this was only because the Greeks violated the principle of legitimism. Supporting Greece, an Orthodox country was a matter of dignity for Russia, a matter of royal dignity – the Russian emperor was seen as the protector of Orthodoxy on the territory of Turkey, the territory of the

Ottoman Empire. But imagine how strong the principle of legitimism was that loyalty to the monarch turned out to be more important. How dare the Greek leader not obey his legitimate ruler and begin a fight with him, despite the fact that this legitimate ruler was the Turkish Sultan – an enemy of Orthodoxy! This is a good example of how firmly Metternich built the Holy Alliance upon his new universal system and how powerful the unity was based upon legitimism.

By the way, Alexander I was quite an awkward monarch from Russia's perspective. Nikolai I, his successor, believed that Alexander I destroyed Russia's foreign policy. Alexander entered Paris and freed Europe from the Napoleonic nightmare. He put Louis XVIII on the French throne and by doing so restored the Bourbon monarchy. He actually released all European people from Napoleon's yoke and didn't do anything to benefit Russia, except expand a little territory in the direction of Poland. And he himself remained on its eastern territories. Alexander, who held young Voltaire and the French Enlightenment's ideas very closely since early youth, and who promulgated liberalism, was a very strange man. That Holy Alliance contradicted Russia's interests in many respects. An interesting point is that all the countries sent their delegates to the congress – France sent Talleyrand, England – Castlereagh, etc., but Alexander I arrived in person and actually spent one year in Vienna, far away from Russia. He didn't identify himself with Russian national interests. He rather undertook a messianic function to save Europe from revolutions, sometimes support liberalism and so on. In general, it's a permanent ambivalence of Russian policy. Russians have always had a feeling of insecurity and on the other hand, have been always driven by messianic ideas. They don't think that their mission is to look after their Russian people, feed and dress them. Their mission is to save the world. At the same time, Metternich understood "mission" as a service from the purpose of national interests.

Vienna remained the center of Europe. This lasted until another very talented person, in this case a German appeared on stage. This was Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck, a conservative. He hated parliament and liberalism. And that conservative Bismarck put an end to the hegemony of Austria on German territories and the leading role of Austria, overall.

In 1864, Bismarck became the Chancellor of Prussia. He carried out an amazingly successful military reform. He was the first one to introduce mandatory military

service for men. He created a wonderful social protection system, for which Germans truly admired him, because that brilliant social protection system, the system of the distribution of social welfare was a totally revolutionary phenomenon for Europe that time. Bismarck strengthened the Kingdom of Prussia, which had been making claims since Friedrich the Great's times, and a small, ordinary kingdom became a force to be reckoned with in the European balance of power. Bismarck accomplished all this in Prussia ... and he suddenly declared: "Why should we put up with the rule of Austria in Germany, when we have a much better army, much better economy and social protection system. Can't Germany make decisions without Prussia's intervention?" Actually Bismarck appealed to power. He was called a man of power, guts, and blood. He developed a political concept called *Realpolitik*, which stated "I don't care for legitimacy. I know what my power is. I respect my power and no other universal principles exist for me." And he managed to unify Germany.

On the other hand, it was very substantial that after Bismarck, England had another headache, when in addition to their traditional rivalry with France, Germany appeared in the middle of Europe. France and England were always strong in Europe, while Germany had been split into three-hundred kingdoms. And suddenly from Germany – which the eighteenth century English considered to be populated by lazy and incapable people – an enormous power was formed in Europe that followed the principle of *realpolitik*, a principle which implied an open appeal to power, rather than an establishment of the principle that might tie together states and peoples.

And of course, the development of *realpolitik* was accompanied by the development of its antipode, its remedy. Just like *Raison d'état*, *realpolitik*, in Bismarck's interpretation, was followed by the principle of balance of power, when other states started to form alliances to balance the growing strength of Germany. Bismarck used the expression – "Nightmare of Coalitions." He was constantly afraid that England, with its fantastic Prime Minister, the talented and able Disraeli, was forming numerous coalitions with Russia, Austria and the Netherlands around Germany's borders. This eventually ended up with World War I, the first global catastrophe. Afterwards, Europe was never able to completely restore the system it had when it ruled the world. World War I was followed by a very important change in international relations: The United States appeared on the international stage and became the decisive force that formed the shape of twentieth century Europe.

Concurring to the development of international relations in Europe, the U.S. formed a totally different tradition of approaching international relations. When Washington became the President of the United States, he declared that America would never send its children to any country for any reason. The America of that time, separated from the rest of the world by two oceans, was a very weak entity on its own continent, both in the north and the south. In the first decades the country was involved in rough, often plunderous, bloody and ruthless expansion on its own territory. We all know how brutally they treated Indians, expanded their territories at any expense, added new territories, and sometimes bought them. They bought Louisiana from Napoleon in 1803. When asked why he was selling such wonderful colonies, Napoleon answered that by doing so he was facilitating the creation of a force that would finally put an end to British domination overseas. Napoleon was obsessed with the desire to annihilate the English fleet. This obsession became a real nightmare and he sold Louisiana, at a symbolic price, to strengthen the rival of England, so that it would defeat it sometime in the future. Napoleon's prediction came true a hundred and fifty years later – the U.S. changed Britain. A very natural, isolationist approach was formed in America. In the 1830s, during Monroe's presidency, the Monroe Doctrine was introduced, which was America's guiding principle before the beginning of the twentieth century.

The Monroe Doctrine states: We have no interest in Europe and we will not intervene in its affairs, but an attempt of intervention in America's affairs on the part of any European country will be perceived by us as a threat to our security and will entail a relevant reaction.

The Monroe Doctrine stated in the United State's exclusive interest on the American continent and during those decades, the U.S. expanded its territories in line with this doctrine and reached its present size. First, it obtained permission to travel on the Mississippi river, then it annexed Louisiana, was in war with Spain over Florida and Texas, expanded westward, annihilated Indians, and so on. During the First World War, the U.S. became the most economically advanced country in the world. At a certain point, at the beginning of the First World War, America produced 30-35 percent of the world's products. Imagine, how much ahead of each European country it was.

It had hardly consumed everything it could on the continent of America when President Roosevelt declared, quite naturally, that America had interests in Europe, that it had to take part in the remapping of the world. Roosevelt was a consistent follower of realpolitik. He was a conservative, believed in power and America's ability to make others listen to. All this derived from the European tradition of that time. He believed that America had to take part in World War I. And, at that moment, during the elections, he was defeated by Woodrow Wilson, who was quite an awkward person – a university professor without any active political and military background. Wilson won the presidential elections.

Wilson and Roosevelt couldn't stand each other and competed all the time. Wilson also declared America ought to be involved in World War I and it seemed these two politicians had the same approach, but the thing is, they had totally different political motives. Wilson was a typical American. He believed in the principles the U.S. is based on. He believed that America was a model for the whole world to follow; for all the people in the world fighting for democracy and freedom. Metternich said that a country's domestic arrangement determined its external policy. Wilson also believed that the internal arrangement of a country determined its foreign policy and that a democratic state could never be an aggressor, that democracy driven by the will of the people was always directed at peace and justice, which is not true, because Hitler came to power through very democratic procedures and history is abundant with many such examples. Wilson entered the war and later arrived in Europe – Vienna – in 1919.

The war ended, Germany was defeated and those experienced democrats were about to remap Europe, just like Metternich did a hundred years ago at the Vienna Congress. Wilson was met by refined, sophisticated European aristocrats with the aristocratic blood of hundreds of generations running in them, who looked at him as if he had just arrived from a dark, remote village – an uncultured, yokel-ish man. And instead of saying give this land to me etc. this guy, totally unexpectedly, started talking about some ideals, some principles everyone had to observe. The leaders of Europe perceived all that at some appalling pharisaism and didn't quite understand what was really going on.

Wilson managed to impose his ideas on them and created the League of Nations, according to his own principles. This was the accomplishment of Wilson's ideas –

Wilsonianism in Europe. This is a spontaneous solidarity with any people who fight for freedom. Not long ago American presidents, for example, Washington, also said: We support any people who fight for freedom. When Napoleon and England fought with each other, Jefferson said the tyrant of the earth was fighting the tyrant of the seas and it wasn't his business to involve himself in the war. This was because during Jefferson, Washington and Madison's times, American ideology stated: We support any people fighting for freedom. Wilson said that it wasn't America's interest to annex new territories and expand; America's interest was to help the idea of freedom win throughout the world, because this guarantees America's security. As a result, world policy would be peaceful, America would not get involved in new wars.

These idealistic beliefs are very important in today's world. Unlike the previous understanding of balance of power – a continual process of creating alliances and coalitions which Bismarck perceived as a nightmare, when England formed alliances sometimes with Prussia, other times with France, and so on, and so on. Under Wilson's influence, the League of Nations was based on a different understanding of the balance of power; it was labeled a collective security system, which implies that whatever is allowed or not allowed is built into the system from the very beginning. It was very momentous when Wilson formed a collective security system in the world. The collective security system had never been achieved, and Wilson's policy had never been perfect, but throughout the twentieth century, American presidents were adherents to Wilson's principles. Reagan, for example, was driven by a sincere hatred of communism. He believed that it wasn't fair to have such a totalitarian system. There is of course, *Raison d'état* in the modern world; there is a balance of power, as well as the elements of realpolitik, which we have experienced, in relationship with Russia, but there are also principles that taken as a whole, are the principles of international law which emerged at the birth of the collective security system and are still the cornerstones of the modern world.

But there was another universal system in the twentieth century. It was the universalist system, an approach created by Lenin which was a system that propagated the dictatorship of the proletariat. This was a struggle for the reinforcement of communism and the principle that wherever a proletariat fights, it is the Soviet proletariat's responsibility to support it.

The history of the twentieth century is very interesting, indeed. Before the disintegration of the USSR, history was represented as a struggle between Wilson and Lenin, between the two ideologies. It might not be an accurate comparison, but every international event could be understood as a reflection of the opposition of these two visions.

In the 1990s America successfully defeated its major opponent – communism. There is a brilliant Bernard Shaw quote: “There are two tragedies in life. One is not to get your heart’s desire. The other is to get it.” The U.S. found itself in a totally new world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It became a unipolar system where there was no longer a balancing power like the Soviet Union. That was the world of the cold war. The modern world we live in now developed out of this difficult course. The modern world we live in now, the world in which Georgia must successfully establish itself, has been forming for 300 or 350 years.

After talking with you about the development of these main democratic concepts, about their evolution, I want you to imagine how the system of modern international relations, in which modern Georgia is embedded, emerged from very specific events. All the dilemmas the world and individual states have faced in the course of historical development, also face Georgia today.

If you recall the period when the Georgian state was establishing itself and the national liberation movement was starting to develop, who would you compare the Georgian public figures and Georgian leaders to? Cardinal Richelieu with his pragmatism or Ferdinand II, obsessed with absolutely idiotic ideas? You can answer this question without stating your opinion in public.

You have to understand that realpolitik, as understood by Bismarck, no longer exists, but you ask me why that Ragozin threatens us from Russia. This happens because that guy thinks he’s a Bismarck and this is the nineteenth century Germany and there’s a war with a small land belonging to it; he has no idea the world has changed a lot since then and new thinking exists, and this is very important. You have to understand that the Wilson approach has never been implemented in its pure form. Along with this approach, we still have the systems and approaches based on the balance of power that operate in the modern world. For the U.S., its national interests significantly determine the country’s policy, of course, but it still adheres to

the supreme principle we've talked about and still builds its international relations on it.

As always, I wasn't able to fit everything into the time allocated for this lecture. I wanted to tell you how integrated Europe was created after World War II, but I don't seem to have enough time for this.

- Maybe you'll tell us in a couple of words about today's Georgia, to give us some hope.

No matter how attractive Wilson's theory is to me, I don't understand why it's not close to realpolitik. Or, no matter how attractive its values are, if there is no power to implement them, they'll never be successful.

Absolutely. Now you're talking like Theodore Roosevelt. He made faces like you while saying, "Does it make any sense to talk about these moral values if there's no power?" Roosevelt said just this: "International law and international principles don't exist for me unless there is power." Wilson was much more refined. You are right in that all these Wilsonian ideas, at the same time, serve America's national interests. After Wilson, every American president declared: "Our national interest is not in Vietnam or elsewhere. Our interest is to protect freedom."

- It's good they have such an interest, but they'll never implement it without realpolitik, because power is a decisive factor. But we're lucky that such nice moral principles do exist. Otherwise, we'd have found ourselves in a very difficult situation.

- Listen! There are no altruistic states. America's interest is America's interest, but America's interest implicates the interests of partner countries. Look what has happened in relation to our country. Why should an American send a soldier, be it his son, father or brother to fight terrorists on a territory which can't even be seen on the map? No one can reach America or New York from Pankisi Gorge and they understand quite well that no Al Qaida or something like that can be found there. But this is how America understands its own interests: It has to have strong stable partners throughout the world and especially in the regions, like our region. Such an approach, regarding stable partners, originated with Wilson.

Lecture V

GEORGIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Hello. Today I'd like to discuss with you the ways of solving the problems facing Georgia.

Any issue is supported by a theory as well as by practices which presuppose the fulfillment of the given theory. Our course is devoted to the theory and practice of democracy. We have looked together at those theories that underlie the establishment of democratic principles in the modern world. We'll come back to certain theoretical aspects later, but by now you already have a better understanding of how modern states have been developing over the centuries; how they've been sustained by those impelling theories, which eventually have led to the creation of welfare societies; how small nations manage to protect their interests and rights with the aid of international relations. This introduction was necessary in order to get closer to the most significant of topics. It concerns the way of how to put all those theories to life in this land in which God gave you to live and work. I'd like us to take a look at what the modern Georgian state is based on; at the fundamentals of contemporary Georgian politics. I would like to devote an entire lecture to the decade, from approximately 1988 onwards, which has greatly influenced your generation in particular, and then we can talk about how existing problems should be

solved in the future. We're going to take a look at the history of Georgia and also at how the country developed in the nineteenth century.

I'd like to start with the phenomenon that is Georgia. I'd also prefer that you use your own knowledge of the diversity and the controversial complexity of what is considered to be the political entity that is Georgia. How do you understand the term *diversity* in relation to Georgia? Can anyone tell me which main ethnic minorities live in the various parts of Georgia? Armenians mainly populate the southern regions: Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti; in two areas of Javakheti, Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki, the majority of the population is made up of Armenians – about 90% in Ninotsminda and about 80% in Marneuli, 65% in Gardabani, 60% in Bolnisi, and 50% in Dmanisi. The last decade saw a mass migration of the local Greeks from Tsalka to Greece, which has resulted in an increase in the number of Armenians, though it is also the home of Pontic Greeks. Do you know how the Pontic Greeks differ from other Greeks? Their language is Turkish, but they are Orthodox Christians. All this is associated with obvious differences in ethnic traditions. Ossetians live in the town of Tskhinvali and other villages within Shida Kartli. The Jewish population lives mainly in Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Kareli and Surami. Ethnic minorities are scattered across the country, however it is more important to be aware of the problems facing us and the ways of dealing with them.

The majority of people have an extremely superficial and vague understanding of the complex phenomenon that is Georgia. I remember the time when Herr Norbert Bass, the German Ambassador and my friend, said in a private conversation while we were discussing current problems, "Georgia is a small country, but governing it and being a leader here is much more difficult than managing a huge empire." It is indeed an extremely accurate observation. Among other small nations, Georgia may well be a unique country precisely due to its unbelievable diversity. In order to fully understand how to make Georgian politics successful, to secure the nation's stability and its further development, it is essential to keep in mind the nature of its society and its diversity and, as a result of this diversity, that Georgia is a nation marked with innumerable internal contradictions.

I asked Giorgi to find me a map of Georgia and this morning he brought me one. I'm glad that GIPA has such a map at its disposal. We are looking at seventy thousand square kilometers, which is quite a small territory. Let's forget about the current

problems with Abkhazia for a moment and instead I suggest we follow the coastline upwards, starting with, say, Sarpi. You might know that Sarpi is a Laz village. We are talking about the Laz population in this area since it is rather diverse in and of itself, as the Laz living in the mountainous regions are quite different culturally from those living in Kobuleti, mainly due to its social structure. Since the end of the nineteenth century, Batumi began to develop as a city with its own specific atmosphere. If we look at its ethnicity, we can see that the population is quite diverse, too. On one hand, today's Ajara is considered the "Muslim Georgia" within our borders. The term "Muslim Georgia" was introduced by Ilia Chavchavadze. Initially, it was a considerable region, including Artvin and four or five vilayets in Turkey. The region is five or six times larger than Ajara proper, populated by ethnic Georgians, but who converted to the Muslim faith during its four centuries under Ottoman rule. Today, the question of Ajara's religion isn't a painful issue and one can hardly find a village with problems associated with the Muslim faith. However, remaining isolated from mainstream Orthodoxy's cultural environment for nearly four centuries has certainly affected the local population.

Let's continue our upward journey. We pass through Grigoleti, with its settlement of Molokans, a Russian community with its own distinct culture. Nowadays this is a very small community made up of hardly more than two hundred people – this fact itself is interesting, especially in connection with other settlements of old Christian sects spread across the region of Javakheti – this constitutes a noteworthy aspect of the Georgian society.

Next we step into Samegrelo, right? I haven't mentioned Poti which belongs neither to Samegrelo nor to Guria, but stands separately, so to speak, with its own culture. The city, especially following Niko Nikoladze, represents a distinct phenomenon with its unique traditions, outlook and understanding of what Poti is. Now we are in Samegrelo and, from Tbilisi's point of view, the region is just plain Samegrelo. However, in reality, it is extremely diverse. It includes the mountainous parts of Chkhorotsku and Tsalenjikha, Lakada, where even the language spoken is a dialect of the Megrelian used in, say, Zugdidi or Senaki. Samegrelo always considered that Gali and parts of the region of Ochamchire, up unto the river Ghalidzga, were part of its territory. This means that the area is populated by Megrelians who practice slightly different cultural traditions, speak a dialect of their own, etc. Next, as you well know, the population of Abkhazia is quite different and diverse, too,

linguistically, as well as in terms of its social traditions. As you may see, this stretch of little more than three hundred kilometers represents a kaleidoscope of different languages, varied religious and cultural traditions.

Now we're able to follow the Great Caucasian Ridge, starting at the mountainous area in Abkhazia, which, unfortunately, hasn't been fully studied by our ethnographers, not by other scientists. It truly represents several unique enclaves in terms of nature and heritage. Following this, we move down, towards the Abkhazian coast, with its cities, the first of which is Sukhumi, which was a kind of a transitory territory.

When speaking of Svaneti, we need to remember that the region has an extremely long tradition of migration to the lowlands. For instance, halfway between Zugdidi and Mestia lies the village of Khaishi, where the main population bears the family name Chkadua. They consider themselves to be Svanetians, even though Svanetians from Svanetia – proper refuse to recognize them as such, which I believe, is an interesting issue. When I was actively opposing the plan to build a power-station in Khudon, I remember the opinions expressed by Georgian ethnographers. They maintained that Khaishi held a very unique place in migratory patterns and played a special role in the process. They argued that if the village were to be flooded in the course of the power-station's construction, it would considerably lengthen the distance between Mestia and neighboring settlements, as well as the lowlands. In its turn, this would certainly destroy the cultural links and the system of continuous cultural exchange, which has been evolving for many centuries.

You might find it strange that I'm giving you a list of seemingly disconnected details. My aim is to demonstrate. My wish is for you to understand that Georgia is unique and special due to the fact that even a tiny village within its small territory is more significant to our national identity, for our unity – the unity of the Georgian nation – than in some of the more densely populated territories in other countries.

Another example of this is the village of Arkhoti, which is located in the Asa river gorge. If I'm not mistaken, there are only three tiny settlements there, each with about four or five households. The Asa gorge, a sparsely-populated territory, isn't connected to the rest of Georgia by any conventional means, including a motorway. During winter, only a couple of Khevsurian families remain in these villages. However, the village of Arkhoti carries enormous task of maintaining the century-old

traditional relationships between the Khevsurians and the Ingush people. Arguably, for the Georgian identity, the loss of these small settlements would become a tragedy comparable to the loss of a vaster territory.

I'd like to reiterate that it's of paramount importance for you to be aware of how significant it is to understand Georgia ... that Georgia is not only Tbilisi, with its clubbing and socializing, it isn't Kutaisi, nor is it Zugdidi or Telavi – Georgia is all of these put together. And if one wants to direct political life in Georgia, one needs to be fully aware of the problems in a village in Javakheti – its priorities – or, say, the problems facing those living in Tusheti, and what this region is. Nowadays, if I'm not mistaken, only about twenty to thirty households stay there in winter. I mean the mountainous Tusheti, since many families move to the lowland town of Alvani during the winter. For the Tushetian population, the kind of relations Georgia has with Chechnya and Dagestan is important, and by the same token, the population of Khulo in Ajara is vitally interested in their relations with the vilayet of Artvin in Turkey; how possible it is for relations to remain amiable for the mutual economic benefit of the region.

At one of my previous lectures I mentioned that the concept of Georgia as a state is rather artificial in the same way it is for many other modern countries. What does “artificial” mean? God Almighty didn't intend the country, within its contemporary borders, and the people living there should be called Georgia. How did it happen that the tribes of the Megrelian-Chan traditions and their languages united with those of the tribes of the Kartvelian tradition and language to eventually establish a common national awareness?

- Megrelian is one of the Kartvelian languages ...

It certainly is, but it's a separate language. From a linguistic viewpoint it is wrong to call it a dialect. For instance, Norwegian and Swedish or Russian and Ukrainian languages are incomparably closer than literary Georgian and Megrelian are. In any case, the Megrelians have their own conversational language which is in everyday use at home, which is an important factor that differentiates them from the rest of the Georgian population. The same applies to the Svanetians. I don't have the ambition of being a linguist. I've had numerous discussions with Tamaz Gamkrelidze about the fact that the Svanetian language is closest to the proto-Kartvelian, or the original mother tongue from which later derived Megrelian and still later, the eastern

language, called Georgian, today. It's a fact that our linguistic inheritance includes not only Georgian proper, but such amazingly rich languages as Svanetian and Megrelian. This is the legacy brought down by the generations of our ancestors and its study can provide us with ample material concerning our past.

So how did a common national awareness evolve in Georgia? In this respect my favorite legend is the one I've mentioned before – during the reign of King Parnavaz, Kuji, the king of Kolchhis, sent him a letter. I don't remember the chronicler's exact words, but Kuji said, "You can be the king of all of Georgia, while I can be one of your feudal lords." I'm not a historian and it isn't my aim to educate you in the history of Georgia, but the legend carries with it that focal point, the key, which to the best of my knowledge, is the cornerstone of the unification of the Georgian nation. It was after this moment that the Georgian historical tradition considers Parnavaz to be the first King of Georgia. Since then, as you may well know, there were very few instances in our history that Georgia was a unified and sovereign state. In comparison, the periods when the country was broken into numerous feudal subjects were certainly longer. Moreover, these subjects often came under various external influences or dominance – for example, by Byzantia or Persia, or later, in medieval times, by the Ottoman Empire or Persia, then Russia, acting as a player or a geopolitical factor in the Georgian reality, and so on. In any case, beginning with Parnavaz onwards, a sense of common national identity was introduced. In the end, what makes the identity oneself with this or that national entity? It's when a group of people, regardless of the language they might be using in everyday life, and not their understanding of each other, announce that they belong to a certain nation; that you and I are Georgians.

Why do I highlight the somewhat artificial nature of the concepts underlying modern states? Incidentally, the same applies to Germany, and the concepts at the nexus of the states such as Italy and Spain.

- Will you give us an opposing example? What is a "natural" state? There must be one, as opposed to an artificial one, right?

An example is Great Britain, mainly because it is an insular country, separated by stretches of water. It developed along slightly different principles.

- Or Japan.

You're correct, Japan. The same can be said about the United States, whose foundation is comprised of completely different principles. You have to realize that all this doesn't in the least affect the stability, doesn't determine the weakness of any state. I'll eventually come to the point when it becomes clear why I chose to single out this concept.

Over long historical periods, Abkhazia, for instance, was undoubtedly a bearer of Georgian awareness and in general, Abkhazia bore the Georgian identity. Very often both – Abkhazian and Georgian – sides use this fact for their respective propaganda, but the fact is that the official title of Georgian kings began with the words “The King of the Abkhaz, the Runs,” etc. It was the first formalized title and, as you know, in the tenth and eleventh centuries the Abkhazian royal line was extremely powerful, ruling in Kutaisi; the descendants of this feudal family dominated many parts of Georgia – at least in the western and southern regions. This didn't happen because they, so to speak, conquered these parts or other Kartvelian tribes living there. It happened because they singled themselves out from other feudal subjects, from other feudal entities. As a result of the use of intense propaganda, starting in the nineteenth century, and especially now, as far as I can judge from the relations with Abkhazia, they began to see their identity in a completely different way. Due to the purges carried out by Beria, the contemporary Abkhaz have started to review their history and have considerably distanced themselves from the common Georgian ethnic identity. You might know that in the nineteenth century, when there were plans to subordinate the administrative area of Sukhumi within the Krasnodar region in Russia, a group of the Abkhazian aristocracy led by Sharvashidze appealed to the Russian Emperor to leave Sukhumi within the region of Kutaisi. The petition was heartily welcomed by Ilia Chavchavadze in his special publications. This instance was a true climax in Abkhaz-Georgian relations, as it clearly demonstrated the unanimous agreement among the Abkhazian elite as to where their priorities lay, what their aspirations were and where the “center” was. At a glance, what benefit could they have seen in being part of the administrative region of Kutaisi? Being part of Russia proper might have proved more profitable, but the sense of sharing a common identity became a decisive factor in their final choice.

In any case, as a result of such purposeful politics and other factors, beginning with the Khrushchev period, separatist tendencies started to strengthen – a time when Abkhazian national identity began to radically oppose the common Georgian

one. Is it clear? This is the thing I'd like you future journalists and civil servants to always remember: Each component of the complex system called Georgia will be integrated into a unified Georgian state only to the extent that it equals the efforts we exercise for its integration. It should be a continual process and these people should feel more secure, their aspirations better realized, within the borders of this unity.

There were periods in our history, especially from the twelfth century onwards when, due to numerous wars, the population of Georgia decreased dramatically – in fact, the numbers were fifteen or eighteen times less. Also, there were periods when the Georgian kings, especially in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, deliberately adopted the policy of inviting other ethnic groups to settle on our territory, mainly the Pontic Greeks and the Armenians. The political reasoning behind such mass migrations of various ethnic groups into the country was that they would eventually become naturalized, and consequently, become loyal to the Georgian throne. In other words, once they became Georgian subjects, they would completely integrate into the Georgian state. Needless to say, such political steps didn't happen the way they were supposed to. This was certainly a result of the unsurmountable problems the country had experienced. The waves of migration became especially intense during the times of Jalal Udin because, as you know, until the beginning of the nineteenth century, Georgia had been regularly raided, ransacked and left in ruins, with its economic potential practically destroyed and its population dramatically decreased in numbers. However, as a result, we have inherited an ethnically diverse country.

How should we approach the problem today? We are going to devote many other lectures to this topic, especially when discussing the last twelve years of our history and looking closely at our experience in this respect, together, with our mistakes – grave or even fatal mistakes in my opinion – that were made in the process of establishing the state. Generally speaking, the history of our statehood proves that there always were alternative approaches and that ethnic diversity was not always considered a sign or condition of weakness.

Personally, for me, David the Builder remains an outstanding leader, a true genius, mainly because he saw a means of turning Georgia's weakness into a source of strength. He was the first, not chronologically, as there were other kings before him who had attempted to introduce the principle, but he was indeed the first to take it to its highest form and establish it as his guiding state doctrine. I'd call this principle one

of turning ethnic diversity into one of the main sources or even the cornerstone of state power. In this respect, it is paramount to keep his experience in mind and compare it with the reality of the not so distant past, when it became evident that the mounting xenophobia regarded the very existence of our multi-ethnic society as the source of our doom, when some of the most destructive methods were applied to deal with the problem.

If asked whether they want approximately 30% of population to be non-Georgians, most people would certainly say no. But such is the reality and we must bear in mind that in solving our state problems, we need to always consider it. At the dawn of the national movement, the common sentiment towards diversity was that it was dangerous and needed to be avoided at all costs. How can you if there are many Azeri living on our territory? Should one attempt to decrease their numbers? You might remember that at the end of the 1980s, tension was dangerously high in Bolnisi, Dmanisi and Marneuli. The situation remained explosive throughout 1989, 1990 and 1991. We have to realize that ethnic diversity is a reality we can't and shouldn't close our eyes to. The solution is not to regard it as a source of fear or one of the weaknesses, but on the contrary, turn it into our strength; especially since Georgia has possessed the recipe since the times of David the Builder, a fact we need to remember well.

Another critical aspect I'd like you to remember alongside our internal diversity is the inconceivable diversity of the countries surrounding us – the diversity of the environment we exist in. Incidentally, when talking about Muslims, one should bear in mind that there are two major branches in that religion. Part of our Muslim population is Sunni, while the other is Shiite. The Azeri ethnic groups are mainly Shiite, while the population of Ajara is mainly Sunni, due to their proximity with Turkish Muslims. The tension between the Sunni and the Shiite is so intense that it overshadows the tension between Muslims and Christians. So conditions in Georgia are rather difficult, as you see.

Is there a solution for a country of such diversity, where you have to delve into the characteristics of each province while carefully considering each group following its own, disparate traditions? The Armenians living in Javakheti look towards Yerevan, while the people living several miles away from them look towards Turkey, which is historically in conflict with Armenia. Even today these two countries have

no diplomatic ties. Some are vitally interested in the developments in Dagestan, while others watch Ingushetia. Can one find a recipe for peaceful development in these traditions? It's the major question in Georgian politics. It's a question that should take precedence over debates of gas prices or minimal wage. It's equal to the question of whether Georgia should continue to be a sovereign state or cease to exist. It should answer the question – Can the country maintain the integrity within its present borders, under the existing circumstances?

It is precisely for these reasons that when talking about Georgia's strengths and weaknesses we should definitely discuss them in the common Caucasian context. One of the most powerful points, the winning card for the state of the country, has always been its unique role and location within the Caucasus. I don't only mean its geopolitical role. Under the circumstances, it might be more important to stress the value of historical tradition, which has been evolving throughout centuries, rather than dwell on the geopolitical aspect as such.

I have often thought about the nature of the Caucasian world. And now it comes down to whether it's a part of Europe or Asia, or neither. In my opinion, it's a world in its own right, utterly dissimilar to anything else. In general, why do we discuss the nature of the Caucasian world? The answer is that there are many more similarities between the cultural traditions of the ethnic people of the Caucasus than, say, between us and other Christian nations. We differ from these nations much more than from the Muslim Chechens. It's for this very reason that I'd like to reiterate that Georgia, its problems and its opportunities, together with other factors and dimensions, should only be viewed in the common Caucasian context.

The population of the Caucasus includes approximately two hundred different ethnic groups and peoples, exercising various religious and cultural traditions. You might know that there is a community of Khlysts, a community and a unique example of mountain Jews living in several villages in Dagestan and Azerbaijan. They are very different from other Jewish people, practically representing separate ethnic group.

The north-west Caucasus is populated by the peoples of Chechnya, Cherkessia and Adigeya. The central part of the northern Caucasus is where the Ossetians live, whose language is related to Iranian. Then we come to the Vainakh people, and then we have a true kaleidoscope of ethnic diversity in Dagestan, which locks the region from the east. The major ethnic groups here are the Khunji and the Kumukh. The former

are linguistically related to the Caucasian family of languages, while the latter belong to the Turkish group of languages. Dagestan is also the home of other peoples, such as the Karachians and Balkanians, whose languages are also related to Turkish.

Stalin's infamous politics planted several time-bombs in the northern Caucasus. For instance, there are administrative regions such as Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabard-Balkaria. The Kabard people are akin to the Cherkessians and the Adigeyians and even speak the same language. On the other hand, the Karachians and the Balkanians are also the same ethnic group, speaking one of the languages of the Turkish group. These peoples were artificially separated and regrouped on the premise that they had historically opposed each other over the centuries. It's only natural if one of these administrative entities launched a nationalistic or separatist movement, especially if it were potentially powerful or successful, it would inevitably cause resistance not only on the part of the metropolis, Moscow, but meet strong opposition from its immediate neighbors as well.

You might be aware that the conflict between the people of Ingushetia and Ossetia followed the same grim scenario. The historic Ingush territories were handed over to the Ossetians during World War II. For example, there is the so-called Prigorodni suburb in Vladikavkaz, which initially belonged to the Ingush people. It was precisely at the onset of the War that the basis for the new prolonged conflict was laid. Also, in those days, sizeable Ingush and Dagestani territories were given to Georgia, which resulted in many Georgian families moving north across the Caucasus. When the Chechens returned from their Central Asian exile in the mid 1950s, the Georgians handed their historical houses back intact, complete with furniture and crockery, which the Chechens have been extremely grateful for, till today. On the other hand, the conflict with the Ossetians, which began in the same period, continues well into our time.

It's for these reasons we should always remember that we live in a region abundant in existing and potential conflicts. At the moment, I'm not talking about those conflicts in the South Caucasus that are either ongoing or potential.

Georgia is, or rather, still was about a decade ago, a country able to conduct constructive dialog with practically all these ethnic groups and peoples. In this respect, it's noteworthy that in the twentieth century Tbilisi had already taken several steps to train various scientists and researchers, especially linguistics, history,

ethnography, etc. – representatives of most northern Caucasian peoples. As a result, the intellectual elite of these nations began to play a considerable role in their respective regions, but more importantly, these professionals were educated in Tbilisi and their academic careers were closely linked to Georgia. It was a capacity based on Georgia's historical experience, a fact which was primarily determined by our state politics. Have I confused you with all this information?

- It's interesting.

I'd like to ask you a strange question. How well are you familiar with Georgian cuisine and what do you believe Georgian cuisine to be? How many Georgian dishes can you name?

(Indistinct noise)

It doesn't really matter how many different dishes people have in Georgia. However, it's not incidental that I asked this question. Has anyone been to Europe and say, visited a French or Italian restaurant? I'm quite confident that if you go to an Italian restaurant several times, you will have a comparatively complete picture of Italian cooking. On the other hand, you can live your whole life in Georgia and still have no idea how diverse Georgian cooking is.

- I believe that matsoni is a purely Georgian food product.

At the moment I'm not discussing what a purely Georgian dish is. It doesn't really matter. I'm more concerned with the unfortunate fact that we don't know and don't appreciate our own heritage, and cuisine is an integral part of any cultural heritage – a significant part of any ethnic group's material culture. It's important, perhaps the central part of a material culture, on which one may speculate on numerous aspects of a particular ethnic group, apart from the fact that cuisine brings with it sheer pleasure. We can take a quick glance at various dishes across Georgia, say, starting with mountainous Ajara, where the dairy products are very different from those made in other parts of the country. For example, the type of soaked cottage cheese from Tusheti, which tastes like a well-known French cheese, and its preparation, is quite similar, too.

I am returning to the same idea over and over again – specifically, that you have to fully realize that your knowledge of your country is far from complete and that you

don't know your own heritage in its full diversity, something that Georgia has acquired throughout the centuries of its existence.

Today we'll first talk about the problems Georgia had in the last ten or twelve years, then move on to the current ones and those geopolitical challenges that we face now. First of all, please be frank and outspoken while expressing your opinion. Don't depend on complete knowledge of your country. And, incidentally, at this stage in the formation of the state of Georgia, it's ultimately the responsibility and the goal of your generation to better understand and more realistically assess the phenomenon which is called Georgia in order to eventually familiarize your countrymen, and others too, with its full diversity.

Additionally, I'd like to highlight another noteworthy point – what's most significant for me personally in the Georgian historical experience – why am I so confident that Georgia can't function in any system, in any family – I mean international family of nations – peacefully and effectively, except in the European family of nations? The answer is that the entire historical experience of Georgia has demonstrated that every time we were given the opportunity to freely express ourselves and fulfill our ambitions, our political compass arrow invariably pointed at those values which considered worthy in Europe at that particular time in history. In this respect, the fact that Georgia participated in crusades is extremely important. It shows that even during the reign of Giorgi the Brilliant, which wasn't a particularly powerful or brilliant period in our history, Georgians continuously tried to establish their position among the west European nations.

It is additionally significant that Ilia Chavchavadze should consciously and deservedly be named as the father of the Georgian nation, as he was the primary author and founder of the ideology of a modern Georgia; someone who definitely determined the present-day state of the nation. His ideas and philosophy were based and constructed on European concepts. He never compared or competed with those interesting concepts which lay at the foundations of the development of our neighboring countries, such as Persia or Turkey.

In and of itself, it is extremely interesting that after Ataturk came to power, beginning in 1915-1918 onwards, Turkey has demonstrated impressive progress. A fascinating, markedly specific concept of Turkish nationalism evolved at that time, which incidentally, saved the already crumbling and conflict-torn territory of the

former Ottoman Empire. Although Turkey is our neighbor, it failed to have the same impact on Georgian political thinking as the political tendencies of relatively more distant countries, such as Germany or France, had on contemporary Georgia. This means that geographic proximity has never been a decisive factor because Georgians have always regarded themselves an integral part of Europe. By the same token, in all historical periods, the Georgian elite, which was responsible for determining the guidelines for the entire nation to follow, invariably directed its attention towards Europe and the latest developments there. In this respect, the most telling example, the most tangible monument or proof, was the Constitution of our First Republic. I probably wouldn't say this in an interview, but I believe it's slightly overambitious and even apish, because it attempted to demonstrate that our Social-Democrats were better or more confirmed Social-Democrats than Kautsky or other European leaders of that party. It included many items that required many years of social struggle in countries such as Great Britain, Sweden or Switzerland; especially the issues related to general elections, women's right to vote, etc.

If you have the opportunity, I would strongly advise you to read Mikheil Tamrashvili's book *The History of Catholicism in Georgia*, which is revealing in terms of Georgia's orientation towards the West. However, the book is rather biased, which is not surprising, since Mikheil Tamarashvili was a prominent Catholic figure. His biased approach becomes evident when he claims that it was Queen Tamar, who first started to seriously consider converting Georgia to Catholicism. At the same time, the book presents an extremely interesting analysis of the unique history of Georgia's contacts, starting in the twelfth century, with the western world and the center of that world – the Holy Roman Empire.

I'd like once again to stress my deep conviction that if we were to take any instance in our history, any episode, it would serve as proof, it would clearly demonstrate, that Georgia's aspirations always lay with the European world, that the Georgians always identified themselves with Europeans.

Today I tried to draw your attention to three major moments so that we could move on to the political turmoil of present-day Georgia.

Firstly, Georgia is extremely diverse, which is consequently, a deeply conflicting phenomenon. But this diversity, if we learn the proper lessons from David the Builder's experience, can be turned into a source of strength and a guarantor of our

dominant position in the region. If properly applied, as in David the Builder's times, tolerance can become the leading political principle of the country. Try to picture David the Builder as a person, someone who had been fighting Arabs for, if I'm not mistaken, twenty years, in order to regain his capital, his throne. How do you think he felt about them while his identity was being formed during his constant struggle against the Arabs occupying Tbilisi since he was 16? He was far from being soft-hearted or sentimental. You may know that he never refrained from putting his enemies or unruly feudal lords or anyone threatening the integrity of the country on the stake, if needed.

- **He was a saint.**

He was canonized much later. I'd like you to picture him as a flesh-and-blood man, a real person with emotions and worries. I'll say it again that he wasn't a sentimental man. So every time he visited a mosque or synagogue, it wasn't an expression of particular soft-heartedness – he hardly counted on others to follow his example by saying, "Let's be like him, let's be gentle and considerate towards everyone." It was a well-thought out, conscious action of a stern, even ruthless, and extremely powerful statesman. I just wanted to make it clear. Another issue is the purely ethical trait of his character. For me he is a great figure, and not only within the realm of Georgian history, and his poetry, *The Hymns of Penitence*, is an unparalleled literary monument. It's a demonstration of his deep remorse; his heart bled at every brutality or evil he had committed – he felt penitent for all his personal sins. It is indeed quite extraordinary, so much so that I can't find another precedent in the history of the world, at least nothing so revealing and tangible. He must have been an extraordinary person as a result of his ethical values, as well. I stress it again that he established the principle of tolerance as the top priority of Georgia's state policy. Incidentally, I have a theory that David the Builder, together with Giorgi Chkondideli, laid the foundation for what can be called the Georgian *Raison d'etat*. In other words, just like Cardinal Richelieu did in the seventeenth century Europe; naturally, not as explicitly and systematically, but the signs were present in David the Builder's policy. It seems that Giorgi Chkondideli played a significant part, and here I mean in church and military reform. And the fact that the Kipchaks were brought into the country along with his many other decisions only testify to David the Builder and his loyal team's firm conviction that the state interest was of the highest and supreme value.

The second point I've drawn your attention to is that, when discussing the problems facing Georgia today – our possibilities, our weakness – we shouldn't limit ourselves to our actual borders; we need to remember that we are an integral part of the historical entity called the Caucasus. And however freely we refer to ourselves as Europeans, however European we may feel inwardly, we will always remain Caucasians, a factor which is extremely important. We can't run away from the problems of the Caucasus, those problems existing in our neighborhood, which, incidentally, make us more interesting and attractive in the eyes of the rest of the world.

And finally, the third point is that Georgian self-awareness was forming and developing into an entity which can be conventionally referred to as a European entity, or the western world – if you please. The Georgian elite have always identified itself with this world, always tried to integrate with it. If we analyze all the battles, wars and struggles, putting a philosophical distance between us and the events of the past, we can clearly see that they were perpetual attempts to remove the obstacles – whether the Russians or the Mongols, it doesn't matter – in our effort to get closer to the West. At every historical stage, whenever Georgians had the opportunity to determine their own destiny, determine which political or cultural world family to join, the nation invariably demonstrated their unanimous preference in favor of the western world. There has never been an alternative decision. I'm not talking about the instances when the kings of Kakheti or Kartli were obliged to convert to the Muslim faith, pay humble visits to the Persian court and so on, in order to save the nation from physical extermination. But these were forcefully induced decisions, while all decisions taken on one's own volition were based on the unwavering desire for Georgia to get closer to the one and single cultural family of nations, return to the cradle of the phenomenon called European culture. It has been all predetermined, encoded and supported by our historical development, and any attempt to take any other decision will undoubtedly violate Georgians and Georgia, destroy the essence of this living organism and consequently, cause more pain and suffering.

Now we can revert to the main aim of our discussion. We need to find re recipe for Georgian success, for the vitality of Georgia as a state. This factor should definitely be considered because I believe and my deep conviction is that as far as I know, our history, our culture, our self-awareness, and in reality the democratic and European alternative is the only possible and therefore acceptable alternative for Georgia. This

is the European family of nations, the only family in which we feel as safe as if in our own home, where we don't feel alienated and don't exist under a constant threat of looming disaster.

This is all I wanted to tell you by way of this introduction. Please remember that your knowledge of your own country is far from complete. You have to try to better familiarize yourself with your homeland, because every new village you come across can offer something new in your understanding of Georgia – who the Georgians are and how different they are from comparatively younger nations. Alongside purely geopolitical, economic and social factors, we often become hostages of our historical legacy. Whatever we've received from our ancestors, our inheritance obliges us to find specific solutions. All this determines our understanding of what our future might be. On a much more personal note, being a Georgian means particular things to you. You are proud to have an alphabet very different from others'. You are proud to have a culture which has produced polyphonic singing. You are the envoy for the culture which gave the world such phenomenal figures as Rustaveli and Pirosmiani, for instance. You are descendants of those talented people who left an abundance of magnificent monuments across the country. On the one hand, this is the source of your pride. On the other hand, the same works as a constant reminder that you should be more ambitious than say, representatives of nations with a humbler heritage.

- Those who receive more are in a position of greater responsibility.

Correct. It is for this reason that our choice, our decision is limited by this extremely significant factor. For the sake of argument, let's pose the question, "Why should Georgia be a sovereign country?" In this respect, Russia wants to keep us under its influence. What should we do? Should we give up fighting altogether, abandon the idea of sovereignty and turn into one of Russia's provinces, or in the best case scenario, receive a special status, slightly better than Belarus?

Such a decision cannot possibly be taken slightly thanks to our legacy, our national pride, the national awareness that we all have, unless one is already alienated from one's roots. And not only that. When speaking of the unconditional choice of European values, we need to remember that it's also determined by our culture, which existed well before us.

I don't intend to delve into the depths of Georgian history, but I firmly believe that it's important that you start thinking about the issues we have tackled today. And you should also be inwardly open to accept the following – and please don't be offended – you start on the premise that your knowledge of your own country is negligibly small. You have to open your mind up to the country you live in, see it in its full beauty diversity. If you begin to see that Georgia isn't only Tbilisi, or Tbilisi and Kutaisi, or Zugdidi, or Telavi, you'll be able to appreciate the true beauty of the country given to you by God. Without realizing this, you'll find it extremely difficult to find the solutions to our problems; we will fail to find the way out of the current situation, which is something we absolutely need to do together. Are there any questions? No questions?

My question refers to what you said today. Despite the fact that Georgia has been trying to integrate into the European community, European culture, I have the impression that our ambitions have remained unfulfilled and our attempts have been futile, despite certain success stories. Besides, I don't believe that the problem of Abkhazia is regarded as purely European in Europe. It also remains a Caucasian problem, not European.

Incidentally, when we started the process necessary to join the Council of Europe in 1994 – or it might have been 1995 – a formal discussion was held in the Parliamentary Assembly as to whether the Caucasus and the three countries in the south Caucasus are actually part of Europe. Some seven or eight years earlier the European elite had to answer the same question, which was more formal in a way. After lengthy debates, it was decided that indeed, the Caucasus is part of Europe. In the previous years, due to numerous reasons, Georgia, together with the entire Caucasia region, was never seen as much. Moreover, it was never regarded as such not just by Europe, but by the western world as a whole. It was the result of the most effective imperial Russian propaganda, supported by, say, the Caucasian wars, ethnic diversity and so on. At my numerous public lectures at U.S. Universities I usually begin by saying that I represent a country which the Soviet Union and Russia labeled in this way, “The Caucasus is a region populated by hordes of savage, uncivilized, unshaved people fighting each other, and the only power capable of keeping them at bay is Russia.” And the Russians know this perfectly well. Some are reluctant to spend time finding out that the Chechen and the Alans are quite different.

(A comment from the audience. Cannot be heard clearly.)

I'm not sure to what extent I have answered your question, but such is the principle. Needless to say, the U.S. and Europe regard the problems of the Baltic countries in a different context compared to Caucasian ones. The approach has always been different. When you walk into the State Department, you see the flags of all those countries recognized by the U.S. Well Before the three Baltic states regained their sovereignty, their flags were hanging there. In other words, their issue was clearer, more obvious, while the independence of Georgia was recognized by most nations only until World War II.

- It might be that it's only we who regard ourselves as Europeans, while Europe doesn't recognize it.

- Russia sees us as a part of it, while we don't see ourselves belonging to Russia. So, here we are suspended somewhere in the middle.

It would be unfair to say that Europe doesn't see us as a separate country, belonging to ourselves only. Every single European institution regards Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan as part of Europe. And I mean the OSCE, the Council of Europe and others. It's another issue that Europe doesn't regard our problems as acute and significant, especially compared to the problems in the Balkans – the Croat problems, for instance – mainly because they are closer territorially.

However, I'd like to note that all this highly depends on the processes within Georgia. When a period of marked economic progress began, starting in 1995, including the first half of 1998, you can't imagine the change in attitude towards Georgia. Wherever you went, Washington or any European capital, you met people who seemed to have discovered an entirely new country. They believed that Georgia could become a truly new model of democratic development, which could be followed by other nations in the region, and this made us an interesting and appealing country. Incidentally, when I was elected the Speaker, I said for the first time¹⁵, and I still like the statement, "We do not grow cotton. We do not have oil or gold in the amounts that might interest the rest of the world. We can become interesting only by the strength of our democratic traditions." And it's still true. In the wider European

¹⁵ Zhvania's parliamentary speech in 1995. See Annex 2.

context, Georgia has always been a kind of a model with respect to democratic development.

Are there any questions? Then we can finish for now.

Lecture VI

MINORITIES

¹⁶The problem of relations with minorities has not only been a challenge for Georgia, but many other countries too, where it's been more successfully dealt with. Please, don't think that the KGB put less efforts in creating potentially explosive conditions in Narva, or that on the whole, Russia worked less in either Latvia or Estonia than in Abkhazia. To a certain extent, they worked harder, because holding onto the Baltic coast had been an extremely painstaking task for Russia ever since Peter the Great's times, since the war with Sweden. However, the national movements there managed to avoid the pitfalls, the "mines" laid by the Russians; they managed to get round the potentially disastrous element, so that the situation didn't turn against society as dramatically as it unfortunately did in Georgia.

Today I address you as future professionals, the young people who wish to study political mechanisms. I'd like to ask you to think carefully about the following: The Russian special services certainly put a lot of effort into Abkhazia and Tskhinvali, where their presence is still very strong but we, the Georgians, need to look at our mistakes more seriously. And, unfortunately, we've made fatal mistakes in this respect.

¹⁶ The introductory part to the lecture has been lost.

From the beginning of the 1990s, even from the end of the 1980s, the general attitude among our ethnic minorities was clearly pro-Georgian. In this period, President Zviad Gamsakhurdia had no problem to appoint a Georgian national as the prefect of the Akhalkalaki region. Today' it's inconceivable that President Shevardnadze could do the same because the distance between the capital and the local ethnic population of some regions is widening, because they feel their strength, as opposed to the weakness demonstrated by the central authorities. What I'm trying to say is that there were a couple of years when the national vigor was freed and we could've used it to solve numerous problems less painfully than we can today. And it was in that period that several fatal mistakes were made.

- Specifically, what should've been done?

- I'd rather not discuss the issue so deeply now, but please remind me about this question later. In reality, most of the mistakes could've been easily avoided, but I'm always trying to show consideration and be as sensitive as I can towards my predecessors. Unfortunately, in many concrete situations, whether in Tskhinvali or in Abkhazia, conflicts were often provoked just to spite each other.

Earlier, I mentioned Gia Chanturia's position on the military action against Tskhinvali. Another example is Zurab Chavchavadze, who had worked out an extremely pragmatic and rational policy towards Abkhazia. He had spent an enormous amount of time studying the Abkhazia problems, had met their separatist leaders and so on. But since some fellow-politician was fighting with Zurab Chavchavadze, accusing him of being a KGB agent, his efforts were futile. Although I was never particularly close to Zurab, I can state with conviction that he was an outstanding leader in terms of his talent, erudition and many other personal traits. And so it happened that if he said he didn't consider it right to hold a rally at a certain location in Sukhumi, those opposing him made sure the rally was organized exactly there and so on.

From the present viewpoint, we should have done everything to include our ethnic minorities in the events of those days, especially since there was readiness of their part, as we clearly demonstrated. And the fact that we made these mistakes ten years ago, is most painful and tragic for me personally. It's an agonizing episode of my generation. I will never forget the instances when Ossetians would arrive to participate in the National Front meetings in the Cinema House, wishing to be part

of it, bringing lists of people who supported the young movement. But more often the reaction was that they might form a fifth column ... In my opinion, the situation hasn't changed much when there is such heated debate over nationality being shown in our passports. I believe Georgia is exemplary in the sense that, having a majority population of ethnic Georgians, it insists on this absurd differentiation. In Turkey, for instance, ethnic Turks do not constitute the majority, in Iran the majority aren't ethnic Persians speaking the Persian language – they constitute about 50% of the entire population. There are many nations in the world whose population growth happens not because of biological reasons, so to speak, but because they've managed to assimilate or naturalize other peoples. In other words, we are a society where an Armenian or Azeri or a Greek doesn't insist that his Georgian passport should have a special section indicating that he is an Armenian or an Azeri or a Greek by nationality ...

- I think in Greece they even indicate their belonging to the Orthodox Church...

- I'm saying that while our citizens don't, it's we who insist they should have some special mark in their passports to indicate that they aren't ethnic Georgians. By this, we are creating additional obstacles in their way to becoming fully integrated into society.

By the way, the term “integration” is mine¹⁷. Since we couldn't use the word “assimilation”, we established a Parliamentary committee called the Committee for Civic Integration. The primary aim of civic integration is that if someone is born Aliev, or Arutinyan, or Papandreu here in Georgia, they should be able to achieve anything they could achieve if they were born Aliev in Azerbaijan, or Arutinyan in Armenia, or Papandreu in Greece, etc. Without such an approach, their loyalty to our country will never be the same as that of ethnic Georgians. There are plenty of examples around the world. Go to our neighbor, Turkey, and ask a Georgian there about his attitude towards the Turkish Republic as the country he lives in. He will reply in perfect Georgian, though with a peculiar accent. You may even feel envious as he demonstrates complete acceptance of the Turkish state, he sees himself as part of the Turkish population. However, he is also aware that he belongs to the people, who some 300 years ago were Christians, and even today these ethnic Georgians put a symbolic sign of the cross on the bread they bake. Such is the result of a clever policy

¹⁷ It was Zhvania who introduced this term into the Georgian political context.

Turkey applied within a relatively short period of 50-60 years. It didn't take centuries. See, your question has taken me away from my main topic. But I certainly want you to think a lot about these issues because civic integration, the creation of a unified society, is the cornerstone of building a powerful, unified state, free of internal contradictions and conflicts.

- Does such an approach radically change state policy?

- Just a minute. I'd also like to stress the importance of another problem we have in our politics. Our political process is characterized by total inconsistency and is torn by internal disagreement. On the one hand, it's an indication of an extremely weak leadership, but on the other hand, it has risen from the nature of our society itself. In a sense, Georgia was the forerunner of a national movement of independence, but even today, so many years later, we're much more inexperienced, our political spectrum much more disarrayed in comparison to, say, the Baltic states.

Several weeks ago, during my visit to the US, I discussed Georgian problems with Mr. Brzezinski, a friend of long standing. His comment was telling in many ways: "Compared to other Eastern European countries, your main problem is your unbelievable inability to compromise with each other, your inconceivable fragmentation. You prefer to waste your time scheming and plotting against each other, rather than finding ways of consolidating around the major national idea, the common state of interest." I would say that the fatal mistake of Georgian politics always was and unfortunately still is, the dominance of private, specific interests over the common national ones. I'd also like you to think about another moment. Before I got involved in politics, I used to study animal world ...

- Did it help in politics?

- By the way, I've often said that it was invaluable experience for the Speaker ... The reason I mention it is that in studying the social behavior of animals, one of the leading instincts is connected to the sense of territory. Whether we are looking at wolves or rodents, one of the most distinct behavioral patterns is their territorial instinct, the way they fight for their habitat, the way they protect their territory. It becomes the main factor in their survival. But what's the connection?

Sadly, for Georgians, the protection of their own territory hasn't proven to be a priority – an important enough objective to unite all of society and set the existing disagreements aside, at least for a while. We carry the blame for not only what happened in Abkhazia. We are also guilty of ... even though enough time has passed, neither our society, nor our political elite have realistically evaluated the events in Abkhazia. Of course there were Russian helicopters, Russian ships, Russian shelling of Sukhumi and a Russian general sitting in Gudauta planning a military operation and so on. But all of this isn't important at the moment.

What's more important is that when Sukhumi was surrounded, the railroad tracks were blocked in Zugdidi so that freight and military trains couldn't reach the besieged city. Moreover, when President Shevardnadze was actually in Sukhumi, numerous rallies were held across the country demanding his resignation. Their reasoning was that Abkhazia could be regained later, while getting rid of "this Satan" was more urgent. While a Georgian contingent of 3,000 was stationed on the Kodori River and Gia Karkarashvili, who incidentally managed to cross the front line four times, asked them to move into Sukhumi, the generals refused to budge. These are the same generals who frequently teach and preach to society even today ... What I wish to say is that if we – the Georgians – don't fully realize our weaknesses in the face of national threat, the fact that we demonstrated our inability to temporarily put aside our disagreements, that our petty personal conflicts proved to be more important than keeping our territorial integrity, that if our political elite remains so fragmented, we will never win; similar events will happen over and over again in the future.

You can easily bring to mind many instances to prove that, sadly, all those drawbacks which emerged at the dawn of the national movement were not dealt with by the state institutions formed after regaining independence. On the contrary, all these negative tendencies have become deeper, have acquired a more dangerous dimension and have adversely influenced our society.

Now I can answer your questions.

- **You must remember the year when Shevardnadze came to power the first time...**

- In the Communist times I was seven or eight.

- What year was it exactly? Personally, I remember only a short period when Patiazhvili was in power, the rest was Shevardnadze...

- Since 1972...

- What you've said amounts to the fact that unless the Georgian politicians fully realize all the economic and social problems, such conditions will always face Georgia, and even become graver. To what extent do the political groups and their leaders share your opinion in this respect?

- Generally speaking, a politician's nature is rather strange. One thing is to talk to one informally, discuss matters in a friendly atmosphere and another thing is a politician at work, when he or she becomes a public figure and states ideas publicly. What each politician is, including myself, while making public appearances, is for you to judge.

I'd like to give an example which might not seem as vital as the mistakes made in respect to Abkhazia and Ossetia. It concerns the attitude towards religious minorities, which I believe is dangerous and rather alarming. The number of Baptists, for instance, isn't very high in Georgia, so their presence shouldn't cause any concern. But the question of attitude, it's like a disease symptom – when one has a potentially grave disease but ignores the symptom. I can say that this dangerous symptom, xenophobia, is rampant in our society. Xenophobia means intolerance of anything which is not like yours, starting from ethnic differences and finishing with religious divergences. I honestly cannot think of any country or nation where the Bible can be burned publicly and this atrocity wouldn't evoke public wrath. The Nazis, for instance, burned books, among them those by Thomas Mann, but even they didn't burn the Bible. We can be "proud" that we are a nation that can openly burn thousands of copies of the Bible and remain unpunished. And following such an alarming event, one MP, another, then yet another, publicly announced that it was immoral to criticize Basil Mkalavishvili. Such unfortunate instances, my friends, are of paramount importance, mainly because tragedy doesn't happen overnight, it mounts gradually, step-by-step, primarily owing to the disgusting fact that such revolting instances are not evaluated.

- What you've mentioned (indistinct) ... apparently is innate, deeply rooted in the Georgian genes. How can it be overcome?

- No, I don't support such a belief. When I was younger, even younger than you are now, I used to be rather euphoric about our country. I've often told Eldar Shengelaia that his films and the works of other Georgian creative people, basically helped weave the Georgian identity. I really had a different, highly positive, often exaggerated opinion of my homeland, believing that Georgians were the best, that our architecture was absolutely the best and so on. When I first visited Italy when I was thirty, I was insulted with what I saw: It became obvious that our Medieval architecture wasn't the best in the world. I remember what Merab Mamardashvili said in his 1990 interview in the newspaper *Tbilisi*: "We need freedom in order to realistically assess our possibilities, what we actually have and what we really are as a nation." And it's absolutely correct. But after regaining independence, first we were euphoric, planned to bring down everything old, then shook our finger at Bush and so on and so forth. Then we fell into another extreme, when some of our serious politicians traveled to Abkhazia during the war and to Samegrelo during the civil war and openly pronounced that unless the Russian police controlled the region, there was no hope for us as we were utterly incapable of taking care of ourselves.

Neither of these extremes is acceptable.

In truth, Georgians with our talents, our possibilities and our mistakes, are no different from any other nation in the world. It's up to us to learn lessons from our mistakes, better evaluate our possibilities and draw conclusions based on realistic calculations. It's useful to remember that less advanced nations have managed to establish their own states. It all depends on our common ideals and the work we put into reaching the common goal. I cannot say there are any genetically determined flaws that can prevent us from doing so.

(Indistinct question)

- Sorry, I just want to tell you a short anecdote. It was in 1991, if I'm not mistaken. Dato Berdzenishvili and I visited the European Parliament and then Paris. It wasn't very frequent in those days that Georgians went to Paris and the immigrants, those who had followed Noah Zhordania, arranged dinner in our honor at a local Georgian restaurant *The Golden Fleece*. Most of our hosts were well over 80, among them Noah Zhordania's son-in-law Mr. Pagava, an amazing person. All of them were respectable and highly likable people, but in about ten to fifteen minutes, and I'm not exaggerating at all, these elderly people began to accuse each other and remind each

other who was a Social-Federalist and who was a Social-Democrat, which of them supported the Anarchists and so on. The quarrel became so heated that they completely forgot about us, engrossed in mutual accusations and petty personal memories. Sadly, it was a miniature image of what our society in general is.

- Consequently, it might be advisable to create fundamental institutions of a kind, but it happens the other way round. For example, Gamsakhurdia had to be the President and no one else, right? The Chancellery gathers in Shevardnadze's office and the tendency ...

- It's a good question. Generally speaking, one of the major recipes for dealing with our problems is institutionalization. We are going to dwell on the issue on one of our last lectures. It is the primary recipe for the nation survival. For any country, the recipe of its success lies in the successful functioning of its institutions, regardless of who is heading this or that institutions at any specific moment in history.

- My question refers to Abkhazia. Let's look at the period when we lost the battle in Abkhazia, when Zviad Gamsakhurdia was in Samegrelo, and there was a threat of him returning forcefully to Tbilisi, with the help of the Chechens or whoever ... And at that moment the Russians were invited to Abkhazia to save the situation. Was there no other way?

- No, the Russians weren't brought at that time. Do you mean the peace-keeping contingent? It was in July 1994 that the peace-keepers were brought in ... Baltin. There was this instance, interesting in itself, when a bribe he received played a huge role, as it were, but we can say with certainty that his influence wasn't particularly long-lasting for Georgia.

Lecture VII

THE CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA

¹⁸The creation of the Constitution in Georgia is a success story. Apart from the document itself and the given provision of the Constitution, the process that finally brought us to the main law of 1995 was decisive, indeed. We can say without a doubt that Georgia is the only country in post-Soviet space where the adoption of the Constitution was the result of very difficult and tense negotiations, rather than the reflection of the leading group's or the President's beliefs. The Parliament elected in 1992 was very diverse. Twenty-five parties were represented there. The largest party was composed of thirteen people. Because the Parliament was so diverse, it was very difficult to reach a consensus. If we recall Locke's theory on how a state founded by people has to be formed, one of the key words used in this context was *Public Consent*. I'm saying again that Georgia was the only country in the post-Soviet space, where President Shevardnadze decided to form two thirds of the parliamentary majority in order to adopt the Constitution in a different way, despite the fact that he was asked to conduct a referendum. A referendum could become an instrument for the people at the top to ignore the ideas of political minority groups. Adopting a constitution in the circumstances of political opposition, when, for example, one group supports a strong presidential republic and the opponents demand a balance, a referendum is not a demonstration of democracy; it is rather a fulfillment of the leader's or the leading group's wish.

In Switzerland, most legislation is approved through referendums. Citizens watch the process and adopt even less significant laws through referendums. Referendums are conducted on three or four issues on weekends. Citizens watch the process and the laws are adopted through a people's referendum. When there are no political debates, referendums reflect the people's will. Georgia chose a different way to draft the supreme law. It decided to form the necessary two thirds majority in Parliament that would be able to adopt a new constitution. In the old Parliament, in the Parliament of the Goguaдзе period where you had permanent clashes, it was unrealistic to have a two thirds majority vote on any issue. It was even more unrealistic to identify the necessary number of delegates when it came to voting for the constitution; the document that provided the blueprint for the satisfaction of

¹⁸ Audio record has been lost. The lecture is based on one transcript only.

acting politicians' ambitions by determining the division of power in the country. Shevardnadze put aside everything and for four or five consecutive months held negotiations from ten o'clock in the morning to two in the morning with different politicians, starting from Kartlos Garibashvili and finishing with Roin Liparteliani, and it became possible to tie together very opposing groups having very different ideas, to form a common position, which was finally reflected in the Constitution. This fact created a precedent in finding a new point of departure after internal wars and chaos; a point from where Georgia's totally new development would start. I must say that the public appreciated this fact. Everyone realized that the country had a new chance to enter a more harmonious state of development and that the Constitution had a chance to play the role it was supposed to play – become a totally new point of departure for the country's life.

What principles was the Constitution based on? There were several modes to choose from. One of the groups of our lawyers developed a model with USAID assistance – the classic model of a parliamentary republic. There was also another alternative: the models of the French and Polish Republics – the version supported by me – which could be described as a mixed model and the model that we sometimes called the American model, which is not totally American. According to the principles of this Constitution, the head of the state is at the same time the head of the executive power. Do you know the difference between presidential and parliamentary republics? In the parliamentary model the source of any state agency is the parliament – or the people elect the parliament. I'm talking about the central bodies, rather than local authorities, which are a different sphere. The parliament that represents the people forms all the state departments. For example, the German president is elected not only by Bundestag, but also by both Houses of Parliament and the delegates appointed by the Land governments. The Big Council assembles only to elect the president. In Turkey the president is directly elected by Parliament, and the same happens in many countries. But in every parliamentary country, the head of state doesn't receive the mandate directly from constituents. He receives the mandate from the parliament, which is elected by the people. The distribution of political powers in the parliament of a parliamentary republic is directly reflected in the configuration of the executive power – the results of parliamentary elections directly determine the political composition of the executive power. In the presidential republic, in the American model for example, which is a beautifully balanced model, it's the president who receives the mandate directly from the people. In the

presidential republic, the president is always elected by the people. Another important feature of the American model is that the president is the head of the executive power. I don't remember quite well how it is in Russia, but in Russia, which is a presidential republic where the president has enormous power, I think that theoretically, the head of the executive power is still the prime minister, rather than the president. If I'm not mistaken, in America it's the president that forms the government. The government is his administration. There the president has to take into consideration the distribution of powers in the parliament, because he has the members of his administration approved in parliament, but his body is the presidential administration and does not reflect political configuration. These are the people who act on the president's order.

One of the classic models is the French model, which is not very perfect, but it has a lot of advantages. In France, the president is elected by people. At the same time there is a very strong government, which is formed according to the results of parliamentary elections. In this mixed model the president is never the head of the executive power, neither covertly, nor actually. He carries out the mediating function between the different branches. A president in a parliamentary republic, Germany, for example, has the same function. Even the symbolic president of Germany has the right to dissolve Bundestag and call early elections. In a situation like this, the president has the exclusive right to determine external policy and ensure national security as well as security in every sphere. Poland has a more elaborate system than France. Here the government has vast power and the president's power isn't limited, either. Georgia's choice was a version of the presidential republic.

You know that any system of power has to be balanced to prevent the usurpation of power. The purpose of balance is to prevent state agencies from putting each other at a disadvantage, to prevent them from taking excessive power in their hands so they don't violate the main principles of democracy. The relationship between the legislative and executive powers has to be balanced. In some systems the parliament has a powerful leverage to pressure the government by the vote of no-confidence. It's the parliament's right to vote no-confidence and in such a case the government has to resign.

On the other hand, in the parliamentary republic there is a mechanism balancing the parliament's dictatorship, which is the early dissolution of parliament. It's a

necessary mechanism for a parliamentary republic. If parliament has the right to vote no-confidence in case the government doesn't meet their expectations, the government should also have the means to defend itself. What are these means? Of course, the government cannot dissolve parliament, but when parliament demonstrates its inability, can't adopt the budget, for example, or the government submits a piece of legislation to the parliament, the approval of which it considers very important, the government can say that if this law is not adopted the government will resign, which may be followed by the dissolution of the parliament. The government can't be formed when the parliament is incapable. In a case like this, the president – not the prime-minister – plays the role of the mediator between the branches of power and has the right to dissolve parliament and call new elections. This is the fundamental mechanism used interchangeably by the parliament and the government – the mechanism of early dissolution. But the right to dissolve is enjoyed by only the president, who doesn't intervene in political battles and keeps an impartial position. His function is to resolve conflicts.

What goes on in the presidential models? In the presidential republic, parliament has no right to a vote of no-confidence. For example, for political reasons, our parliament has no right to vote no-confidence in relation to the cabinet of ministers or an individual minister. We have the impeachment procedure only. Impeachment is the persecution of top officials in case they violate the constitution or commit a criminal offense. Impeachment is a reaction to a criminal offense, only. It's not politically motivated.

While the parliament doesn't have the right to a vote of no-confidence, it has the right to remove, through impeachment, the president or a government official from office. On the other hand, the president can't order an early dissolution of parliament. The parliament cannot reduce the presidential period even by one month. Here it's necessary to balance through a different mechanism. The weakness of the Georgian Constitution is that, actually ... proceeding from our tradition ... unfortunately, what happened was expected to happen: Presidential power is quite inadequately balanced by Parliament. In the U.S., Congress is so well developed that, as it's often said, it is both the legislative and governing body. It can make any decisions regarding the budget. I watched from inside how this mechanism works. Congress is always aware of what's going on in the State. In presidential republics, one of the main balancing points of the executive power is that the budgetary power is actually controlled by

Parliament. In the U.S.'s case it's controlled by Congress. Our Constitution also provides for this – all the budgetary power shall be retained by the Parliament. This implies both drafting the budget and monitoring its execution. This sets the taxes in the country. The *Magna Carta* was created eight hundred years ago for just this purpose. Its primary function was to allow people, instead of the king, to set permanent taxes. The violation of our Constitution begins at the point when agencies try to bypass Parliament to set different taxes and fees. So a citizen has to play a lot of taxes not provided for by the Constitution. When talking about balance – I mean the budget now – our Constitution includes a very interesting provision. Budgetary entitlement belongs to Parliament but Parliament has no right to amend the draft budget without presidential consent. All similar provisions – and you can find lots of them in the Constitution – were created to force cooperation. The constitution as such is created to force all the state bodies to cooperate with each other. I hope that through the comparison with other constitutions you will see the difference, the peculiarity of our constitutional arrangement. A very big shortcoming of our Constitution is that it doesn't provide for the vote of no-confidence in respect to the government, and unfortunately, for early elections, which would make it possible to solve political crisis. This is my argument and this is why I was against this type of constitutional model. The 1999 elections were won by the Citizens' Union. In two years this party was totally discredited and ceased to exist. People thought the parliamentary majority didn't meet their expectations. When does this happen? At the first level of crisis management, the government is removed from office and a new government is formed. If this doesn't help, Parliament is dissolved and early elections are called. This enables the population to express their position on the condition of crisis and gives the mandate to another party. Unfortunately, our Constitution does not provide for suchlike mechanisms. In today's Georgia we gave a system close to the Soviet nomenclature system of the Brezhnev period, where there was no separation of functions. It's tragic, for sure, when the Chairman of the Chamber of Control attends government meetings and takes part in them when, according to one of the important provisions of the Constitution, controlling bodies have to be kept independent from the President and the Parliament and shall be accountable only to the Parliament. This is because the Chamber of Control has to exercise permanent control over the spending of budgetary resources by executive bodies. But our Chamber of Control is busy with how many thousand lari was spent by Saakashvili on the publication of some book, etc. So, one thing is what's written on paper and another thing is how we

exercise monitoring and control. One of the biggest problems in Georgia is that, unfortunately, laws are poorly implemented in practice and we actually have one Georgia on paper and the other Georgia where we all live. After the adoption of the Constitution, Georgia was the first post-Soviet country that said farewell to the Soviet legislation and legal heritage, in all spheres. Georgia was the first to establish a habeas corpus based judicial system and criminal law. I remember how revolutionary it was to give lawyers and prosecutors equal competition rights in front of the court, when the presumption of innocence was introduced, or when you accuse someone of something you have to prove that this person is guilty, contrary to what we had in the Soviet tradition, when people were accused and had to prove their innocence.

Georgia was the first post-Soviet country which adopted a package of liberal legislation. Georgia was the first country in the post-Soviet space that adopted legislation on land ownership – the main basis of an independent and democratic society.

This is the main starting point for a liberal and democratic society. In most cases, though, the rights that people acquired through this legislation were not realized. For instance, the Law on Ownership was approved in 1996, but in 1999 there were many farmers who didn't possess the certificate that enabled them to actually enjoy this right.

Land ownership means you can transfer the land to anyone you want, to your child or someone else, or you can sell it. This was not realized, and because of this, what land ownership was supposed to entail – the creation of a land market in Georgia – didn't happen. Adam Smith said: Competition and market regulate everything. Since there is no sphere where a free market has been created in Georgia, nothing is regulated.

There is chaos in Georgia also in terms of the territorial arrangement, for example, Kvemo Kartli is a region with vast resources. Elections have been run in the region but power is actually in one person's hands there. This person is Mamaladze, who has been in the region for 8 years now and is the only decision-making person. It's up to him only to decide who should be appointed where and who should be dismissed in administrative bodies and factories. According to legislation, and also in reality, he is only accountable to the President and the people who can influence the President. As a result we have a system with nine or ten president representatives in the country,

having enormous power and there is no mechanism to control them. It's a problem in the governmental system. This huge segment has been dropped out of the checks and balance context.

Another problem is that we still haven't decided what the country has to be like. Should it be arranged as a federal state; for example, should Samegrelo, Imereti, Kakheti be given the status and rights of a federation member? We don't even know whether regionalization needs to take place or whether administrative units should be formed, at least for the administration rather than self-governance. Shall we keep the districts as part of the corresponding regions that were created as a result of the Soviet administrative arrangement? In the Soviet period districts were formed according to the number of Communist Party members on this or that territory. Then our historians and geographers set districts' borders more accurately. Here we have a lot of things that proceeded from the historical tradition. The role of autonomous republics in the future administrative arrangement is not clear, either. For example, Ajara is quite whimsical in relation to the central authorities. Today, Ajara is quite whimsical in relation to the central authorities. Today, Ajara is the only country in Georgia that recognizes its jurisdiction. What are its rights in the budgetary sphere in terms of ownership? What is its stand in relation to defense and security issues? There are many issues like these. These are the issues that create a lot of unsolvable problems. That's why in 1999 I was trying hard to make a concrete decision. This creates regional problems. I'm for regionalism. I believe that we should create units with economic self-governance; units where economy can function appropriately. For example, Kharagauli district taken separately is too weak to have a separate budget source. Abkhazia should have political autonomy, just like the Tskhinvali region. I am for the so-called asymmetric regionalism. There are some signs of this kind of regionalism in Italy, but they are more prominent in Spain. The Basque country and Catalonia are related differently to the central authorities than Galicia and Andalucia. At our first meetings I proposed to Ardzinba to have a two-chamber parliament and to always appoint an Abkhaz the Chairman of the Senate. In the European states the second person in the country is traditionally the Chairman of the Senate. Actually, the second person is always the prime minister. This is actually the Georgian-Abkhaz state and for this reason the supreme authority in the country should be an Abkhaz. Within the Senate it is possible to give the Abkhaz, for example, the right to veto some issues, a right not enjoyed by representatives of other regions. I want to say that

individual solutions have to be found in every separate case, that there can't be a single solution for all the problems.

Constitutionally, the government is part of the President's administration. The government is a collective body. Under the Constitution the government has no right to issue a resolution. It is the President's advisory body. Within the limits of their authority, ministers have the right to issue normative acts. Legally, at the meetings they only execute advisory functions and when arriving at an agreement, this agreement takes the form of a presidential resolution, rather than governmental resolution. The Security Council is also an advisory body. What we are talking about is that legally, under our Constitution, the President has several extremely important advisory bodies. The Government, the Security Council and the Council of Justice hold discussions on which the President makes decisions, but legally, he has the right not to listen to them and issue a decree that varies from the advisory bodies' opinion.

Lecture VIII

THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY OF GEORGIA

(Noise in the classroom)

- This does not compensate for reading the Constitution.

Watch parliamentary sessions less and read more. Is it true none of you has read the Constitution? Now I'm asking those of you who've read the Constitution. Do you have any ideas regarding inconsistencies we were talking about at our previous lecture?

As for our Constitution, I'm asking you again to keep in mind that the drafting of a constitution, its adoption and the establishment of constitutionalism are different things. Remember that there may often be discrepancies between these three. For many years we lived in a country and society which had a constitution but there was no constitutionalism. I mean the Soviet Union. One of the main challenges Georgia is facing now is the establishment of the principle of the supremacy of law, of written universal norms and of constitutionalism in general, which is a very difficult and dynamic process and takes a lot of effort.

When talking about the main problems related to the development of Georgian policy, we'll probably go back to this topic again. And I have already asked you to write essays about what you would have done if you had won a majority vote in the Parliament of 1992 and had become the president of Georgia. What would have been the first four, five or six decisions you would've made as the leader of Georgia that had just gained independence?

Now, if what we're talking about is a casual chat for you and if you don't read and study the material we've been talking about, our meetings and lectures will have been of no use.

Today I want to touch upon totally different aspects of Georgian politics. One of them is foreign policy, which is one of the instruments that secures our sovereignty, our independence. We talked about how important external relations are to secure the

national interests of countries. We also said that one of the most powerful leverages is a targeted, appropriately planned external policy. I want to remind you that we were also talking about the concept of national interests – *Raison d'état*, established by Richelieu. Thanks to its extremely targeted policy, France did not allow the formation of a unified Germany for actually two hundred years, before the Bismarck period, and became the hegemon in Continental Europe. This is one of the brilliant examples of how it's possible to achieve your aim through different international intrigues, eucumenic tricks, through allying with unexpected partners. Remember we talked about the Catholic Cardinal Richelieu, about how he used his links with Protestant kings and leaders to not allow the unification of the German world around Austria and the Holy Roman Empire.

I also want to remind you of the dynamics of the development of foreign policy strategies in the U.S. When the U.S. was developing as an independent state, especially before the end of the nineteenth century, before the intense industrial development in the nineties, the Monroe doctrine dominated. You must remember that through this doctrine Americans distanced themselves from European affairs, but at the same time they declared that no one was allowed to get close to the continent of America. This was done, on one hand, to continue colonization and annex the present western territories of the U.S. and on the other hand, to prevent European forces from creating outposts on adjacent territories. Only in the Wilsonian epoch did America depart from the Monroe doctrine and finally involved itself in European affairs. In that period, America demonstrated other ambitions backed by economic potential. If you remember they created a wonderful system based on Wilsonian idealism through which the U.S. announced its priority – to provide support to people fighting for any kind of freedom, independence, etc.

I'm telling you all this because I want you to understand what appropriate external policy means and how important it is to identify your own weak and strong points. In the modern world, where the Bismarck type of realpolitik is no longer decisive and the size and professionalism of your military forces is not as crucial of a factor as it was before, this becomes one of the determining factors of the existence of guarantees for sustainability and independence. The categorization of countries into small and big ones is not based on the country's size, only. It's related to the country's economic potential, its involvement in external developments and the ability to influence those developments. Israel's territory is three times as small as Georgia's and

in terms of population size it's almost the same as Georgia, but Israel cannot be considered a small country. Or, let's take the Netherlands. The population of this country is ten million and is territorially almost Georgia's size, but it can't be considered a small country because it has traditional influence, a very important niche in the international space, etc.

Georgia is a typical newly formed small country. To ensure its security, its sovereignty, what is especially important is not just how strong our army is, but mostly how well we can justify to the international community the necessity of our sovereignty and independence. And this will determine whether you, as a state, will be considered a necessary player in international developments by those forces who represent the main axis of the present international reality. You have to be able to hold the key to the recognition of your necessity as an independent subject and apply it, appropriately, to the solution of your problems. I'm using this opportunity and saying this in the presence of many officers¹⁹...

We also said that in the first period of our independence we dropped out of international context and it was probably the worst mistake caused by the euphoria of that time. We thought the mass meetings and demonstrations that took place in Tbilisi and other towns of Georgia were enough to impress the international community, to make it think that Georgia became strong, wanted to become independent and so it was the right time for everyone to come help it. I remember quite well how this illusion dominated the thinking of the political elite of that period. Our entire educational system is based on the perception of Georgians as a unique nation. We believe that we are the oldest country, the cradle of civilization, that we are the most beautiful nation, etc. And this created the illusion that other countries, including big states, perceived Georgia in the same way and the only thing they thought about was helping and supporting us. Of course, this is all far from reality because just like in business where relationships are competitive, just like in science and sports where relationships are competitive, relationships in the modern world are also competitive between different countries, and we have to understand and remember that nothing can be taken for granted. And in this world of intense competition you have to justify the place you think you deserve, you have to prove that it's an absolute necessity for you to be independent.

¹⁹ In that period the military attaché, that were receiving training in the institute, attended Zhvania's lectures.

I asked to bring a map of Euro – Asia, so that we looked, once again, at Georgia's location. There is another myth or legend about the very special geopolitical location of Georgia and we are always convincing ourselves that we are so important because we are the country linking the East and West, etc. We also have to take into consideration, my friends, that given modern communication technologies and transport infrastructure, Georgia does not at all have – look at the map – the location which strategically valuable cargo is bound to travel through its territory. Tell me, what's a very special product that can't appear on the best selling European market if not supplied by Georgia?

- **(An indistinct comment).**

- ... It is the product that the whole world dreams of ... What do you mean? Mineral water or tangerines?

- **Cold tea.**

- Cold tea from *Kazbegi*. I want you to look at this in such a dramatic way. Let us take Caspian oil. We speak very loudly about the pipeline ... But, there is no and was no guarantee that the oil from Tengiz oil fields – with the largest reserves in the Caspian basin – would necessarily run through Georgia. There is the huge gas pipeline infrastructure, *Druzhba*, from the Soviet period, which runs from Siberia to Western Europe. Last year the construction of the Trans-Caspian pipeline was completed, which transported gas from Tengiz field to Novorosisk. There also exists a pipeline connecting Azerbaijan with Novorosisk, etc. So, on the territory adjacent to Georgia there exist extremely important energy resources the Caspian basin is rich in. This is the third largest reservoir in the world following those in the Persian Gulf and Siberia. And, there is some hope that it can become even bigger after exploratory studies. But, as said before, it's not at all self-explanatory that the oil pipes run through our Poti Port.

I was in the U.S., Houston, some time ago. When I had a meeting with the port administration I of course, started the conversation with how important Poti was as a strategic resource. I kept saying that Poti links Europe and Asia, and so on and so on. When they told me that the Port of Houston is the biggest one in the United States, I asked about its freight turnover. I was told it was two hundred and fifty million tons per year. Then, unfortunately, they asked about the freight turnover of the Port of

Poti, which I was trying to promote as hard as I could. My answer was that it was three million tons per year – a bit of an exaggerated figure. This equals the freight turnover of a very small port in China – in China there are lots of ports like this. What I want to say is that even the Port of Poti, with its attractive location, has never had infrastructure that would impress the world and justify our demand to help its development. I want you to understand that when we started to form as a state, we didn't have a single, tangible advantage, that would make the world think that this small and proud country deserved support to come a fully – functioning, strong, democratic and independent state. Therefore, when in the first years we kept reprimanding Gorbachev and Bush and accused Europeans of having security service agents in the high echelons of European states, this also worked against us and dropped us out of international context. In addition, Georgia has quite a disadvantageous location and when discussing this issue, you should also take geopolitics into consideration.

Imagine, let's say, the Prime Minister of a European country who has lots of problems of his own and gives Georgia 5% of his time, or ... I don't know ... half an hour, because he has many other things to think about. So if the Prime Minister wants to make a decision, important for our country, during these thirty minutes, he or she has to realize that Georgia is surrounded by zones with very difficult, protracted conflicts: There you have Karabakh, here you have Abkhazia, Tskhinvali region, war in Chechnya ... in the Caucasus, in general. And, when that Prime Minister looks at a document prepared by an expert, he sees that about one hundred and fifty different nationalities live there; some of them are very small and reside in two or three villages. These people have always been at war with each other. In addition, all the religions existing in the world are represented on this small territory, etc. At the same time, there is a country, Russia. As the Prime Minister of his country, he is linked with Russia through very important economic interests. He wants the Russian market to be more open for his exports, he wants his goods to better establish themselves on that market and so on and so on. So, our Prime Minister starts thinking like this: The Russians are experienced in looking after those savages that have been confronting each other for two hundred years, now. The Russians have been looking after them so well that they haven't come to my country, haven't created mafias here. Maybe it's better to leave them to Russians.

When we had war in Abkhazia we all wondered why no one reacted appropriately to what Russia did there. The same was in Tskhinvali. No one reacted to Russians' open aggression there; neither the UN, OSCE, US nor EU. This was because there was no readiness to solve this problem, there was no understanding that Georgia could be important to them in any respect.

I hope I've managed to present a picture to you of what was going on at that time in quite dark colors, so that you have an idea what the situation was like when we started our activities. What I told you reflects the past reality very accurately and I want you to realize that Georgia's privilege to gradually find its place on the world's political map was not something natural or self-explanatory. The only thing we could do was not interfere with the process. And I believe that it was one of the most impressive achievements of Shevardnadze's successful policy, an achievement that I hope will have a positive impact on Georgia for many, many years. The success and achievement I am talking about is that he managed to demonstrate how special Georgia was to the forces that were actually the leading decision makers in the world.

I remember quite well that when they started talking about the European corridor, not only Americans, but Nazarbaev, Karimov and other leaders of Central Asia didn't show any interest in the idea either. What does the Silk Road mean? A large section of the infrastructure for Uzbekistan cargo is beautifully built. By the way, it links with European ports through the Baltic ports. So, cotton, minerals, etc., the main strategic exports of Uzbekistan run through ... and now, let's assume, they're linked in the middle of the infrastructure of the Petersburg, Tallinn and Riga ports, which as you see, are in the middle of the European markets. So you have to justify why Poti is more attractive than they are. And it's even more difficult to do given the fact that during the first years, European leaders weren't very enthusiastic about the scenarios related to Silk Road and European corridor. The crucial point related to what was most accurately formulated by Senator Braunberg when he called the Euro-Asia corridor the "corridor of freedom." Braunberg said that it wasn't about how economical it would be to transport oil, gas and cotton through this route. The main thing was that the route running through the Caucasus would create a totally new political alternative for that huge region.

I want to more precisely explain what we're talking about. Turkmenistan sits on oil and gas fields. In 1998, 1999 Turkmenistan and Russia had big debates. Because

transporting its energy to Georgia, Europe and other regions through Russian territory, meant Turkmenistan was financially liable to Russia under a bilateral agreement, and its liabilities amounted to astronomic figures. So instead of benefiting from its wealth, Turkmenistan accumulated debts. Why did it happen? It happened because it could only transport its resources through Russia and there was no other alternative because Russia was the one who determined whether Turkmenistan could sell its resources or not. What I want to say is that the new Trans-Caucasian route created a new alternative for the entire region. This enormously increases the region's economic independence, because it becomes less dependent on Russia and of course, increases its political independence. Some events that took place in the past look very different from today's perspective. For instance, it would have been very difficult for Uzbekistan to cooperate so openly with the U.S., to get involved with intensive military cooperation, if not for the existence of the Trans-Caucasian route, which Russians, Americans and Uzbeks were well aware of.

Now look what happened: Georgia, which had no clear geopolitical advantages, became a crucial factor for this huge region in terms of ensuring its sovereignty, its independence. This is truly a very elegant, very interesting construction. And we have to admit that one of its main authors, on the global scale, was Shevardnadze. He managed to demonstrate to Washington, first of all, and by the way, to the EU, the viability of this idea. Thus, Georgia was given a role that made it extremely important in the formation of the modern world's architecture.

I would advise you to read *The Grand Chessboard* by Zbigniew Brzezinski. If I am not mistaken it has been translated into Georgian. Anyway, it's a wonderful book. Brzezinski gives a very interesting explanation of the importance of these territories for world architects. He has told me that in his opinion there are three countries that determine the future of Euro-Asia or heartland, as he says. These countries are Uzbekistan, Georgia and Ukraine. They are joined by Azerbaijan, of course, and Kazakhstan, to a certain extent. But because of their potential and influence, these three countries represent the foundation of the axis that is supposed to determine the future of this Euro-Asian space.

- Did Brzezinski arrive at such a conclusion thanks to Shevardnadze?

- No, but he is one of the biggest analysts and is an enthusiastic supporter of Shevardnadze's vision. I must say that no other leader has ever had such an accurate vision of how to create his own country and region necessary for the world system.

Now look at what's important there. Central Asia is surrounded by huge countries – Russia and China, countries which attract the most attention in the modern world and represent the biggest challenge for the U.S. and Europe.

Central Asia has vast resources. First of all, it has energy resources, but apart from that, cotton is also a strategic resource. Central Asia has enormous resources starting with gold and finishing with aluminum and bauxite. Now imagine the Central Asia countries with their mines and resources locked between Russia and China, without having any other route to use. But Georgia and Azerbaijan represent a totally new corridor, through which these countries can link with western oriented architecture, geopolitical architecture and become part of it. This is why in the last period of Clinton's presidency, when an official document was drafted to determine a ten year strategy for the energy sector, the Caspian mines were considered one of the main components of America's energy security, or the existence of this corridor became necessary to ensure energy security of the U.S.

Now, let's talk about what our deal is and what language we use today to talk to international partners. Georgia and Azerbaijan form a corridor that enables the Central Asia countries to get fresh air. Now imagine destabilized Georgia, which according to the worst scenario, goes back to 1991 events, is a permanent target of Russia and is regulated by Moscow, only. In such a case, the corridor is blocked and a territory with vast resources finds itself at a dead end and is left with no one else but Russia and theoretically, Iran and China. Russia and Iran are in advantageous positions since they already have a well developed transport infrastructure for energy resources.

I want to reiterate that Georgia managed to make the system attractive, important and even, sometimes, necessary from the point of view of global development perspectives. Unfortunately, the policy of our country was rarely successful but we managed, in a situation with extremely complex combinations, to justify that it was necessary to consider Georgia and make our security an indispensable component of the vitally important interests of the U.S., EU, Turkey and other countries. Thus, for the purpose of our security not only did we create military forces, that are quite weak

compared to the armed forces of Russia and Turkey and are not likely to become stronger in the near future, but we also created rather solid and successful international guarantees. And this isn't because we became a UN member state, I don't know ... one-hundred and tenth member, maybe ... and not because we are involved in OSCE developments – you might participate in some processes without anyone showing interest in what you do – but because, today, a policymaker in Washington, might think like this: What will happen if the situation changes in the Persian Gulf and the oil route from the Arabic world is blocked? What will happen if Russia and OPEC countries finally agree to pursue a common policy? Will we have to exhaust our resources? But – thinks the policy maker – we have another alternative and this alternative is the Caspian basin, which could become an alternative source for our country ... Theoretically, an alternative might exist. For example, one of the scenarios was chosen by Belarus due to its ethno-cultural specificity and the certain actions of its government. For totally different reasons, Armenia chose to stay within the international system with Moscow as its center. Or an actual alternative was such: Georgia makes the decision to stay with Russia and gives Russia the opportunity to use Georgian territories for its strategic military purposes or keep Georgia as its own territory, as a springboard for its military bases to not allow Turkey's increasing influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. So, it would be the role Georgia was assigned to play.

Personally for me there was no choice, because I deeply believe that Georgian society will develop, will be stable and successful only if it returns to the family, the member of which, it had always been. Anyway, this is what I believe. And this family is called the family of European peoples. The first and most important precondition of this was separation from Moscow and also becoming Russia's alternative in many respects. This is why I think that the alternative to this corridor was the pipeline's orientation toward Russia. When we go back to the events following the year 1995, we see how mad Moscow was at Georgia, which is self-explanatory. No other post-Soviet country was put under such intense pressure as our country. Why? It wasn't, of course, because of the Black Sea resorts Bichvinta and Batumi. Russians also liked to have a rest in Jūrmala and many other places. What was the main purpose of the terrorist acts and other covert actions that were arranged with the manipulation of Javakheti, Ajara, etc., and were always related to the construction of the oil pipeline? Their main purpose was not to allow the precedent of the construction of such an infrastructure. The reality is that there was a real battle around the absolutely

insignificant Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, the present capacity of which is five million tons of crude oil, and, in the best case, the capacity of its pumping stations might increase up to eight or ten million tons per year, which is nothing compared to Novorosisk oil pipeline, with its annual capacity of one hundred and thirty or one hundred and forty million tons, if I am not mistaken. Remember the moves made by Yeltsin and Chernomirdin? In 1996, if I'm not mistaken, Yeltsin told Shevardnadze quite openly: Forget this oil pipeline project, because it will create serious problems for Georgia. This is because it was unacceptable for them to have a precedent like this. And much earlier than American and western analysts, Russian analysts understood very clearly the implications of that special corridor for the entire post-Soviet territories surrounding Georgia.

I'm going back to Brzezinski's idea of the axis composed of Ukraine as a very vital link to Central Europe, Georgia and Azerbaijan as a corridor and Uzbekistan as a very energetic developing country. These countries can really ensure a totally new deal in this part of the world, the type of international agreement without Moscow at the center; an agreement which is actually related to common European security or economic architecture, with a common structure being formed now.

When talking and thinking about Georgia's geopolitical reality, Turkey acquires special importance in this context. Here we have journalists in the class ... It's a weakness of our mass media that the Georgian public does not adequately realize the role of Turkey, starting from 1992 onwards. I want to remind you that Turkey was actually the first state which held high level visits to Georgia in 1992 and which declared its readiness to take part in the solution of economic, trade, energy and grain supply problems. For the last four or five years it has been playing a very important role in the solution of our security problems.

Why is that? Is it because the Turks are so kind or have a strong pro-Georgian attitude? Of course, not. This happens because it's very important for Turkey to establish itself in the Turkish speaking language sphere. This space is composed of all the Central Asia countries, except for Tajikistan. You must know that Uzbek, Kazakh, and, by the way, Tatar, Bashkir, and some northern Caucasian languages, like Karachian, Balkarian or Kumukh languages belong to the Turkic languages. The Turks and Azeris easily understand each other and can communicate without an interpreter's help. Turks believe that such an intensely developing country as theirs,

shouldn't lose the chance of finding its special place in this extremely important strategic space, and should establish itself in this economic market. Turkey is actually in Europe now. If we consider it part of Europe, which is absolutely true, it's probably one of the most dynamic countries in terms of development. I mean the GDP growth eighty years after the revolution, and especially in the last fifteen or seventeen years, and also in terms of the population growth. By the way, I was recently told that the population in Turkey grew by 10 million in the last ten years.

Developments are amazingly intense in this country. I certainly don't want to use the word *Pan-Turkism* in relation to Turkey, because Pan-Turkism is a specific concept, which implies the formation of a unified Turkish state. This is the idea typical of some marginal, radical groups in Turkey and I'm not talking about that now. It's just that Turkey thinks that Ankara's natural role is to be the center of the Turkish speaking world where independent, sovereign countries coexist. In this respect, Georgia is one of the crucial points for Ankara. Why? Because if Georgia becomes Russia's springboard again, Azerbaijan will be stuck somewhere between Armenia and Georgia, and the infrastructure so important for both Azerbaijan and Turkey, in terms of Baku-Ceyhan, for example, will actually be controlled by Russians. And Turkey will have fewer chances to create an economic, trade and transport infrastructure which will tie it to this region more closely. Because of this, Georgia acquires special importance for Turkey and this is what our advantage is.

Now, let's take Ukraine and its relationship with Georgia. Maybe not to the same extent as Turkey, but for the independent Ukraine state, Georgia may be a necessary ally in the achievement of its ambitions, typical of a powerful state. What's the main geopolitical challenge for Ukraine? Russia, of course. Kiev has the ambition and its natural aspiration of the Ukrainian state to be the engine of the train that brings the new states to the European family; and Ukraine aspires to play this role irrespective of who it has in its administration, Kuchma, Kravchuk, or someone else. It's the Ukraine's role to undertake reinforcing its position in the European community. From this perspective, Georgia's sovereignty, the existence of a Georgia-Azerbaijan strategic alliance and strengthening links with the Central Asia countries, becomes a necessity for Kiev. By the way, the relationship between Kiev and Tashkent has become especially warm in the recent years.

- (A comment about GUAM)

GUAM was a very special phenomenon, at least, because it represented one of the first cooperative attempts between these countries. You know what GUAM is, don't you? It's the abbreviation for Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. When the TRACECA project was developed and when the Senate was passing the Silk Road Law, correspondingly, at the American's initiative, a discussion club was formed under the OSCE umbrella. The purpose of this club was to ... Dato, what was the name of the treaty?

- Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

- CFE Treaty. So, the purpose was to develop a single, coordinated position regarding the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Thus, at first, a club was set up in the OSCE composed of these four countries. These states had common problems and had to decide what policy to choose regarding the removal of Russia's military equipment from their countries, given the conflicts and specific problems typical of their states. In reality, their efforts were directed at formulating the concept of security and strategic development of this relationship. Two years ago, if I'm not mistaken, GUAM was joined by Uzbekistan and developed into GUUAM. Moldova was quite passive, as always, and we considered the formation of this network quite valuable. While in Washington, on the last day of my visit, I invited, as a rule, the ambassadors of GUUAM countries for lunch to tell them what we thought about the American's position. This ensured the mutual exchange of our ideas and concepts.

Americans don't need this now, because they have their direct military representation in Central Asia, which totally changes the geopolitical map of the region.

When talking about our geopolitical advantages and disadvantages, we shouldn't forget the special role of our two neighboring countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan; the role they play in determining our country's future. These two countries will always be very influential to Georgia, at least because of having a numerous diaspora on our territories, or to be more precise, minorities ... minorities is the right word. Azeri and Armenian minorities densely populate our territories. Therefore, we have to keep in mind that this is a very powerful leverage Baku and Yerevan have in influencing internal developments in Georgia.

Our internal stability, especially at the present stage, and minorities' involvement into the formation of an integrated civic society is very weak. This is one of our serious weaknesses, a major threat to our national security.

If we look at the developments following the years 1988 and 1989, Azerbaijan and Georgia have almost identical problems. If you're an official guest in Azerbaijan, you are first taken to the graves of the victims of the January 20th bloody events. This is similar to the events that took place here in Georgia. The January 20th events are as important for the Azeris as the April 9th events are for Georgians; the Karabakh story had the same impact on them as the Abkhazian tragedy on us. In addition, there is an important link – the pipeline – that unites us. I must say that it was Aliev's and Shevardnadze's great achievement that they saw, precisely, the importance of a strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and Georgia; that without each other each of them would be at a dead end.

We can say today that the political elite both in Baku and Tbilisi clearly realize the importance of the partnership forming between us. It might develop into some significant strategic cooperation, but cooperation with Azerbaijan has a weak point which we have to take into consideration. We shouldn't make Armenia think that through this kind of cooperation Georgia places itself in the camp that has always been threatening to Armenia. Georgia does not, of course, need to turn Armenia into its enemy. Especially in a situation when eighty thousand Armenians have collective settlements in Javakheti and have close economic ties with Yerevan. Of course, we don't need all that. But we can use some leverage to reduce their irritation through regional development. Historically, Armenia has been especially close to Georgia. The development of these two Christian countries has followed the same pattern. Our cultural and spiritual values are close to each other. It shows in our architecture. If we look at this relationship through the pragmatic perspective, we could say that for Armenia, Georgia remains a major opening into the outer world.

So, when we think about the prospects of the region's development, we shouldn't forget to ensure the appropriate place for Armenia, to make a peaceful, stable development of the region a necessity for this country, to link its vital interests with the region's happy future.

I'm afraid you are already tired of different types of information and for this reason I want to state, in the form of a conclusion, what I find most important: When

we analyze our success and shortcomings we've had in the past ten years since Georgia formed as an independent state, I believe that we have to emphasize that one of the most successful actions of the Georgian state was the creation of the rigorous and appropriate geopolitical system around us. This is an unusual case, when the small Georgia managed to play its crucial role in relation to Ukraine, Central Asia, Turkey, Russia and America and was one of the main players in the establishment of this vision and the formation of this system. This is the story of how Georgia made itself important to the modern world, to certain countries of the modern world.

- Do you think the West will manage to influence Russia's interests in Armenia?

- I'm saying it again, Badri, that we can discuss more specific aspects, as well. I've often said in front of many different international audiences that there are enough resources in the Caspian basin to prevent countries from permanent confrontations. This wealth can become the basis for a new type of cooperation instead of the new type of confrontation. It was the official Georgian doctrine on the utilization of Caspian Sea resources. What does this mean? This means that Russia should also be interested in the fact that the pipeline runs through Georgia and Turkey. After Russia has digested the fact that the Baku – Supsa pipeline is already operating, after it has digested the fact that the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is inevitable, we should tell Russia: You see, it doesn't make any sense to oppose each other. Let's try to make your interests explicit. What could be your interest, for example? There is an idea, that ...

- Novorosisk terminal.

- Not only Novorosisk terminal. This could bypass Novorosisk, linking it ... It could be a very interesting approach in terms of Abkhazian relations. The Abkhaz should also see their own interest in all this, to get motivated to return to our common state and seeing one of the pipes running through their own territory might be just this kind of motivator.

Armenia should also see its chances in this kind of development. Imagine that you're an Armenian politician and you see that next to you, in Baku, everything is flourishing ... lots of investments ... and Georgia has also found its place and there emerge pipelines, and all that ... And you sit and wait for someone to give you

something ... Let's say, Russia has already given you 300 missiles and CY. I am using this opportunity to tell you that Dato is our chief military expert.

- Russia gave them MIGs.

- Some MIGs and some other things ... That is, you are angry and well equipped, at the same time ... It's always dangerous to have a neighbor like this. So, our strategy should be to create a niche in this development process for Armenians rather than wait for them to find it themselves – and make peace and stability in the region vitally important for them ... Introduce the vision of cooperation and development versus the vision of war and conflict. This is what the solution is and it's very important that we understand it well.

- The Karabakh problem ...

- The Karabakh problem of course complicates the situation but you can think about different interesting scenarios in this context. It's not my intention to go into detail now. It's not only Azeri oil we have here. Today, for example, Georgia transports Kazakh oil, Chevron oil, by railway – about two million tons per year. Armenia has no problems with Kazakhstan. We should explain to Azerbaijan that we could create some elements of an Armenian infrastructure on the Black Sea. I'll tell you what I mean. Gia Chanturia had a very interesting idea of building, somewhere near Supsa, an oil processing plant and maybe even a chemical factory. Why would it be impossible for an Armenian businessman to invest in this enterprise and own a 20% share of this business? It could be an American company that would easily solve the problem of energy carriers for Armenia.

- But Azerbaijan will start taxing Armenia.

- This is why I'm saying you can tell the Azeris that it will be done using Kazakh oil. It's always possible to find some solution and strategy. This is what Badri was talking about. It's a really very important strategy for America not to leave Armenia with nobody else but Iran and Russia. Now I'm talking to you about the geopolitical arrangement as it's seen from Tbilisi. But if you look at it from the Yerevan perspective, you'll see a totally different picture. The main allies and partners are Moscow and Iran. Why? Because in Armenia they've a historically based fear of

Turkey and they call the Azeris Turks, and to counterbalance this create that kind of axis.

- As I understand it, you're talking to us only about the security component, which is necessary of course. These are the political and economic results we achieve through this pipeline. But I want to know its impact on Georgia's economy. I'm interested in figures, in proxy figures, or I want to know how the state budget will profit from this. Apart from this, there is also another problem: We talked about the pipeline but we didn't mention the fact that Turkey stopped building roads towards Georgia or the infrastructure that is needed by the pipeline, needed for the relationship between our countries, is not expanding.

- I'm going to say it once again: It's not my purpose to give you a lecture on Georgia as a transit country. I'm trying to explain to you that Georgia, just like France in the past, very intelligently used every single peculiarity of its surrounding countries. It managed, proceeding from one's own interests, to create a new system of international deals. This made Georgia much more important than it used to be, let's say, ten years ago.

We declare that we are a transit country. There is no country in this world, including our neighboring countries, that wouldn't keep saying they're a transit country all the time. But you won't see a single policeman on their roads. I happened to travel by car from our border to Yerevan. There isn't a single policeman there. But here, with us ... My friend Rezo Adamia conducted a little experiment: They counted the number of policemen from Tbilisi to Poti and then from Tbilisi to Bakuriani. Every seven or eight kilometers you can see a police car which stops people and extorts money. What has it caused? Iran stopped shipping cargo transport by trucks, whereas while in Georgia, Rafsanjan went to Poti and Batumi – it was a political decision – and produced a lot of cars that would drive through Georgia. At the end of the first year the Iranian drivers said they preferred to drive through the territory of Kurdistan. They might be blown up by bombs or by something else there, but it's a probability whether this will happen or not. As for Georgia, they were stopped hundreds of times and the police took three or five dollars from them. All this is rather depressing. Now imagine that you are in Turkey and they stop you every moment and take money from you. You're in a strange country, strange environment. You're stopped by a representative of that country's authorities, dressed in uniform.

You're totally insecure and feel depressed. Georgians know better how to defend themselves in Georgia.

Compared to the last years, we now have fifty-thousand less Turkish vehicles here, the vehicles that carry cargo. I've always emphasized what I'm about to tell you: Every nation, if it's a healthy nation, realizes its place in the world. The Dutch, for example believe they are a country of big international trade and everything related to that is sacred for them. For Italian self-awareness, Italy is a major cradle of European culture and civilization, and this idea is one basis of Italian mentality. As for us, we can't understand, unless we agree on it, what's important for each Georgian family and the nation as a whole. What is it that should be tabooed. You may take a bribe or spoil something but there's something you should not dare to touch, because it's the foundation of your country's security, economic strength, etc. Otherwise you'll never be able to build your state.

- And that something is ...

- And that something is the concept of a transit country, one of its main components, grounded on what I told you before. Another very important issue is it's not of crucial importance what role it will play in the economy of our country, in its budget. When there were talks about the Baku-Supsa pipeline, Shevardnadze said openly in Parliament what I consider absolutely correct. He said: "We do not expect economic profit from the Baku-Supsa project. What we gain from it is much more important. It's not only that there's the color of your country in the world map, but there's something more important. What happened is that now several congressmen and senators on Capitol Hill know, in detail, what is going on in Georgia." And this is totally irrelevant, because they aren't supposed to know this, since they have no constituents in that country. And this very remote country became very important to them when they thought about the protection and promotion of their own interests. This is what we are talking about. Otherwise, the Supsa terminal and the pipeline can give you, I think, five to seven million dollars, at most.

- Baku-Ceyhan brings two and a half million.

- Regarding the economic strategy I want to tell you one paradoxical thing: It's a good thing from the perspective of future development of our economy that we don't have oil, gas or gold, because in the countries that are rich in some natural resources,

the economy always develops in an asymmetric way. The authorities there know they'll easily solve the problems by, for example, exporting more oil to the world market. At the same time, the other economic sectors are totally atrophied. For the healthy development of society, it is very important that other sectors like the service sector and the sectors where production is ensured through intellectual activity develop in parallel with mining industry.

- Stemming from what you said during your lectures, the Caucasian issue, the theme of cooperation and unity in the Caucasus is topical indeed ... Georgia can establish itself ... in the western space, only ... (The last part of the sentence is indistinct). The Trans-Caucasian Seim of the 20s has just come to my mind. It dissolved later, maybe because it wasn't built upon firm principles. Therefore, when Ms. Naira Gelashvili formulated a very interesting concept of the Caucasian House, it immediately became clear that Russia was very influential in the North Caucasian territories and fragmentation had already started. What model do the major heroes of Georgian politics have in mind to ensure, for example, the placement of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan within the same normative region?

- It's a very interesting issue. By the way, Naira Gelashvili and I jointly elaborated on the concept of Caucasian House in 1990 and often traveled to the North Caucasus.

I want to tell you that Georgia benefited a lot from the difficulties in the region. For instance, there are very effective, huge systems – I don't remember their capacity – that run from the south Caspian coast of Azerbaijan towards the Persian Gulf. Excuse me for being cynical but we were lucky because of what happened twenty years ago, that an Islamic Fundamentalist regime was established there; it's totally unacceptable for us and is regarded as the biggest threat for the U.S., more in political rather than economic terms. So, these routes are totally blocked. Moreover, the U.S. does everything to demonstrate that as long as Tehran is ruled by mullahs, it will never have a chance to get its share from this development.

I want to say that due to these difficulties we had an important chance and Georgia more or less managed to use it. We have to understand this very well. However, the more time passes, the more intensely this structure develops, the more we'll lose from the instability and conflicts in the Caucasus. If the confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not neutralized, the region as a whole, will never be able to use this resource, will never become as attractive as it could, given the

potential in the Caucasus. If we're not a peaceful region, if businessmen aren't sure that it's possible to invest money here, if they don't make sure it's possible to work in Tbilisi if you invest your money in an enterprise ... It will be like this. If there is no better cooperation in the future, Georgia will finally lose more.

- Evaluation of the Georgia - Abkhazia conflict ... or Georgia -Russia conflict .. (Indistinct)

I find it very difficult now to answer this question. It's a very difficult issue and needs a thorough analysis. I am afraid that irrespective of our evaluation of the conflict, we would've never been able to get needed support. But the UN and the U.S, immediately reacted to the events in Kodori. Why is that? In the past it wasn't much because of our mistakes ... Now, Washington showed a full readiness to share our burden. Strobe Talbott, one of the creators of America's external policy of that period, is my close friend. I'll never forget that during our conversation in 1999-2000 he started talking about the mistakes made by the U.S. in the first years of Clinton's presidency (1992, 1993, 1994). It was the time, especially in 1992, and, partially, in 1993, when Yeltsin was actually ready to ...

- give in...

- Yes, to give in. In short, it was the same thing we had in the case of the Baltic States. And Americans, because they weren't ready for that, told Yeltsin: No, please, you look after them yourself. We have no idea who they are, what they are, what they want. The absurd processes that took place in Georgia, especially in 1991 - 1992, also contributed to that. We demonstrated we truly were a country of savages and there was nothing that could unite us. Even the war in Abkhazia, even the protection of our own territory didn't unite us. And this was something that everyone observed. And they thought to themselves: It seems that these people don't perceive themselves as a nation, haven't been shaped as a nation. All these factors determined the fact that during the Abkhazian war ... I don't know ... You have to be a Shakespeare to describe what was going on there ... When Shevardnadze was standing there in the disarmed Sukhumi on September 25th and 26th and kept sending telegrams to his personal foreign friends, they were telling him something like this in response: We are so sorry that you are being bombed ... And none of them made a single step to help. It was a time when the international community wasn't ready for this, when super powers,

and the U.S., first of all, weren't ready for this and we, on our part, did everything to make them turn their backs on us.

- It's not clear ...

- That's why I'm saying that it's very difficult for me to answer this question right now. The opposite interpretation could be: Then Yeltsin was considered by the world to be the father of democracy ... He defended freedom standing on a tank and now you start shouting that Russians are aggressors and are attacking us? Your weak voice of course couldn't be heard given the Russian propaganda and those economic interests that America and Europe had in relation to Russia. They don't care what will happen to you in Abkhazia. What they want is to sell as many Mercedes as possible to Russia, get gas and oil from it at better prices, export their own products to that huge market. That's why you can't be dropped out of international context. You can't have an illusion that you, a tiny country, will change the direction of world policy. You have to see what direction it's taking you, you have to see that there's no interest in you and your people and find, within this flow, the right place for yourself. Now I remember, that on this bank of Kodori a three-thousand person division stood ... And Sukhumi was falling ... Karkarashvili tried hard, but couldn't manage to make the rest of our army move towards Sukhumi to defend it. There was a lot of betrayal ... a lot of political intrigues, deals, etc. And, for me, in general, it's a very dirty and shameful page in the history of Georgia.

Shall we finish now? Thanks a lot.

Lecture IX

GLOBALIZATION

We're getting towards the end of our lectures. Today I'd like to dwell on a different issue, a completely new area which I'm sure will be useful to you as future journalists and civil servants.

Throughout the course, I've tried to demonstrate how the concept of democracy and its separate elements have taken their present shape. We've devoted ample time to historic events, which I hope you'll agree were paramount in order to imagine how they influenced the current mechanisms and how they strengthened those structures and institutions which we have today.

And again, I'd like us to temporarily distance ourselves from the current affairs of Georgia, especially since we've devoted the last three lectures to them. Instead, I suggest we try to imagine what the future might be for our planet and consequently, those challenges which you'll face when you begin your work for the country's well being.

Today I'd like to talk about globalization. What is it? Who can tell me what globalization is? Or, what do you think the concept covers?

(Indistinct question)

- No, but "zone" is an interesting term. It means a separate, detached territory, while globalization doesn't. It is rather a process that is enveloping the entire planet. Can you add anything?

- **Division of power...**

- Common trade...

(Indistinct comments)

- In a way you're right. Very often the Internet is seen as a pure sign of globalization. The notion of globalization comprises many aspects; as a process it's marked by the application of new technologies, but what you said is also very important. Globalization is an entirely new condition of the international system, a fresh approach to the world system.

We've previously mentioned that significant historical events always influence international relations, even have a deep impact on the national development. For instance, the fall of the Roman Empire was the impetus to the creation of nation states in Europe. The process took about fifteen centuries. But we also said that the specific outlines of modern nation states became visible only after the Treaty of Westfalia, which put an end to the Thirty Years' War among the European countries. It surely was a crucial point in defining the modern boundaries of the continent. Another example is that the Napoleonic Wars enhanced a rapid spread of the French Revolution across Europe. And finally, in the aftermath of the World War II, a system emerged which was based on the balance between two super-powers. I'd like to stress that the reality in which the modern world exists, the process which is actively underway, was strongly determined by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. With its fall, Europe symbolically got rid of the Berlin Wall in 1989. With its fall, Europe symbolically got rid of the Iron Curtain which had conventionally divided it and the rest of the world in two parts. The event had a much greater impact on the world than, for instance, the balance of power during the Cold War, or the times of Ancient Rome. Such are the deep differences, those dramatic changes which we're presently witnessing.

The first point I'd like to mention about globalization is that you should clearly understand that it's not the Internet directly or world trade as such, which used to be disjointed and excited in its relatively separate, smaller sectors where the principles of free trade were inapplicable. Neither is it unique new technologies separately. Globalization is an entirely new system of international relations adopted by the world; a system we should accept as reality.

Many events of the twentieth century have clearly demonstrated to mankind that the world is much smaller than we had ever imagined. It all started with the first European consortiums, common markets and so on. World War I, which began in 1914, considerably hindered the process, but it's still seen as the initial stage of globalization. It was roughly at that time when people first discovered that for example, the bonds of the Latvian government could have a decisive impact on the life of a British person, the shareholder of a major British company. Or, for instance, if the consortium constructing the railway line between Bombay and Delhi was experiencing problems, this might have had an adverse effect on the life of an ordinary German burgher, who had never set his foot in India. It was exactly at that time when people first began to realize that the world wasn't as large as they had thought earlier, that places weren't as distanced as previously believed.

In the footsteps of technological advances, it became evident that mankind was much more connected, that various nations depended on each other much more than previously thought. One of the most impressing, and alarming at the same time, indications of such proximity was the creation of weapons of mass destruction, which in turn, created the new world order, or rather a new balance of power in the Cold War period. What lay at the basis of the mutually restraining policy? The fact that someone living, for instance in Cincinnati, feared the Soviet Union might use its nuclear weapons to target a military base in US, served as a clear indication to mankind that a global system was already in place. The world population saw that in order to ensure security, it was paramount to seek global, rather than local or regional, solutions.

The second issue, which emerged in the 1970s, is connected with the concern over environmental problems. We, the people in this particular classroom, are vitally dependent on numerous industrial developments, such as the clearing of the rain forest in the Amazon, which may disastrously affect the amount of oxygen in the world. The birth of environmental consciousness, which is deeply concerned with the preservation of our global habitat, has become a determining factor for us as we become accustomed to the onset of the globalization era. Gradually, people living thousands of miles apart have gotten psychologically used to the idea that environmental problems – the necessity of protecting the world regardless of political borders – are a global concern. All this has definitely added to our realization of how

small the world is and how interdependent we all are compared to earlier periods, say, 30 or 50 years ago.

But what's happened since the fall of the Berlin Wall? At the turn of the twentieth century, what we now see as the common European market began to emerge. However, its development was seriously hindered by World War I and other major historical events. But, after an induced pause of about 70 years, the artificial obstacles between nations or groups of nations were finally removed so that now we can talk about a global market.

(Indistinct comment)

- Yes, there was the Soviet system and the so-called Iron Curtain, which only enabled Finland to import certain products and goods into the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was completely isolated from global trade and refused to accept the free trade principles. That system is rightly called dictatorial. You remember that we have discussed how abnormal the system was, how destructive such isolation was for the country's industrial and economic development. When we talked about Adam Smith, we mentioned a number of economic principles which led to the establishment of economic liberalism as a political theory. When the Soviet system fell, the Russian market opened for world goods, which activated a completely different developmental mechanism in Russia itself.

One of the most significant events that followed the fall of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc as an international system, was the introduction of the global market. Nowadays, the global market is considered to be the youngest and the fastest growing among other world systems. I'm not talking about the separate markets of Korea or Russia. I mean the global one. It really is an entirely new phenomenon, a completely new reality, never before witnessed.

The establishment of the global market is accompanied by technological advances. In other words, a previously unseen development of computerization occurred simultaneously, at an amazing scale and speed. Very soon, further advances brought the miniaturization of computer equipment, which in turn brought about the introduction of such technology that had been inconceivable earlier. To compare, I can recall that when we started our Green Party, one of our achievements was acquiring a car phone we managed to secure from the Communists. It used to produce

funny noises, mostly crackling and screeching. In those years only the top governmental officers' cars were equipped with this so-called radio-phone. It was far from the ideal as you had to first call an operator and then get the connection you wanted. To tell the truth, about ten years ago, I could hardly imagine I'd be able to take my own portable mobile phone out of my pocket somewhere in the mountains of Tusheti and call a friend in the U.S. without any problems. This is an illustration of the technological leap we've witnessed, and in this respect telecommunications are particularly impressive. We now talk about digital technology which enables one to store and send information not only more rapidly, but in a compact manner as well.

The world nowadays has at its disposal of one of the most amazing inventions – the Internet. In a way, technically, it has reached the stage where it seems to have a life of its own, to be an independently developing phenomenon, because this astounding network, which covers the entire world, has successfully dealt with problems connected to information exchange. If one has even basic electronic equipment, one can get in touch with practically anyone in any corner of the world. I'm sure most in this room have their own experience using the Internet. Once I attended the opening of a computer class with Internet at the Barisakho boarding school. The village is in Khevsureti, at the altitude of 1,460 meters. This means that any student capable of mastering basic computer skills, can access any information available to any Stanford University professor. So in theory, in practice, it only depends on how well a student can acquire the necessary skills. The only discrimination for these students is the fact that they live in a remote mountainous village and up to now, acquisition of information had been problematic for them, especially in comparison to their peers in, say, Washington, DC. Nowadays such a discriminating factor has disappeared. The situation was very similar for Georgian researchers, too. For instance, ten years ago, someone studying the human brain was obliged to subscribe to a specialized journal and wait indefinitely for it to arrive just to check a relatively small detail in his field, or to find out about the recent technological advances in registering the brain neuron activity. Today, one single click is sufficient for your computer to connect to the leading information banks across the globe and literary find out what happened this morning in this or that lab throughout the world. Information is instantly available for everyone interested in particular areas of study or research. In other words, the process of accessing information, storing and cross-referring, has become incomparably faster.

I'd like to reiterate that numerous developments in various areas are all contributing to what we call globalization today. Francis Fukuyama, an eminent modern scholar, maintains that the processes underlying globalization have clearly proved how correct the liberalization idea is, its strength in comparison with other concepts or approaches. His book has a rather pessimistic title: *The End of History and the Last Man*. He believes that liberalization, or the reign of liberal ideas, is a significant phase of globalization. It is truly so, but firstly we need to define "globalization" itself. Primarily, it means that all the obstacles prohibiting the course of establishing free, world-wide economic relations, based on capitalistic principles, have been brought down. These principles were opposed for years, mainly by the Soviet system, which was believed to be the most appropriate and flawless by the Soviet Bloc. One of the most common arguments was that our economic system produced plenty for the consumers and that many services were free for them. The Soviet media abounded in photographs of bread queues in Washington and similar propaganda. Fortunately, this all belongs to the past because as soon as the major political barriers disappeared, the rules of free economic relations, complete with the accompanying rules and regulations, have spread widely across the world. Such was the driving force leading to the establishment of the common global market.

- Is globalization a political process?

- No, actually this is one of the most fundamental mistakes in interpreting globalization. It isn't a political process and your question has given me the opportunity to look at those reasons that have brought the topic of globalization to the top of other controversial issues. You might remember that our President touched upon the issue in connection with the Russian economic crisis. And, incidentally, we are extremely proud that the global economic crisis did not affect Georgia.

Later we can discuss the reasons why Georgia wasn't affected. At the moment I'd like you to remember the following. A series of financial collapses began in the south-east Asia at the end of 1997. First, the banking systems crashed in Thailand in December 1997, when the local currency fell by 30 or 40%. The system failed to resist such a fall and 58 banks out of 60 collapsed in Thailand in a single day. It was a revealing symptom because very few people had realized before the crisis that the process in, for example, Bangkok could adversely affect the stocks in New York, Seoul, Tokyo or London. A much deeper impact was soon registered, as it swept

across the other financial markets of South-East Asia, Brazil, South Korea and, in August 1998, Russia. I don't pretend to be an expert in this area, and some of you who have a serious economic education, might be better informed of these problems. However, the conclusion drawn from these events is as follows: In the modern world, various markets and financial systems, including international trade, are so closely connected with each other that the processes in one part of the globe eventually affect its other parts, or the entire world, seriously influencing the condition of the world market. The only reason the crisis didn't affect Georgia is that, unfortunately, Georgia isn't a part of the global market. It can be illustrated by the fact that no Georgian shares appear at any more or less respectable world stock exchanges, which usually indicate the condition of the entire world market.

This crisis forced many world political leaders to deal with the problem. They found themselves unable to make any economic and financial forecasts in their respective countries because no one had predicted the adverse impact of the 1997-1998 crisis, no one had imagined its depth and, apparently, no country was prepared for it.

This was when talks about global impact started. I vividly remember the articles by eminent economists in *The New York Times* and other leading publications, in which they demonstrated their utter bewilderment with the new world reality which defied all the previously known laws of economic development.

Someone asked about ways of stopping it. Globalization has three driving forces, it lies on three wheels, so to speak. These three elements are connected to the democratization of the spheres which were considered closed and elitist, attainable only for the very few belonging to the nomenclature.

The first is the democratization of technology. You have seen many films where spies are after the most recent technological inventions of other countries. Globalization has brought about the ease with which anyone can use technological discoveries, as well as the global availability of various inventions. For example, it took approximately a year or a year and a half for the mobile phone to reach Georgia, which is located away from the mainstream economic processes. Mobiles have become widespread in Georgia and not only among the wealthy, but among those with a moderate income. Generally speaking, telecommunications have traditionally been the privilege of the few. For instance, during the Cold War it was considered to

be of the highest military significance. Telecommunications today are more available and accessible for a common person than at any previous time.

The second important element is the democratization of finances. In the 1960s, for example, it would have been absolutely unimaginable for any of us to invest or buy shares abroad. Apart from political reasons, other obstacles would certainly have made it completely impossible. In this respect, the financial sphere was quite privileged, too.

This didn't happen as a result of technological advances only. One of the main reasons was the competitive market mechanism itself. The financial markets became vitally interested in bringing down all artificial and semi-artificial obstacles leading to the free global market. Many people only use computers for entertainment while others use theirs to access the stock exchange in New York. Their numbers aren't high; personally I know only a dozen who can go to some remote town in Georgia taking their laptop, modem and a credit card. Provided there's a working phone-line in place, they can easily participate in the global financial process. In other words, such basic equipment is sufficient for them to speculate on the stock markets of New York, Seoul, Tokyo or elsewhere. True, I don't know many people who have made a fortune in this way, but it's an additional source of income for some of our countrymen. However, it isn't really important for me as I believe the principle is more significant: The world financial markets, and its heart – the New York stock exchange – has become accessible and absolutely realistic for practically everyone. Financial democratization is linked to sharing among separate financial sectors, local national markets and other areas.

The third, and probably the most important component is the democratization of information. I remember the times when more or less valuable information was available only for the very privileged few as it was highly classified. Any information of economic, political or scientific nature was the privilege of high ranking officials, and it's extremely interesting that this applied not only to the Soviet system, but to the western world as well. On the whole, a larger scope of information was much more closed, more classified in the 1970s than it is today. Considering the availability of the Internet, one of the main traits of the present reality is the democratization of information on the world scale. If any one of you tried to access the CIA website, you'd discover that only a negligible percentage of files are still classified. The rest is

available for those interested in searching for biographies of prominent figures, the work of various, large or relatively small, research centers, their past findings and future plans. Such is the openness of information for everyone worldwide.

These three components – the democratization of technologies, finances and information – determine the fact that no one can either stop or direct the process of globalization at their will.

(Indistinct question)

Thank you for the question especially since I was going to mention it. Thomas Friedman is an extraordinary journalist, whose book clarified many aspects of globalization personally for me. I'd like to quote one of his passages: "I'm often asked if I support globalization. As a rule, I reply that I do, in the same way as I support the sunrise every morning, because the sun gives warmth and light to the planet. But I can say more: Even if I didn't, the sun would still rise regardless of my support." This is how we should approach the issue.

Now I am going to discuss an extremely important aspect, especially for us and nations like us. We should clearly realize that globalization is a reality which no one can avoid or stop on their own volition. The only premise could be to destroy modern technology, such as the Internet. Earlier I gave you an example of Soviet propaganda – supposedly, a bread queue in New York. In this book, Friedman explains that this particular photo was taken on a Saturday morning in front of a very famous bakery, whose buns were particularly popular among New Yorkers. In the meantime, the hearts of Soviet readers bled at the miserable condition of poor Americans.

Furthermore, the democratization of information means that today it's unimaginable to keep societies, or even a part of society, ignorant of the latest developments, to isolate them from the world news for a long time. For instance, in China, where the totalitarian system is still quite powerful, the authorities face serious problems created by alternative political opinions reaching the public via the Internet. By the way, several major scandals on an international scale ensued, because propaganda can't work there any longer since, theoretically, any schoolchild with a PC can access millions of sites offering alternative opinions to those of the Communist authorities. In other words, alternative sources of information are available for

anyone sufficiently interested. This is the underlying idea of the democratization of information.

I would like to reiterate that we should regard globalization as a reality, the existence or non-existence of which, doesn't depend on a particular individual or a particular nation or a particular group of nations. On the other hand, globalization today is far from being global, so to speak. I've often discussed the issue of computerization with university students and they invariably tell me that the poverty of our people is more important and so on. We can say that for the vast majority of the world population, and our country as well, globalization is a phenomenon akin to some science fiction subject. However, regardless of the number of our countrymen involved in this global process, we should still keep in mind that it has the same effect on everyone, whether a shepherd in a mountainous Georgian village or Bill Gates of Microsoft. It happens because the world today follows different rules and such a reality needs to be considered.

I'd like to return to the topic of globalization and the issue of anti-globalization. As the term suggests, the latter opposes the former. One of the founders of the protest was a French farmer, a producer of cheese, who had his own problems with imported American products of questionable quality. The fact itself isn't so important. The question we should ask is what causes the sense of protest against globalization? It's fear that lies at the bottom of the protest: While the world is becoming smaller, more compact, more interconnected, we fear of losing our own identity, the traits that differentiate one nation from another, the qualities that make a nation proud of itself. This is the emotion that drove one of my acquaintances, Prof. Guram Sharadze to protest against building a MacDonald's in Tbilisi. Incidentally, there have been innumerable protests against McDonald's fast-food outlets across the world because it represents a new, surrogate culinary culture based on sameness, which means that a hamburger in one country tastes exactly as one in another country. So, a hamburger in Hanoi or Rio de Janeiro or Tbilisi has the same disgusting taste. I've always hated McDonald's – in this respect I'm supporting anti-globalization.

We have to bear in mind that it is vital to find an ideal balance in globalization: On the one hand, we need to preserve our national identity, our national individuality, our institutions which we highly value and which underlie our unity;

on the other hand, we shouldn't lose the opportunity to join in the process of making world nations more closely linked and interconnected.

Why is it important for us not to lose the opportunity? The main reason is that all the mentioned components of globalization – democratization of technology, finances and information – add up to the fact that, whether you like it or not, you're already involved in the competitive global process, when it isn't enough for you to be the best among your immediate peers, or in your university or your home town. You should realize that, in a way, you have to compete with people around the world, those possibly older and more experienced than you, and you can't avoid it. We could avoid the global process only in case where we find someone stupid enough to build a lofty stone wall around our country and stay in our tiny enclave, while the rest of world development takes its course. They say that during the Cold War, between 1945 and 1989, there were only friends and enemies. The world was divided into the U.S. with its friend and allies, and its enemies. Such was the polarization of the time. There are no friends and enemies in the globalization process – there are only competitors. This is the main approach we must adopt in dealing with the reality.

There certainly are permanent interests, especially when talking about competitiveness. And there are partners as well, but the partners are driven by their own interests in the process of attaining their goals in such a competitive environment. For instance, today the U.S. sees Iran as its enemy and there is a lot of talk about the *axis of evil*, which only supports the belief that it's important for any powerful country to have an enemy image to concentrate on, to justify its military expenditure, to evolve its security systems and other protective institutions.

Nowadays, Georgia should be satisfied with the fact that the world community is wholeheartedly supporting its dependence and sovereignty. But once we're able to stand firmly on our feet, these countries will begin to see us as a potential competitor. One of the reasons they support us now is to weaken their real competitors.

Generally speaking, the world under globalization is rather young, having started its emergence in 1989, only after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc. Its relatively young age explains why there are so many discrepancies and conflicts between the new world order and the systems of the Cold War period. It isn't surprising at all, as such a controversy always accompanies new ideas and innovations. There still are conflicting viewpoints regarding the end result of

globalization and its accompanying processes. At the moment I'm not going to discuss whether there will be one world government and one global constitution. Personally, I don't suppose so, mainly because I firmly believe that mankind is wise enough to find the golden means, a perfect balance, which will ensure that the Georgians, well-equipped with PCs and the fiber-optic Internet, will be able to take pride in seeing their monuments such as Svetitskhoveli, in the same way as the Armenians see their Temple of Wine and so on.

Another illustration is the following: One of the most computerized countries in the world is Israel and it's hard to imagine another nation so advanced in technological terms. In Friedman's words, several generations have lived with the sense that they are ready to give their lives for the olive tree planted on their land hundred years ago. These people are permeated with the belief that it is their tree, planted by their ancestors and not their Arab neighbors. Thus, even in such advanced societies, the issue of national identity remains rather sensitive. To sum up, my conviction is that however smaller or compact the future world is going to be, however close financial and economic contacts may become among the nations, however strong the links that tie them in communication and technological respects are, mankind will still attempt to preserve the existing differences. It's determined by our psychology that each individual, each nation, each ethnic group strives to maintain its uniqueness – this is exactly what makes our planet so diverse and consequently, so beautiful.

Many analysts believe that the modern world undergoing the globalization process demonstrates a strong tendency to preserve its old traditions and national traits. The desire to maintain the national identity entails the intensification of its protective mechanisms. For instance, in the last twenty years it's become fashionable in Germany to use dialects instead of the standard language to an extent that some revert to their native dialects even during their speeches in Bundestag. Helmut Kohl also had his accent. It would be the same if our MPs used a strong Svanetian accent during their speeches. In Germany, and other western European countries, it's considered a good taste to wear national clothes at the weekends. Basically, it all amounts to the fact that traditional national values are becoming increasingly important.

However, globalization doesn't mean automatic abolition of borders. The example of Japan would suffice – one of the most developed countries in the world is carefully guarding its national traditions and values.

There are numerous reactions to globalization. I've mentioned McDonald's as an example of the fast-food culture, designed to serve fast and eat fast, with the guarantee that customers are getting a certain amount of calories and vitamins. In Italy, about six years ago, a whole chain of new "slow-food" places have emerged in response. I had the pleasure of enjoying Italian cuisine in one of these places where seven courses were spread very carefully to give the customer the chance to savor local ham and espresso coffee, among other delicious things. It is an illustration of the Italian's attitude: "We have our unique cuisine, part of our rich national culture, and only because I stay long hours tied to the office equipment, I won't allow globalization to annihilate it; I'll never disregard those traits which I consider historically mine, will never neglect my identity – something that makes me different from others, something which is my legacy and heirloom."

If we take a closer look at those nations that have plunged into the process, we can see that they've learned to swim and managed to reach a different stage of development. On the other hand, those nations which failed to join the process have found themselves in a dire position. The gap between them and the developed nations is growing at a catastrophic speed. As an illustration, let's imagine two cars. Every now and then, either of them can overtake the other. At any one point you have the feeling that you can speed up and overtake the other which is ahead of you. But, when you're driving an old rumbling car and a sleek sports car passes you at 250 mph, you have the feeling you're not moving at all. The situation is more or less the same in the modern world. The developed democratic nations – and some from South-East Asia which have joined the club – are moving ahead so fast that others experience retrogression. This affects the psychological state of society, which in turn, is reflected in particular patterns of national behavior, which eventually leads to social degradation.

Such is the modern world in which we live, described in a couple of words. We should remember that the positive process of globalization is accompanied by numerous threats. One of the examples is the notorious Hong Kong virus. The scientific experiments with various viruses have led their mutation, which means

they grow and spread and become increasingly dangerous. If we look at the past epidemics of cholera or plague, the focus of these infections was naturally impounded by vast stretches of water and mountains, so that their pandemic spread was avoided. Although the diseases still spread from country to country and often across the ocean as well, the pace was different, sometimes taking decades to reach another continent. In contrast, the first overseas victim of the Hong Kong virus outbreak was registered in Canada within a week. This means that nowadays any threat automatically becomes global. Needless to say, we should take advantage of the benefits of globalization, but should be aware of the accompanying setbacks.

My main point is that we should remember the process is controversial and will give rise to more conflicts and debates. Conversely, should we disregard our chances and possibilities of joining the global process to live in a competitive world? Should we, instead, lock ourselves inside our borders? Or should we join in and try to maintain our national identity? I'd like to reiterate that the issue is of paramount importance for our society and the nation as such. The issue is frequently exaggerated and presented as a purely Georgian problem. We need to realize it's a global issue reflecting the present state of the new world. In a sense, it is an entirely new approach to our home planet's problems, because for the first time in history, global social development has ceased to be under the control of any particular government, any particular society or group of people. No one can stop the process and make any meaningful predictions about the direction in which technology will evolve in the future. Many new, until now, hardly imagined aspects are forecasted to accompany globalization. In his book, Fukuyama gives certain indications that the latest technological advances, cloning and other biological findings, can entail significant global changes in the nearest future.

I'd like to finish for today and express my sincere hope that all of you present here will have your own PC, a modem, a phone line and, preferably, your own credit card, with a modest sum on it – in order to feel comfortable and be rightful citizens of the world we witness forming today.

Lecture IX

CONCLUSION²⁰

The purpose of this course, called the theory and practice of democratic politics, was to show you the essence of the democratic arrangement – democratic system. Democracy is not a general, abstract idea. It is a conglomerate of specific rules, mechanisms, principles, agencies and institutions. It is a strictly determined rule of relationship within society, between individuals and society, society and authorities, and between different agencies. And this is very important to understand, because very often, democracy is perceived as arbitrariness, which is of course wrong. We saw how this phenomenon has developed through centuries, the phenomenon that we call modern democracy today, in the year 2003.

Democracy as a system implies the following: The principles on which the state is based ensure maximum satisfaction of people's interests, the interests of its concrete, individual representatives, rather than people, in general.

Democracy developed through struggles and battles, in a process where people gradually deprived authorities of their rights and fought for more freedom. Does it mean that democracy is an ideal system? Of course, not. Of course it has many shortcomings and problems, and the individual's interests are not fully met; but it gives a chance to gifted, industrious and ambitious citizens to realize their potential, realize themselves. As Churchill said: "Democracy is an awful way to run a country, but it's the best system we have."

The twentieth century finally demonstrated that democracy is the best governance system, is the most effective system to arrange the state. At the same time, it has become clear that a liberal free market and economy ensure the enrichment of the state on the one hand, and the well-being and success of people, on the other.

I wanted to analyze together with you, the last fifteen or twenty years of the history of our country, draw conclusions and articulate, at least within the limits of this classroom, the major mistakes made by us, Georgian society. I think we now understand that lofty ideas and high values don't always evoke positive outcomes

²⁰ The audio record has been lost. The lecture is based on one transcript, only.

when making political decisions. In the first years of our independence we made mistakes in the field of economy, in the policy pursued in relation to minorities. It was a period when we were trying to find the right place for Georgia within the international community. Along with this, in the course of our lecture, we also tried to look at the positive aspect of our society. And our society was successful only when some part of the government and opposition started to cooperate for its well-being. The Constitution of 1995, which was a result of social concord, can be considered a success story.

One of the main issues I've always emphasized is the topic I'd like to discuss at our closing lecture. It's not directly related to democratic structures or the democratic system and its implementation in everyday life, etc. Imagine that you've constructed a sort of machine that you place on Rustaveli avenue and it ensures the creation of all democratic institutions, customs and practices on this territory; you no longer have rigged elections, you are less pressured from your government and so on and so forth. Will it be enough to have real democracy in the country, a democracy that will be actually directed towards the satisfaction of each individual's interests? Unfortunately, representation, people's representative institutions, conditions for political and free competition, etc, are not enough to ensure democracy in its present understanding. To make the democracy machine work, you need a very special fuel, which is the sense of civic dignity. This is a political category and should mean the ability of every individual and society as a whole to be loyal to its principles.

What do you think the society's moral is? It's the principles important for the absolute majority of a given society, the principles agreed upon and considered acceptable to everyone. We're talking about specific ethical principles. I intentionally focused on the idea of Christianity that ushered in crucial changes from the perspective of the future development of democracies, as such. That's why we're talking about the present principles of Christianity and not only about Christian ethics adopted two thousand years ago.

You should remember that society is created only in the case when there's one person, or a hundred, thousand or ten thousand people that are ready to give something away for the social well-being, for the victory of their society. And this applies to each of you. Each of you might find yourself in a situation where you'll have to give something away for the victory of your society. Immanuel Kant said, "I

am constantly amazed by two things: the starry heavens above and the moral law within.” Without this rationally unexplainable moral law, everything we were talking about will be a mere description of the arrangement of other countries.

Finally, I want to say that democracy works and develops only in those societies where there is a social moral and where everyone, if not every citizen, feels that it is just he or she who guards these moral values and principles and is ready to protect them and give something away for their protection. Otherwise, this machine will never work²¹.

²¹ See Zurab Zhvania’s open letter to President Shevardnadze. Annex 3.

Annex 1

The Speech of the Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia, Mr. Zurab Zhvania at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 27 January, 1999, Strasbourg

Mr. President,

Dear Colleagues,

I am extremely excited and overfilled with emotions at the moment. It is my honor to address you on such a historic day for my country. It would not be an exaggeration to say that every Georgian, all Georgian citizens look forward to an important message from this hall of the European palace.

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to all who helped Georgia become the member of the Council of Europe. Their work is invaluable. We express our gratitude to Mrs. Leni Fischer, the former President of the Parliamentary Assembly for the considerable efforts she took in the process of starting and developing Georgia's cooperation with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. I would like to welcome the election of Lord Russell-Johnston President of the Assembly.

Mr. President, thank you for your support. I would like to express my gratitude to Mr. Terry Davis and Mr. Andras Kelemen, for their speeches. Since the very first visit to Georgia they have been the most upright and strictest evaluators of the on-going processes, not sparing their efforts and energy to study every detail of the existing circumstances in Georgia. Now our country has true friends who know exactly what is going on in Georgia and around it.

I would like to thank everyone who voted for Georgia's membership in the Council of Europe, all political groups and the representatives of state delegations. All of you sincerely have taken pains to study and understand our problems and reality, to share our hopes. I would like to thank those, who on the threshold of a new millennium reflect on this part of the world in the context of Russia's imperial political geography of the XIX century. I am grateful that they did not impede the Assembly's ballot, that they also welcomed Georgia join the Council of Europe.

From the very first year of its independence, Georgia occurred in such a chaos and lawlessness that hardly anyone would have put faith in the future of our state – we have undergone through the bitterness of civil war, economic collapse and have witnessed the hardest social crisis. Today Georgia is a completely different country. In August, 1995, we adopted the Constitution as a result of political consensus and this is why the Constitution has become the starting point in the unification of the nation and national concord. The results of Parliamentary and Presidential elections having taken place on the basis of the new Constitution gave way to radical reforms in all spheres of our life: We have adopted over 500 fundamental legislative acts in three years; we have initiated cardinal judicial reforms, held local elections. Today, political life of Georgia is driven by pluralistic polyphony. Strong and dynamic public sector is being developed on the basis of influential and independent mass media, along with likewise strong and influential non-governmental organizations.

More importantly, Georgia plays the key role in the development of new regional architecture in this part of the world. Our vision of the region's future is based on the belief that plentiful resources of the Caspian and the Black Sea regions, causing endless confrontations, that are less likely to be beneficial for anyone, not only allow, but offer everybody to take advantage through cooperation.

The new concept of a “new silk road” leads us to a new regional order which means welfare and stability in this part of the world. This will be our contribution to the cause of building up European security. Not a single country should be isolated from this wonderful prospect.

I take the opportunity to appeal to our dear colleagues to expedite granting the membership of the Council of Europe to our brothers, our close neighbors – Armenia and Azerbaijan. I am confident that this will deepen regional cooperation and make it warmer and stronger in the whole region.

We, as a country of new democracy, are still facing many problems and challenges. I do share the remarks of the speakers and members of the Political Affairs Committee as well as of the authors of the addenda. We do our best to handle all these problems within the context of internal policy. The terms and conditions offered by you are acceptable for us, since these terms and conditions are a part of our working program. I am positive that Georgia will fulfill every obligation the Parliamentary Assembly lays on it.

The president of Georgia, Edward Shevardnadze made a big contribution to the formation of a new European order, the order which enables us to speak about great Europe without any demarcation line or a wall. His personal belief and efforts to make Georgia a part of this new architecture is obvious to all.

Joining the Council of Europe is not the priority of only Georgia's President or its political establishment. This is the fundamental priority reflecting the wish, consciousness and aspiration of Georgian people. We believe in the future of Georgia, which is now returning to its natural habitat, back to its home – the European family of free nations.

By joining the Council of Europe we declare our political choice and state that the values which the Georgian society is based on – pluralism, respect for social diversity, traditional tolerance, dignity of a person and the supremacy of rights of each individual – represent the genuine values for the Georgians.

Throughout centuries we have been struggling for the maintenance of our independence and national individuality, we have been dreaming of the time when we would return home.

I think you can understand the emotions of my friends, the members of Georgian delegation and mine, how happy and proud we feel to have the privilege fallen to our lot to declare in this hall “I am Georgian and therefore I am European”.

Annex 2

Parliament of Georgia, 30 November, 1995
The Speech of the Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia,
Mr. Zurab Zhvania

Mr. President, Your Holiness, Dear colleagues, Dear guests!

A few days ago, when I had the honor to be elected the Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia, I emphasized in my short speech that we, the members of Parliament elected on 5 November, had not come to an empty place. We came to the Parliament which has very important positive tradition, i.e. the tradition of overcoming political confrontations, achieving essential agreements for the country between confronting parties under crisis. The aim of my speech today is to present my reflections on the future of the Parliament of Georgia, its special place in the process of building the entire system of the state and the starting point for me, on the one hand, is to maintain and deepen positive practices and traditions that we have inherited from the previous Parliament and on the other, to manage to fully reflect on those demands and interests of the public, that today's reality dictates to us.

Naturally, the main function of the Parliament is lawmaking and probably, in the first place, we need to clearly imagine the way which the draft law will pass through from the moment of its creation to its final ballot at the plenary session. We are only accustomed to the discussions and hearings that took place at plenary sessions, where the opportunities to produce and stand up for their arguments, to participate in debates were hugely restricted for deputies and especially experts, for certain understandable reasons. The main thing we need to achieve from the very first days is to attach a realistic significance to the work of Parliamentary committees and sub-committees. In the Parliament of Georgia, likewise all traditional Parliaments, the issues should get essential solutions at the committee. While at plenary sessions the decisions should be documented and alternative positions recorded. It is not accidental that in every country with sophisticated parliamentary culture, when the work of the Parliament is being reviewed, special attention is paid to the discussions at sub-committees and committee hearings. If we look at TV coverage of say, the US Congress work, we will see that about 70% is dedicated to committee hearings and only 20-30% to the debates at plenary sessions which speak to the fact that real debates and the establishment of final position take place at the level of committee

discussions. We should clearly realize that it is a very important priority for us to introduce this tradition in our Parliament.

During committee hearings, the participation of deputies is practically unrestricted, and most importantly, top-ranking professionals and experts, the representatives of all interested agencies or public groups can be involved in these debates. We need to clearly understand that the lawmaking process is the competence of MPs and lawmakers in the first place, but we are certainly interested in getting help, being given advice, getting criticism from professionals and ensuring the availability of experts. If this is introduced, any draft bill adopted by our Parliament will be secured against all contingencies or inadequacies.

When we discuss lawmaking, how to run this process, we should probably emphasize two essential circumstances: firstly – to ensure staffing and expert provision for the activities of the Parliament, its committees and subcommittees. In my opinion, we need to give new thought to the role of staff and guest experts in our activities. The main obligation of an MP is to develop a good insight into political situation, make most reasonable political decisions based on their conviction and world outlook. This should be a politician's decision. However, beyond this, in each case there should be high quality projects, bills worked out at a professional level. The discussion of each bill should be accompanied by adequate expert assessment that would envisage political, legal or economic effects upon its enforcement. This is what should be ensured by the staff and guest experts.

Furthermore, the determining factor in the process of making decisions in democratic society is information, i.e. supplying decision makers with information.

For this reason, if we wish to build a genuinely efficient model of parliamentarism in Georgia, we should devote special attention to the issues of providing MPs with sufficient information so that any MP could express their own position being equipped with sufficient information about the issues before they finally press the button.

Today, we need to introduce entirely new standards. In my deep belief, the Parliamentary staff should represent the model of professionalism and efficiency in the country. These days I have had an opportunity to get familiar with the structure of the staff, main departments, personnel, in general, and I must say that I have met

many people who indeed meet high requirements. I am delighted that in this respect we do not have to start from zero. By the way, I must note that under the chaotic circumstances existing in the country, a lot has been done. A very interesting library has been set up; the Research Office of the Parliament has carried out interesting work. I would like to highlight, that the Parliament has a serious Legal Department basing their activities on absolutely new principles, also Information Department and many others. I am not going to list all. To cut it short, I want to say that there are many employees we can all learn from and working with them will be a genuinely creative process for each of us. However, it should be said that we will have to carry out a lot of work in this respect and we need to think together about how to improve the Parliamentary apparatus.

The second factor that will play an important role in the Parliament's legislative work is the participation of executive structures and the interested parties of the public, let me call it – lobbyist's groups in the initiation and discussion of draft bills. We should always remember that the “production” of the Parliament – the draft bills adopted by us – has its concrete consumer. Each law has to envisage the improvement of life and work conditions of the public and its individual group. Consequently, those people whose responsibility is to enforce this or that legislative enactment should be most actively involved in committee discussions. In this respect, I think it is crucial to introduce the position of the Parliament Secretary in every ministry and large state agencies. The position should authorize the Secretary with the rights of the deputy head of the agency or ministry whose main function should be constant cooperation with the Parliament and each of its structural units, or sub-committees. This will avail the Parliament to take the experience of working on individual projects existing in different executive structures in full account, as well as those problems that the adoption of a legislative act may cause. We had consultations regarding the above issues with Mr. President and I believe when Mr. President in the nearest future, this new and an extremely important situation will occupy an important place.

I hope my today's speech will serve as at least a slight stimulus to the development of civilized lobbyism in Georgia. This is quite a new theme in our society, but we have to take into account that if Georgia is building a new type of open society, in which non-governmental sector will be playing an increasingly important role in the economy of the country, as well as in other spheres of our life, we should approach this issue with great responsibility and reflect the interests of not only our

governmental but of non-governmental sector in our activities. This will be a bigger and much more growing group of our society. Western democracy has a diverse experience in this field. We need to study those practices thoroughly, paying a special attention to the experience of American lobbyism. The latter is strictly regulated by legislation and is, by the way, one of the significant mechanisms for the elimination of corruption in state structures. I would also like to note hereby that I am deeply convinced that anti-corruption activities should be one of the key priorities in the work of the Parliament.

One of the constitutional functions of the Parliament is to determine domestic, as well as international policy of the country. I think we need to view the implementation of this function from a new angle. Inter-parliamentary contacts that are represented by single, spontaneous visits should become regular and thoroughly thought-out in order to occupy a distinguished place in the entire system of the country's foreign relations. In this respect, when we review the Parliamentary structure, we should by all means take into account permanent delegations of the Parliament of Georgia. The analogy of such structure exists in all traditional parliaments under different names – in the West, as well as in the former Soviet countries. In my opinion, they should not be more than five or six and should imply only strategically significant developments of the country. Thus, thinking of essential structural units for conducting our parliamentary activities, I believe we should create real working, efficient subcommittees within the committees on the one hand and on the other, permanent parliamentary delegations.

Now let's move on to one of the key issues: What should the relationships between the Parliament, the President and the entire executive power be like? This is probably the central issue in our activities. During these four years, new traditions of the Georgian state should be finally established; the principles set in our Constitution should be embodied; we need to develop the model of relationships between the Parliament and the President that would last for decades. It can be said with confidence that this will become the main axis for the functioning of Georgian governmental structures, its determining factor.

It won't be a secret to anyone if I say that more than 120 deputies including myself who quit the Citizen's Union or other parties consider themselves Mr. Edward Shevardnadze's team members and came to this Parliament to carry out his policy. As

for the electorate support, it was conditioned in the first place by the factor of its leader. At the same time, each of us should play our own role in the life of the state. Our foremost aim is to establish vital state institutions. We should achieve that an individual or individuals are replaced by strong structures over the time; institutionalization should take place. This will become a stable and irreversible guarantee for the country's democratic and free development, stability and peace of the society. That is why the relationships between the President and the Parliament should be considered, in the first place, within the framework of institutionalism as determined by the Constitution of Georgia. This is what we should pay attention to. In the next few days the President will present new executive structures, his own views on staffing principles and functions and I think this will be the starting point of new relationships. Therefore, we all must be prepared adequately for these changes.

Drawing the line between legislative and executive powers, introduction of this key principle in everyday life of a legal state will have a crucial importance for all of us. The pre-election campaign has clearly proved that some of the candidates, as well as a considerable part of the electorate have no clear understanding of the role and function of the legislation in state processes. We probably need to mention that it is beyond the deputy's competence to interfere in the activities of local government, in the decision-making process regarding human resources and other issues. It is not a secret that many thought that being a deputy was an indulgence for their errors, as if they were given a certain privilege not to perform any specific tasks and still belong to the elite society. We should persuade our electorate that being the member of the Parliament means hard and strenuous work directed at protecting specific interests of each particular family. Being a deputy means taking on a great responsibility and if the electorate has voted for each of us, it means that we have to serve our term in the Parliament and fulfill our obligations. I know the President's attitude, as well as ours. It is necessary to rule out mass transfers of the deputies to executive structures, especially having any other second jobs that are prohibited by the Constitution and laws.

When we speak about the Parliament's relationships with the executive power, we should remember that the Constitution envisages strong leverages for the Parliament's influence over the executive power. This is the legal right to control the functioning of the executive power, lawmaking, and the budget. I would like to address everybody-present or future ministers, heads of different bodies, be it central

or local ones that the Parliament will make the utmost use of these leverages. Everybody should be prepared to submit information, reports about their activities and any answers concerning the deputies' work to the Parliament, its commissions or sub-commissions. We remember the nonchalant attitude towards the Parliament there used to be and I would like to state it again that such attitude will be absolutely unacceptable in our work. Everybody who wished to be in our government should by all means take my words into account. Our Constitution is the guarantee for the above, as well as our President and the principled stand of the entire deputy corps to the issues mentioned.

We have been talking about the Parliament's functions as of a lawmaker but we should take into account that the Parliament, as the supreme representative body, is the arena for settling opposing political issues, arguments, balancing alternative solutions. The Parliament is the main guarantor of the democratic development of the society, political pluralism and strengthening civil freedoms and rights. I believe that the results of 5 November elections create every condition for the development of stable political system in Georgia which will be based on representative parties, reflecting the interests of broad masses of the population. In this respect, it is crucially important what kind of relationships will be developed between the majority and the opposition in the Parliamentarism. From this standpoint, I would like to offer the following working guidelines to the majority as they will be bearing political responsibility for further development of the country in the next 4 years. Consequently, it will need to have all the leverages to implement this responsibility and 4 years later give the answer to its electorate. We all remember examples of when the representatives of the opposition being the heads of certain major structures caused deep unconformity that finally led to the government to a dead end when making vital decisions for the country. If we are trying to build Georgian political system on the classical principles, similar issues should be out of question. The majority should be given opportunity to carry out the uniform policy in all spheres of life and consequently, 4 years later be responsible for the outcome of its policy.

On the other hand, information on current processes going on in the Parliament must be absolutely accessible for the opposition. The latter should have all technical, material, institutional means available to be able to invite experts in order to elaborate competent alternative approaches to any issues. Parliamentary factions should probably occupy the central place in terms of political organization of the Parliament

and any expenses from the Parliament budget that are envisaged for policy development must be distributed among factions strictly in proportion to the level of their representation. I would like to address my friends in the first place, representative of the majority. We must take into account that ensuring the rights of the opposition, i.e. of Parliamentary minorities, must be the major determining factor of our activities. I consider that the representation of the opposition in the Parliament and committees in the position of one of the deputies to the chairperson, will be a certain guarantee for protecting their rights. This will give the opposition the chance to control all issues and will pose a challenge to the majority as well.

If these principles are acceptable to you, dear colleagues, then I am sure we will avoid meaningless confrontations and arguments. Even when dealing with the hardest cases we will be able to make parliamentary discussions constructive. This is one of the necessary conditions for building a democratic state. In his speech, His Holiness focused on non-parliamentary opposition and I would like to dwell on the issue. We need to take into account that many dignified people who are in different parties have unfortunately stayed out of the parliamentary life as a result of elections. We initiated the establishment of political consulting council and I think all of us should attach a specific function to this idea or if necessary, seek other, more acceptable forms. The main purpose is that everyone with constructive potential gets involved in common state processes. We cannot allow ourselves to withdraw people that are needful for our country, without taking any notice of them. Edward Shevardnadze's words which he pronounced on the day of his inauguration were very important for me: "Our victory should not mean anyone's defeat". We should all try to turn these words into reality. The society should virtually feel this approach and attitude in their life.

I think it would be incorrect to devise the future activities of the Parliament without taking into consideration one of its most important functions – the Parliament being a school of democracy, the major institution for the establishment of democratic practices and traditions. After the period of anarchy which was a painful experience for our society, it has become clear for everyone that democracy does not mean chaos, impunity and lack of self control. But democracy is when the society, its every member lives in compliance with rather strict rules. The main basis of the democratic order is the representational principle of the government, relationships between the electorate and the elected which implies the whole set of

skills. I would put it so: The electorate has to realize the rights regarding the elected person as to what they can get from the deputy, the future local authority member in terms of protecting their rights in reality. Only full implementation of this principle will create the genuine foundation in our society for the realization of each citizen's rights. There was no such tradition in our society and that is why people often have a vague understanding of what to expect or demand from the representatives elected by them.

This causes a nihilistic attitude of the population to their government. It is a dangerous problem which must be overcome to create a strong and sustainable state. It is necessary that citizens trust their government, realize that government is theirs. Therefore, I am sure that the Parliament must devote a special attention to relations with public, our electorate. Decision making process in the Parliament should become totally understandable and I would say transparent for every citizen. The Parliament should turn into the most open state institution in Georgia. Similar to other countries, pupils, some groups of public even from remote regions should be admitted to plenary sessions of the Parliament of Georgia, so that they were able to see with their own eyes how the supreme body of the country works, what the lawmaking process is like, how the bills are discussed, enforced in life and what all this means to them and their families. The electorate should be able to see the above clearly. We need to bring up our electorate, so that they are more exacting towards us. We should apply the MP's accountability principle to real life. The electorate should believe that for the elected deputy he/she would represent the top authority.

Full publicity of the work of the Parliament and its structures is the basis for the above mentioned principles. We should give a new look at the relationships of the parliament with free mass media. Freedom of press is one of the earliest gains of Georgian democracy. Independent journalists must be deeply and fundamentally informed about the work of each separate structure of the Parliament and they should base their evaluations and if you wish, their criticism regarding our work only on the relevant information.

By the way, I would like to say that lately we often hear criticism of the Parliament from independent media, lots of talks about it being homogenous and non-national. Let's consider it as a natural syndrome, since in the previous Parliament, about 30 different parties were represented by one or two MPs while in

reality none of them had any power to take the burden of political responsibility in real terms upon themselves. It is hard for me to call to mind any democratic country in which parliaments were represented by more than two or three parties on their political arena for years. I am speaking of the most stable and fast developed countries of the world. If we think of the examples of Britain, the USA or Canada, we will see that they had a two-party system for decades. The existence of large parties, the process which has already started in Georgia, is the sign of stability and not that of the disagreement of diversity.

As for non-national character of the Parliament, I think it isn't even proper to discuss seriously, while there are dozens of people in this hall who have dedicated their lives to the idea of nationalism, those who have created today's image of Georgia. I am sure that most respectable people represent the Parliament today, the people who are able to make such a dignified Parliament indeed, that Georgia needs to have today.

I would like to conclude my speech saying that adopting a new Constitution, holding Presidential and Parliamentary elections gave a start to a new epoch in Georgia. Each citizen of our country can take pride in being the co-founder of a new Georgian democracy. This is a completely new phenomenon not only in Georgia but in the whole region.

Some countries have oil, some – gas, some gold and they build their welfare on these resources. You may smile and think it strange, but I am deeply convinced that the pledge of the success, strength and wealth of our country, lies not in any oil deposits, but rather in the democratic tradition, that is finally being established by adopting the Constitution. This is the way to investments, to our integration into the rest of the world – the integration with the security system and this is the way for Georgia to occupy its unique place in the modern world which will restore the sense of dignity in every citizen. These are democratic traditions and we, the Parliament, are the main guards of this treasure. This is our major function. Thank you very much.

Annex 3

Open Address of the Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia to the President of Georgia

Mr. President,

Georgian society is on the verge of fatal crisis. The existing situation includes the potential of civil confrontation and the gravest social cataclysms. Thus I feel obliged to publicly express many of my friends', associates' and my own position regarding the current processes.

The threat to our country is posed not by many problems that we are well aware of, but by the fact that population has no more trust and faith in the government that it is willing to solve the existing problems. Statements, speeches, declarations have lost their value. Speaking about future plans does not seem to make sense for that simple reason that the society does not believe in any promises the Government makes. Such distrust is caused by tragic incapacity and obviously fake actions taken to solve corruption problems. Lots of statements about corruption, no matter how harsh they might sound, have become meaningless, since over the past two-three years, against the background of such statements and endless talks, the overt corruption of state authorities has reached an unprecedented scale. Georgian society has always been willing to support the government for the benefit of the country. But it will never put up with the fact of the government living at their expense; nor will people tolerate the cynical way in which some top ranking officials demonstrate their life style.

The places erected in the capital and on the hills and mountains of its surroundings, most expensive luxury cars driven in our streets whose owners are known to everyone will always remain the symbol of presumptuous cynicism of high ranking state officials among the impoverished population. These places were built at the time when we were unable to pay out pensions, to supply the capital and regions with electricity, to implement the vital state functions. These villas were built not with the money earned from decent businesses but it was the money misappropriated by high officials, i.e. as a result of robbing people when you, the President of Georgia, many times declared corruption as the most dangerous and perilous problem which could victimize even our statehood.

Why and how can the poor pensioner or a desperate worker who has lost his bank accounts, or a scientist who has reached the poverty line believe that only those high ranking officials or their relatives had such an extraordinary talent of

entrepreneurship and commerce that they have managed to get so wealthy in two or three years, while the rest of the population got poorer and poorer? There is no argument for this, nor is there any explanation as to why foreign investors are leaving Georgia and moving offices to neighboring countries – why is it not possible to do small business in our country without being protected by an official or some influential clan?

All the above give rise to alarming reality and if our foreign friends, who three years ago spoke of Georgia with hope and enthusiasm, calling in the “country of opportunities”, today they have to face the truth and call us the “country of lost opportunities”.

I have many times expressed publicly my friends’ and my own attitude towards Edward Shevardnadze’s policy. I would like to reiterate that for me, he is not the President of today’s Georgia only. But he is the founder of an independent, democratic state. The person who managed to stop practically irreversible processes of Georgia’s collapse, who restored the order under complete chaos and total anarchy, who gave Georgian an extraordinary international function due to which our country’s development and stability occurred within the sphere of strategic interests of big states. That Georgia took the way of democratic development was his choice in the first place. He laid the foundation for the reforms without which we will never overcome the grave legacy of the Soviet period.

That is why we sincerely shared and advocated our policy even when it was necessary to take extremely unpopular decisions, when we had to make an inevitable decision about joining the CIS, when we were to approve “zero version” and many others. We know that carrying out the right, non-populist policy sometimes requires taking painful decisions and despite the disdainful, dirty words we could hear, we took these decisions together with you as we were confident it was a necessary thing to do for our country.

Every achievement, every success based on enormous dedication and hope of Georgian people that has been attained due to your hard work and personal commitment, be it the integration into the international community, most important transport or communication projects, withdrawal of military bases of an alien country from Georgia or any other deeds, can become void today and our incapability to respond to the challenge of total corruption can make all our efforts worthless.

Apart from corrupted officials, the current situation crates one more perilous circle and tend for the ideal environment to exist. I am talking about populism, which

often has the air of Soviet nostalgia. The loss of our society's last hope for novelty, democracy, building the strong Georgian state, will provide a wider arena for the above mentioned activities and you know best what result to anticipate. The signs of this threat are already obvious – this is the threat of new confrontations, total collapse of still immature state institutions. This is the threat of losing Georgian statehood once again.

The salvation is in taking actions, taking radical, decisive, and understandable for the society measures. You are the only person, who can make these decisions as you have all necessary legitimate and moral rights to do so, and you are the one who has made necessary and daring decisions for the state under even worse crisis.

Only by taking actions will we be able to return hope and belief to those people, suffering extreme hardship now, who have been creating material and intellectual wealth through many years of hard work. These people expect to hear from the government, in the least, that the hope is still there for their children and grandchildren to live with dignity and work for their own families and not for others'.

That is why the decisions you make today will determine the future of Georgia for many decades ahead.

I am sure that it is necessary to take intermediate radical changes in human resources, as well as institutional changes. Those authorities identified by the public as being corrupted due to their disputable property must leave the government. This should be followed by serious reforms in state management that will put a stop to never-ending confrontations within the executive power. It will ensure taking joint, coordinated efforts by economic team and give way to fundamental reforms of law enforcement bodies.

Mr. President,

I think there still is a chance to save the situation, avert the wave of confrontations and chaos. I am afraid this is the last chance not only for the government, but what's more fortunate, for today's society. Only a unified, strong and efficient government can take this chance. You are the one who has to make decisions and believe me, no matter how hard the struggle is going to be, my friends and I will stand by your side as always, to accomplish the building of an independent and democratic state which you have begun.

I can clearly see that the time limit is up and that delay will mean catastrophe. The choice you make is going to be really historic and fatal not only for the

government or one individual party, but for the whole society, the entire country. That is why, I allowed myself to say publicly what we have many times discussed together.

Sincerely,
Zurab Zhvania
Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia

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This book contains Zurab Zhvania's lectures on modern Georgian politics and the major principles of democratic state building. The book covers the main philosophical, historical and diplomatic aspects of the theory of democracy. This is used as a context to analyze modern Georgian politics and discuss the future development and problems of the democratic Georgian State. The book may be interesting for students of social and political sciences and related disciplines as well as for the readers interested in modern Georgian politics.

